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ABSTRACT  
 
Performance audit, compared to the traditional financial and compliance audits, is a 
relatively new innovation that emerged amidst accountability concerns in the public 
sector. Economic crises, ministerial scandal and inefficiencies were among the 
impetus that led the public to demand better performance and greater accountability in 
the public sector, and performance audit was among the many responses to such 
demand. In New Zealand, performance audit is carried out by the Controller and 
Auditor General (the AG) under the mandate granted by the Public Audit Act 2001. 
Adapting the methodology from grounded theory, this study looks at the impact of 
performance audit on seven entities audited in 2006 by the AG. This study found that 
the entities were impacted through the manifestation of implemented audit 
recommendations and the attainment of performance audit goals. In particular, there is 
a high acceptance and implementation rate to the audit recommendations made in the 
seven audits. The implementation of accepted recommendations consequently led to 
the changes within the entities in terms of managerial practices, as well as internal 
systems and processes. In some entities, these changes were translated into 
performance improvement, where the entities experienced changes in the way that 
they carried out their operations. However, based on interviewees’ accounts being the 
auditees of the audits, most interviewees viewed performance audit as having a 
greater role for performance accountability compared to performance improvement. 
Whilst the auditees found the audit recommendations useful, the impact on 
performance in their view has not been significant. Rather, the auditees viewed 
performance audit as having a more important role as an assurance tool in terms of 
their accountability to the public.  
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Chapter One – Introduction  
Chapter one provides an overview of the thesis. In particular, it introduces the 
concept of performance audit, provides a brief overview of the research and describes 
the structure of the thesis.  
 
“Performance auditing as a generic activity covers a broad range of activity. 
Defining it is not easy. An institutional approach of defining it as what auditors 
or audit institutions do is probably most useful since the issues concerning 
performance auditing relate to the institutions in the first instance.” (Shand and 
Anand, 1996, p.59) 
 
Chapter Introduction  
 
New Zealand is a democratic country that rests under the system of constitutional 
monarchy. Under the system, the Sovereign is the head of State, and Government is 
formed from a democratically elected House of Representatives (The Parliament, 
2010). The New Zealand Parliament is unicameral, where there is only one chamber 
and no upper house, and consists of the Sovereign and the House of Representatives 
(ibid). The Controller and Auditor General of New Zealand (the AG) is an Officer of 
the Parliament, who is independent of the Government but is answerable to the 
Parliament on matters of stewardship and public resources (Office of the Auditor 
General, 2010). In providing independent assurance to the Parliament as well as the 
public, the AG carries out statutory and discretionary work as specified by the Public 
Audit Act 2001, which includes performance audit. Historically, performance audit 
was introduced to provide assurance over accountability concerns in the public sector 
(Green and Singleton, 2009, p.107). At present, performance audit is gaining 
importance for its role of providing such assurance to the public.  
 
Performance audit is carried out by the AG under the authority of Section 16 (1) of 
the Public Audit Act 2001 (the Act). The section specifies that:  
The Auditor General may at any time examine 
(a) the extent to which a public entity is carrying out its activities effectively 
and efficiently:  
(b) a public entity’s compliance with its statutory obligations: 
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(c) any act or omission of a public entity, in order to determine whether 
waste has resulted or may have resulted or may result: 
(d) any act or omission showing or appearing to show a lack of probity or 
financial prudence by a public entity or 1 or more of its members, office 
holders, and employees.  
The Act allows for performance audits to be carried out on all public entities, with the 
exception of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand or any registered bank (Public Audit 
Act 2001, Section 16 (3)).  
 
The Office of the Auditor General (the OAG)1 describes performance audits as 
examining “matters of efficiency and effectiveness, waste, probity, compliance with 
statutory obligations, financial prudence, or any combination of these” (OAG, 2009b). 
Performance audit serves as an assurance to Parliament on programmes and issues of 
management by public entities. In a report published by the OAG in 2009, the OAG 
described performance audit as follows: 
“A performance audit can examine; 
§ How effectively and efficiently a public entity is working 
§ Whether a public entity is complying with its statutory obligations  
§ Any act or omission that might waste public resources; and  
§ Any act or omission that might show (or appear to show) a lack of probity or 
financial prudence by a public entity or one or more of its members, office holders, 
or employees.”  (OAG, 2009a, p.5) 
 
A Peer Review Team that reviewed the efficiency and effectiveness of the OAG 
reported that in 2007-08, the total estimated cost for the Performance Audit Group 
was around $2.4 million (OAG, 2008, p.50). This amount followed a significant 
increase in funding allocated to the OAG for performance auditing in 2004, which has 
also been reflected in a steady increase in the number of performance audits carried 
out, for example from 10 audits in 2004-05 to 15 audits in 2006-07. In addition, the 
Peer Review report records that most audits cost between $170,000 and $230,000 and 
generally take between 9 and 12 months to complete (ibid).  
 
 
                                                 
1 The title ‘Audit Office’ was used prior to the passage of the Public Audit Act 2001. Hence, ‘Audit 
Office’ will be used in this thesis in discussions of the OAG prior to 2001. 
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1.1 Terms and Definitions  
 
Performance auditing has its own set of nomenclature, although different countries 
and academics use different terms to describe it. They include value for money audit, 
comprehensive audit, efficiency audit and operational audit. The different terms do 
not entail markedly different concepts, as most of them encapsulate auditing of a 
similar nature. In the earlier days of performance auditing however, very few writers 
attempted to find this common ground or elucidate what they understand by the 
auditing concept (Parker, 1986, p.6). A closer review into the usage and conceptual 
application of the nomenclature by Parker (1986) revealed that “the differences 
between these various terms are insignificant and that essentially they refer to a 
common form of auditing” (p.11). In a broad sense, this ‘common form of auditing’ 
concerns the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public sector operations. The 
definitions and conceptual application of these three E’s differ across jurisdictions, 
largely depending on the mandate, respective AGs, and their interpretations of the 
mandate.  According to Glynn (1987, p.5), the focal point of this divergence is in the 
term ‘effectiveness’. He stated that: “Effectiveness tends to be thought of in a variety 
of different ways; for example, cost-effectiveness, management effectiveness, 
effectiveness of the management information system, and the effectiveness of 
government programs.” In most countries, including New Zealand, the line is drawn 
on government policies, hence the term ‘effectiveness’ generally applies to areas of 
management accountability other than policies (ibid). Adopting the definition of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness as used by the UK National Audit Office, 
Bourn (2007, p.57) presented the definitions of these aspects as in Figure 1.  
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The term used in New Zealand is ‘performance audit’, following the mandate 
specified by the Public Audit Act 2001, a term which this study also uses. It is worth 
noting that prior to the passage of the Public Audit Act, there were several other terms 
used in the literature of performance audit in New Zealand, in particular operational 
audit (Colquhoun, 2005) and value for money audit (Jacobs, 1998).  
 
1.2 Research Background  
 
This research places performance audit within the accountability and performance 
framework of the New Zealand public sector, particularly in terms of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. This activity is relatively new for the AG compared to 
his other mandates, arising from public demand (Green and Singleton, 2009, p.107) 
and concerns over non-financial aspects of public sector performance in the 1960s 
(Colquhoun, 2005). In the late 1980s there was a major public sector reform which 
shifted the principles underlying public sector practices. In particular, the application 
of New Public Management (NPM) doctrines subsequently heightened the focus over 
performance and accountability in the public sector. The three E’s became 
synonymous with the doctrine as economy, efficiency and effectiveness emerge as 
Economy 
Minimising the cost of resources used for an activity while having regard to 
appropriate quality 
Efficiency 
The relationship between outputs, in terms of goods, services or other results, 
and the resources used to produce them. An efficient activity maximises output 
for a given input, or minimises input for a given output and, in so doing, pays 
due regard to appropriate quality 
Effectiveness 
The extent to which objectives have been achieved and the relationship between 
the intended impacts and actual impacts of an activity achieved.  
Definition of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Figure 1 
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dominant themes in the restructuring. With these in mind, public managers were given 
greater accountability for performance (Mulgan, 2001). The legal framework for the 
public sector was revised and new mandates introduced, for example the State Sector 
Act 1988, Public Finance Act 1989, Local Government Act 1989, and more recently 
Crown Entities Act 2004, in addition to the Public Audit Act 2001. A number of 
performance and accountability mechanisms were also introduced within this 
framework, in line with the principles of NPM such as performance audit and 
requirements to present Statements of Service Performance (SSP). New Zealand was 
not alone in embracing NPM and performance audit, but rather was part of an 
international movement which included countries like Canada, Australia and most of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member 
countries (OECD, 1996).  
 
The widespread adoption of NPM and performance audit attracted significant 
attention internationally. In June 1995, a symposium attended by OECD member 
countries in Paris discussed key issues relating to performance management and 
accountability within the NPM framework, specifically issues relating to performance 
audit. Among the broad areas discussed were the role of performance audit in NPM, 
the objectives and effectiveness of performance audit, and the association between 
performance improvement and accountability in terms of performance audit (ibid). 
The symposium focused on the different conceptual definitions, legislative 
arrangements and the application of the performance audit concept across the 
different OECD countries. The period between the 1980s and the 1990s saw a rise in 
performance audit literature through authors like Parker (1986), Glynn (1987), Jacobs 
(1998), and Guthrie and Parker (1999). Like the symposium, these studies also 
focussed on the theoretical aspects of performance audit, the conceptual application in 
practice, and its development in specific contexts. Parker, Glynn and Guthrie and 
Parker for example, focussed on performance audit in Australia. However, little was 
done to study performance audit in practice, as greater attention was given to the 
theoretical and conceptual aspects of performance audit as an innovation in the public 
sector.  
 
The literature on performance audit generally agrees that it is a social construction, 
whereby its characteristics are largely constructed by contextual surroundings. For 
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example, influential groups or ‘epistemic communities’ play a vital role in shaping 
performance audit in a particular context (Jacobs, 1998). Jacobs suggests that 
performance audit was a ‘solution’ provided by the Audit Office (as an epistemic 
community) for a set of perceived ‘problems’ in the public sector, and this solution is 
‘flexible and contestable’, defined by the problems of the day. Performance audit is 
also likened to a masquerade by Guthrie and Parker (1999) as the changing attitude 
and concepts of various groups “constitute the changes in masks and costumes that 
takes place between scenes in the drama, or changes in dramatic presentation from 
masque to masque” (p.328). These authors found that performance audit practice 
evolves over time according to the context that it is in, for example the political and 
economic moulds of a particular country. This dependency on context provides a 
significant area for research, as there is much to learn and understand at a particular 
time period, in a particular country. My study focuses on performance audit in New 
Zealand in the early 21st century, specifically focussing on seven performance audits 
carried out in 2006.  It is expected that these performance audits will reflect the events 
leading to the practice in the present day, including the relevant legal, political and 
economic context of New Zealand.  
 
This research aims to study the impact of performance audit on seven entities audited 
in 2006, by capturing the practices of performance audit in New Zealand. Whilst there 
has been a body of literature on performance audit towards the end of the 20th century, 
there have been very few studies on performance audit in New Zealand. Furthermore, 
these studies largely focus on theoretical aspects of the relatively new and emerging 
concept. Studying the impact of performance audits allows an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the audit recommendations, subsequently the 
practicality and usefulness of this type of audit. It is important to note that such 
assessment should not depend solely on the number of recommendations implemented 
by the audited entities. Morin (2001) points out that AGs usually use this criterion to 
measure the success of performance audits although it indicates little of the actual 
impact and influence of the audit. She further questions; “Does the Auditor General 
make any real difference in public administration through VFM audit practice?” and 
notes that this has not been clearly answered in the literature (p.99). This research 
hence, seeks to answer the research question:  
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“What is the impact of performance audit on seven entities audited in 2006 by 
the New Zealand Office of the Auditor General?”  
In answering the research question, research methods from grounded theory are 
adopted, although not in their entirety.  Grounded theory is a methodology that builds 
a theory from data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.1). However, since this research does 
not aim for theory building, only certain aspects of grounded theory methodology are 
adopted. In particular, this research seeks to gain knowledge through the data derived 
directly from practice, without imposing any a priori knowledge. Data in the form of 
performance audit reports, official documents and interview transcriptions are 
analysed for emerging concepts. The analysis involves note-taking and memo-writing 
in the earliest stages, and is extended to coding and conceptualisation at later stages. 
The analysis however, is not a straight forward process; instead it is an iterative 
process involving multiple data gathering, analysis, concept generation and questions 
over the concepts generated. At the end of the analysis, findings are presented in the 
form of themes that emerged, which provides valuable insights into performance audit 
practice and the impact that these audits have on the audited entities, thereby 
contributing to the current knowledge on performance audit.  
 
Thesis Structure  
 
The remainder of the thesis is constructed as follows. The next two chapters discuss 
relevant literature, as well as the emergence and development of performance audit, 
particularly in the New Zealand setting. Chapter four explains the theoretical basis of 
the research by outlining the framework and methodology adopted. At the heart of 
this paper are chapters five and six which present the findings of the studies, and the 
analysis and discussion of the findings. Chapter seven provides the conclusion and 
limitations of this research, and presents fruitful areas for future research on and 
practice of performance audit.  
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Chapter Two – Literature Review  
Chapter two provides a discussion of literature on the international emergence and 
development of performance audit. It also identifies areas for further inquiry on 
performance audit, which this study then seeks to explore.  
 
 “…the high degree of independence necessarily accorded the Auditor 
General, combined with the contested and emerging nature of performance 
audit, will continue to make personalities and organisational culture 
important in this field. Proper consideration of these factors will remain 
central to any assessment of public sector performance audit.”  (Hamburger, 
1989, p.19) 
 
Chapter Introduction  
 
Performance audit is a relatively recent innovation introduced in many countries to 
assess matters of efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. It is prevalent 
predominantly in democratic countries like the United States (US), the United 
Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia and New Zealand in response to increasing public 
demand. This chapter looks specifically at what caused the international emergence, 
and subsequently the rise of performance audit. In doing so, the chapter discusses the 
dynamics of performance audit in terms of the mandate, approach and practice of 
performance audit in several democratic countries. The relative recency of the 
innovation has left some questions regarding performance audit unanswered, some of 
which this study will attempt to answer.  
 
2.1 International Emergence and Growth of Performance Audit  
 
The concerns over the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector can be traced 
back to the 1960s in several democratic countries including New Zealand. In the 
literature, there were competing claims over the origins of performance audit, with 
several authors claiming it is an innovation of the US, whilst others claiming it as a 
Canadian innovation. For example, according to Green and Singleton (2009, 116): 
“The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) was the pioneer of 
comprehensive auditing after the Second World War. Government spending 
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programmes, especially the military sphere, were assessed for the efficiency with 
which they used resources, and for the effectiveness with which they accomplished 
their objectives.” 
However, Glynn (1985a, p. 113) on the other hand claimed that: “Canada was first to 
adopt VFM auditing, which together with regulatory audit requirements, is called in 
their terminology ‘Comprehensive Auditing’”. Despite this contradiction, there is a 
general agreement that increasing concerns over efficiency and effectiveness of the 
public sector were becoming apparent in the 1960s, consequently leading to the 
emergence of performance audit. In recognising the importance of government 
spending, the GAO for example, “devoted progressively more resources” to assessing 
efficiency and effectiveness during the 1960s (Green and Singleton, 2009, p. 116). In 
New Zealand, Colquhoun (2005) found that there were serious concerns about 
efficiency issues in local governments that led to ‘special investigations’ of local 
councils in 1964.  
 
Concerns over government spending and changing public attitudes provided an 
impetus to the early traces of performance audit. In the UK for example, public 
expenditure was rising dramatically, “often by more than ten percent per annum” 
(Glynn, 1985a, p.114). Like the UK, New Zealand was also experiencing increases in 
government expenditure, which was added to by “ministerial scandal” and 
“departmental incompetence” (Skene, 1985, p.271). Skene further noted that these 
problems led to “public agitation at the inability of the executive to provide reasons 
for its policy choice and take responsibility for poor performance”. As a result of 
these concerns and ‘public agitation’, the public was increasingly demanding greater 
accountability for performance in public sector activities. Green and Singleton (2009, 
p.107) wrote: 
“Indeed there was an upturn in public demand for information on the activities of 
public sector entities. In New Zealand and overseas people became less trusting of 
public servants and elected representatives, and started to call for greater 
transparency.”  
The changing public attitude led governments towards greater emphasis on 
accountability to the public and ratepayers. Governments across the world started to 
respond to these demands for greater accountability by introducing performance audit 
mandates in their respective countries.  
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In the 1970s, governments responded further to the increasing public demand for 
greater efficiency and effectiveness by giving performance audit statutory backing. In 
Canada and New Zealand for example, a mandate for the Auditors General to carry 
out performance audit was introduced in 1977. The Canadian mandate was given by 
the Auditor General Act 1977, whilst the New Zealand mandate was introduced 
through the passage of the Public Finance Act 1977 (Glynn, 1985a). Australia was not 
far behind in this movement, having introduced the mandate for performance audit 
with the 1979 Amendment to the Audit Act 1901 (ibid). This development continued 
well into the 1980s and the 1990s, with more countries taking the step to recognise 
performance audit as part of their accountability arrangements. According to Bourn 
(2007, p.4): 
“In more recent times a number of countries have introduced significant changes to 
the remit and operation of their state audit offices. A common objective has been to 
give statutory authority to carry out performance or value for money audits. In Italy 
for example, major new audit legislation was enacted in 1994 that enhanced the 
role of the Corte de Conti and facilitated the development of performance audit. In 
Ireland, the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act was passed in 
1993, extending the post’s remit and placing performance audit on a statutory 
footing.” 
 
The statutory backing given to performance audit led Auditors General into a whole 
new turf, beyond their conventional financial and compliance audit. Morin (2001 
p.99) suggested that:  
“The advent of the VFM audit led auditors into totally new territory to them, for 
they were henceforth called on to evaluate just how economical, effective, and 
efficient the management of the organisation they audited actually was. Auditors 
had never before been so closely involved in the management of public bodies.”  
The change in remit consequently entailed several benefits and risks to the Auditors 
General and the Audit Offices. According to Green and Singleton (2009, p.116), on 
the one hand the “expansion into new areas was invigorating, and could add to the 
weight and prestige of public offices”. However, on the other hand, it would also 
require appointment of external consultants and recruitment of new personnel with 
non-accountancy backgrounds, which could subsequently “cut into the resources 
available for attest and compliance auditing” (ibid). Green and Singleton further add 
that the expansion into economy, efficiency and effectiveness would require 
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development of performance indicators, which would be a challenging task, and 
misinterpretation of performance audit reports by ministers and government would 
consequently thrust auditors increasingly into the political arena. Nevertheless, 
despite these risks, the statutory mandate ensured the continual presence of 
performance audit in many democratic countries.  
 
Performance audit and subsequently the changes to the remit of the Auditors General 
were coincidental to a wider international movement called the New Public 
Management (NPM). The adoption of this new public sector philosophy started to 
gain momentum in the 1970s (Hood, 1991). Similar to performance audit, the 
movement arose from concerns in the public sector, as well as rising public demand 
for greater accountability for performance (Mulgan, 2001). As a result, the philosophy 
entailed an emphasis on devolving responsibilities and hence accountability to public 
sector managers. Mulgan further adds:  
“Under the new approach (NPM), control over public agencies was to be exercised 
in terms of ex post monitoring and performance measurement rather than through 
compliance with ex ante rules and directions. Emphasis was thus placed on the 
articulation of clear objectives and on developing accurate and independently 
verifiable means of assessing how far these objectives had been achieved. The 
more measurable and unambiguous the indicators of performance, the more 
agencies and managers could be held accountable in terms of results and therefore 
liberated from the deadening influence of input and process controls.” (p.27)  
The change in the underlying public sector philosophy towards NPM triggered 
widespread public sector reforms in many countries, including New Zealand (Hood, 
1991). With the rise of these reforms and performance audit, the notions of 
accountability and performance consequently took centre stage in many democratic 
governments, and were given greater emphasis than ever before. 
 
2.2 Accountability and Performance in the Public Sector  
 
The concerns over public spending, and consequently the widespread public sector 
reforms and introduction of performance audit mandates pushed the concept of public 
accountability into prominence. Glynn (1985a, p.119) reported that the Canadian 
definition of performance audit given by the Canadian Comprehensive Auditing 
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Foundation regarded “accountability relationships” as a crucial idea. The definition 
was based on:  
“…the assumption that those who delegate responsibility should reasonably expect 
to receive, in return, an appropriate account of the discharge of the responsibilities 
conferred. It is an examination of the principles and practice by which 
responsibility is discharged by those who manage public funds.” (ibid)  
Glynn added that “the introduction of value for money auditing in Canada was 
accompanied by a number of other institutional innovations, all of which were 
designed to increase the accountability of public sector organisations” (p.126). New 
Zealand provided a similar case where the introduction of performance audit to the 
mandate to the Auditor General was also closely linked to the notion of 
‘accountability’. Skene (1985, p.271) went further by adding that: “In practical terms, 
its (Audit Office) involvement has gone some way towards redefining the concept of 
accountability for bureaucrats responsible for public spending”. 
 
Indeed the concept of accountability was redefined by the significant changes in the 
public sector. Glynn (1996) found that changes brought about by NPM and 
performance audit were allied to the “changes in the nature of accountability” (p.128). 
This is particularly the case in areas of performance audit where the expanded remit 
of the Auditors General reflected the accountability of public sector managers beyond 
traditional financial and compliance auditing.  With the significant changes in the 
public sector, “public accountability is thus considered to be a broader concept than 
financial accountability…The auditor’s role would therefore seem to be that of 
ensuring that management processes and accountability are clearly linked” (p.129). 
This view is supported by Roth (1996, p. 253) who noted that:  
“In the past, employers were, in effect, held accountable for their compliance with 
rules and procedures. Now that employees are being asked to achieve results and 
are only given broad boundaries within which to make decisions, they should be 
held accountable for the results achieved with the resources entrusted to them.” 
 
It is therefore not surprising that the role and goals of performance audit were directly 
targeted at accountability of the government and public sector managers towards the 
public. On the role of performance audit, Glynn (1985b, p.18) suggested that: 
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“Accountability in the public sector occurs when both politicians and the public at 
large are assured that the public funds are being spent efficiently, economically and 
on programmes that are effective. VFM auditing assists this process by reporting 
upon management’s performance at both central and devolved government levels.” 
Glynn’s sentiments on the role of performance audit was echoed by Morin (2001) 
who emphasised the importance of trust and confidence of the public, and also the 
importance of the Auditors General in keeping that trust and confidence with the 
public administration. She advocated for the central role of Auditors General and 
performance audit to maintain the trust and confidence in terms of the accountability 
in the public sector. She noted that:  
 “…their (Auditors General) work may, from time to time, negatively affect public 
trust in a particular institution or administration, but the very existence of this work 
and its ability to examine and report publicly and independently should give the 
public some assurance concerning the overall system.” (p.99) 
She further added:  
“Auditors General, through VFM audits performed in public organisations, 
represent, in a way, citizens’ voice in trying to induce changes in those 
organisations. To do so, as guardians of the public purse, auditors disclose wastes 
of public funds hoping that better management practices in the management of 
government will occur after the audit.” (p.115) 
These roles of providing assurance on accountability matters and creating ‘better 
management practices’ reflected the overarching goals of performance audit.  
 
According to Barzelay (1996), there are two “related, but not identical” (p.40) goals 
of performance audit, namely performance accountability and performance 
improvement. However, which one of the two is the primary goal remains arguable. 
Barzelay wrote: 
“NPM doctrines would seem to suggest that the principal goal of performance 
auditing should be performance improvement rather than accountability. As NPM 
doctrines are not universally embraced however, it seems better to take on board 
only the uncontroversial goal of performance accountability.” (p.20)  
Performance accountability emphasises the “accountability relationships” as 
explained by Glynn (1985a, p.119), hence “is concerned with establishing and 
operating proper relationships between government organisations and their principals 
so that the latter can enforce responsibility for performance on their agents” 
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(Barzelay, 1996, p.40). Performance improvement, on the other hand, concentrated on 
“achieving desired changes in efficiency and effectiveness (and other dimensions such 
as performance management capacity)” (ibid). Although theoretically it is easy to 
separate these concepts, this is not the case in practice. It is difficult to isolate the 
achievement of performance accountability and performance improvement through 
performance audit. The relation between performance accountability and performance 
improvement further adds to the difficulty in isolating the achievement of each goal in 
practice.  
 
In the literature, there are competing views on the relation that performance 
accountability and performance improvement share. Barzelay (1996) for example, 
suggested that there is a trade off between these two goals, whilst Roth (1996, p.249) 
argued that “it is possible to have improved performance and enhanced accountability 
in government”. Upholding both goals at the same time was argued to be a challenge 
because they are claimed to be competing concepts. In particular, Barzelay (1996, 
p.40) argued that the concepts are not synergistic and hence cannot be pursued 
simultaneously.  On the one hand, negative publicity of performance audit reports 
may support the goal of performance accountability, but at the same time may create 
managerial defensiveness and hence hinder performance improvement. However, on 
the other hand, auditors being closely involved with management of the public sector 
advances the goal of performance improvement, but may risk crossing the fine line of 
auditor independence and consequently impairing auditor’s capability in supporting 
performance accountability (ibid). In addition, Barzelay also added that:  
“…even when a move that benefits performance improvement has no direct 
negative effect on performance accountability, the two goals will still be in tension 
owing to the fact that one set of activity will tend to crowd the other if they both 
draw upon the same pool of resources.” (ibid)  
 
However, Barzelay’s view was not shared by Roth (1996) who postulated that both 
goals can be achieved synergistically. Roth’s argument centred on the importance of 
the achievement of results, which will enable the achievement of both performance 
accountability and performance improvement. In particular, he argued that holding 
public managers accountable for achieving results is effectively holding public 
managers responsible for performance improvement. Despite these differing views in 
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terms of the relationship between the two goals of performance audit, both authors did 
not offer evidence from practice to support their argument. A study into the 
achievement of performance audit in practice therefore, would contribute to the 
debate on the relationship of performance accountability and performance 
improvement, and consequently improve understanding of the milestones that 
performance audit has achieved since its emergence.  
 
2.3 Approaches to Performance Audit 
 
Apart from redefining accountability and bringing about goals for performance 
accountability and performance improvement, the rise of performance audit also 
entailed different approaches across different countries (Glynn, 1985a; Shand and 
Anand, 1996; OECD, 1996). These different approaches centred on the focus and 
emphasis of Auditors General in carrying out performance audit. The New Zealand 
Audit Office for example, “examine selected areas or programmes within an 
organisation” by examining “relevant statutory obligations, policy aims that arise 
therefrom and the planned tasks that have been taken to implement policy aims during 
the period under review” (Glynn, 1985a, p.121). The Canadian Auditor General on 
the other hand, advanced performance audit “as a means of improving performance” 
(OECD, 1996, p.81). In doing so, the Canadian approach placed greater emphasis on 
reviewing results “rather than systems and procedures in making its assessments” 
(ibid).  
 
The different mandate given in different jurisdictions, as well as the different 
approaches to performance audit should consequently lead to different practices of 
performance audit. However, currently there is limited information documented in 
this regard. In undertaking a comparative study of performance audit across different 
jurisdictions, Glynn (1985a, p.113) noted that his findings “discuss mainly the 
philosophy and recommended techniques of undertaking performance audit”. He 
added that; “…little documentary evidence is available on what actually happens in 
practice. Therefore, an important caveat is that there may be wide divergence between 
the recommended approaches and actual practice” (ibid). Hence, although the 
different approaches to performance audit have garnered much interest in the 
literature, very little work was done to study performance audit in practice. This area 
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is important, particularly in assessing the achievement of performance audit against 
the expectations set during its international emergence and recognition.  
 
2.4 Performance Audit as a Social Construction 
 
The varied approaches to performance audit demonstrate its nature as a social 
construct. In particular, performance audit displays traits of the economic and political 
concerns surrounding it. Previous studies looking particularly at the development of 
performance audit confirmed this constructionist nature of performance audit 
(Hamburger, 1989; Jacobs, 1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1999). However, different 
processes of social construction were proposed by different studies, reflecting the 
influence of context on performance audit. Hamburger (1989) for example, places 
emphasis on the role of the Auditor General of the Australian Audit Office (AAO) in 
shaping the direction and role of performance audit in Australia between 1974 and 
1987. He does not however dismiss the importance of other institutional factors like 
internal management changes and independent external report on the AAO. Whilst the 
influence of the players in the process moulds performance audit within that setting, a 
later study found that it is the interaction of these players that play as the key 
determinant of the nature and role of performance audit (Guthrie and Parker, 1999). In 
studying events that occur between 1973 and 1998 around the Australian National 
Audit Office2, Guthrie and Parker likened the evolution of performance audit with a 
masquerade, where in the ‘dramatic play’, “the sponsors, actors and audience 
continually create and revise the execution of the drama” (p.327). While agreeing to 
the contestable role of the players, Jacobs (1998) however, opted to present the 
performance audit scene in a different manner. Adopting an approach from public 
policy, performance audit is seen as a solution to the problem defined by the Audit 
Office. Studying the events between 1975 and 1997 in the New Zealand public sector, 
Jacobs argued that the Audit Office had to compete for opportunities with other 
‘epistemic communities’ like the Treasury and the State Services Commission in 
defining the problems and subsequently providing solutions to the executive 
government. Despite these differences in view however, this constructionist nature 
                                                 
2 Hamburger (1989) and Guthrie and Parker (1999) used different names in their studies, but both 
Australian Audit Office and Australian National Audit Office used in their studies represent the same 
audit institution. 
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proposed by prior literature supports the importance of continual study into 
performance audit, as it is evidently vulnerable to changes in its surrounding 
environment.  
 
2.5 Gaps in the Literature of Performance Audit    
 
Being a relatively recent innovation, there has been increasing interest in the literature 
regarding performance audit. For example, there were a number of studies undertaken 
to review the different mandate and approaches across different countries, which 
include Glynn (1985a), OECD (1996) and Shand and Anand (1996).  The 1996 
symposium held by the OECD member countries mentioned in Chapter 1 also offered 
comprehensive discussion on issues pertaining to the mandate and application of 
performance audit. However, as Glynn (1985a, p.113) noted, these studies tended to 
focus on the “philosophy and recommended techniques” adopted in embracing the 
new concept. In addition, there were also longitudinal studies carried out to study the 
development, and consequently the nature of performance audit. Jacobs (1998) and 
Guthrie and Parker (1999) in particular, found performance audit to be socially 
constructed, in which its surrounding environment will have influence in practice. 
Being a social construct also means that over time the dynamics of performance audit 
will change to adapt to the evolving political, economic and social climate. This will 
in turn, be different across the different countries adopting performance audit as each 
country is faced with its own circumstances. It is therefore, crucial that studies in this 
area continue to maintain and enhance the current knowledge base.  
 
There are currently limited studies that look at performance audit in practice. A recent 
study carried out by Morin (2001) noted that the improvement brought about by 
performance audit in practice has actually never been empirically tested (p.99). Her 
study, which focused on the influence that performance audit recommendations had 
on performance improvement of audited entities, found that “four of the six audits 
analysed were not very successful” in influencing the auditees through the audit 
recommendations (p.110). She thus argued that the number of recommendations 
should not be the measure of audit success, as the number of recommendations 
accepted do not reflect the influence or impact that performance audit has on the 
auditee. Her views echoed an earlier view advanced by Hamburger (1989, p.17), who 
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suggested: “A 75 percent acceptance rate (of recommendations) might not imply 
success, for example, if the rejected recommendations were the most important”. 
These arguments are important given that Auditors General typically follow up on the 
audits that they have carried out on the basis of recommendations accepted. A Follow-
Up Report done by the New Zealand OAG for example (OAG, 2009a) largely draws 
their assessment on the basis of the acceptance rate of the audit recommendations. In 
particular, the Office found that, for the fourteen performance audits that they carried 
out on in 2007, the number of recommendations implemented was nearly 94% (p.7). 
However, such assessment provided no answer as to how the implementations of 
these recommendations impacted the auditees. Furthermore, as Morin (2001, p.102) 
suggested:  
“It would be worthwhile to go further and explore why, for instance, managers 
have accepted and implemented auditor’s recommendations: is it because they 
believe that the auditor’s recommendations were in the best interest of the 
organisation, or is it because, by doing so, they avoided considerable problems for 
themselves and their organisation.”  
 
A few studies in the literature have looked at the aspect of performance audit impact, 
and in most cases as part of broader issues studied. One of the few examples is a study 
done by Hatherly and Parker (1988), which looked at the actual outcomes of 
performance audit in terms of the audit objectives, audit report format and auditee 
responses. They stipulated that the variant approaches undertaken by the Auditor 
General of the Australian Audit Office (AAO) and Victorian Auditor General (VAG) 
appeared to result in different actual outcomes in terms of auditee acceptance or 
rejection of the audit recommendations, and hence left different impact on the 
auditees. Based on their sample, Hatherly and Parker also found that the acceptance 
rate on the recommendations by the AAO was 57%, whilst the acceptance rate for the 
VAG was 69% (p.34). Another insight was shared by Shand and Anand (1996) on the 
effects of programme evaluations conducted by the Office of the Comptroller General 
of Canada on the auditees. They noted that “over 80% of evaluations led to no 
substantial or visible programme change” (p.74). In addition, as aforementioned the 
study by Morin (2001, p.110) found that “four out of the six audits analysed were not 
very successful” in influencing the auditees, implying that these audits left very little 
impact on the auditees. Morin also went a step further by stating: “This comes down 
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to saying that VFM audits of public administrations performed by auditors can be 
practically exercised in futility” (ibid).  
 
Prior literature concerning the impact of performance audit therefore, seems to 
question the impact of these audits in practice, particularly on the auditees. 
Nevertheless, the literature generally acknowledged that more can be studied in the 
area, a call which this study seeks to answer. Hatherly and Parker (1988) for example, 
noted that their study was a “limited inference” (p.37) which provided “preliminary 
evidence as to certain apparent outcomes of performance audit” (p.21). On this basis 
they concluded that: “Given the paucity of available research results relating to 
performance audit operations and impact, this study represents but a first step in an 
urgently needed field of investigation” (p. 39). The need for more research into the 
impact of performance audit was supported by Trodden (1996. p.162) who states: 
“…how to measure the success of performance audits is an area that needs greater 
attention in the (Inspectors General) community”. Shand and Anand (1996) however, 
warned that it would be a difficult task. Measuring the impact of performance audit 
will not only be dependant on interpretations, but is also exposed to various other 
variants that may also impact the auditees and the audit subject. Despite this 
difficulty, it is however an area worth exploring, given the dearth of current studies on 
the impact of performance audit.   
 
2.6  Problem Statement  
 
These issues pertaining to the practice of performance audit clearly demonstrate that 
there is much to learn from it. My study, therefore, aims to provide invaluable insights 
into performance audit practice, particularly in New Zealand in the early twenty first 
century. It looks at how performance audit carried out by the OAG impacted seven 
audited entities in 2006. This area is currently largely unexplored, as performance 
audit in practice has received very little attention from academia. My study therefore, 
seeks to improve the knowledge of performance audit, particularly on the impact that 
it has on the auditees. It is hoped that the results of this research will contribute to 
more fruitful debates to enhance the impact of performance audit in the public sector, 
consequently contributing to the current knowledge base of performance audit.  
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Chapter Conclusion  
 
The literature review highlighted important characteristics and dynamics of 
performance audit. In particular, its emergence over prevailing concerns in the public 
sector created an emphasis on accountability and performance, which subsequently 
led to statutory recognition of performance audit in many democratic countries, 
including New Zealand. Coincident to the international rise of performance audit was 
a widespread public sector reform brought about by a new philosophy, NPM, which 
together with performance audit redefined the concept of accountability in the public 
sector. These changes within the public sector set the role of performance audit to 
providing assurance to the public on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the 
public sector. In doing so, performance audit is not only targeted at improving 
performance, but also in enhancing public accountability through the reporting of 
public activities in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. However, there 
were competing views regarding the relationship between accountability for 
performance and performance improvement. To contribute to this debate, a closer 
look into the achievement of these goals in practice is needed. Furthermore, given that 
performance audit is viewed as a social construct, there is a need for continual study 
on performance audit, particularly in the area of its practice where studies have been 
very limited. The limited studies on this area found that there were misconceptions 
regarding the acceptance rate of audit recommendations and actual improvement in 
performance. There is to date, very little evidence offered on whether performance 
audit has achieved what it aspired to offer. Therefore, more attention needs to be 
given to the achievements of performance audit in practice, particularly because the 
dearth of studies in this area widens the knowledge gap between practice and the 
academia. My study on performance audit practice hopes to narrow this knowledge 
gap by contributing insights from practice, particularly in terms of the impact that 
performance audit has on the auditees.  
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Chapter Three – Performance Audit  
Chapter three discusses the emergence and development of performance audit in New 
Zealand. How performance audit emerged and evolved is imperative to this study as it 
will aid greater understanding of the current practice of performance audit. 
 
“We realize that, to understand experience, that experience must be located 
within and can’t be divorced from the larger events in a social, political, cultural, 
racial, gender-related, informational, and technological framework and 
therefore these are essential aspects of our analyses.” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
p.8) 
 
Chapter Introduction  
 
The importance of performance audit is generally overlooked due to its relatively 
recent existence. However, it is gaining recognition over time as emphasis on 
performance improvement and accountability mounts and the public service evolves 
into a new era. Bourn (2007, p.2) notes that the modern public administration is a shift 
away from state control to a higher degree of privatisation and market control. 
Aligned with this shift is greater emphasis on public accountability, reflecting the 
behavioural change of public consumers as well as the devolvement of accountability 
from the state to public sector managers. This shift is aligned with efforts made by 
AGs to promote reviews on systems, programmes and output of public entities, both 
at central and local levels.  Several decades ago however, the expansion of such 
reviews was not possible due to the inward focus of the public sector (hence dearth of 
performance indicators), lack of skills and resources, and most importantly, the 
absence of a mandate. The development of audit mandates into efficiency and 
effectiveness of programmes started around the 1960s (Shand and Anand, 1996), and 
reached its pinnacle around the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, historically the audit mandate for the AG was expanded to 
meet the increasing demand for accountability in the public sector. This case is true in 
many countries including New Zealand, where traditional financial and compliance 
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audits were deemed insufficient to match the changing scene of the public sector. As 
Skene (1985) explains;  
“The inability of traditional legal methods of budgetary and financial control to 
cope with vastly increased budgets has resulted in moves to transform the 
budgetary process and shift the focus from questions of legality to issues of 
management.”  (p.285) 
These issues of management have been known to incorporate the elements of widely 
termed ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’. Following this development, many 
countries extended the remit of their Auditors General to include an audit of the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public entities.  
 
3.1 Emergence of Performance Audit in New Zealand 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of performance auditing in the 
public sector has been around since the 1960s, pervasive in countries like Canada, the 
United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and New Zealand. Among 
the early adopters was Canada, a county which Pallot (1991) claimed to be the leader 
of the technology in Westminster-style governments. The passage of the Auditor 
General Act 1977 introduced a new mandate for performance auditing in Canada, and 
New Zealand’s approach has been said to follow closely that of Canada’s (Glynn, 
1985b). For example, in the 1980s there were exchanges of ideas and personnel 
between the OAG and Canada’s federal Audit Office which assisted in strengthening 
of the practice in New Zealand (Pallot, 1991). Although this might seem to imply that 
the concept arrived in New Zealand around 1970s – 1980s, the literature suggests that 
this might not be the case. Traces of performance auditing can be found earlier amidst 
concerns over efficiency in local governments. The concern was later developed and 
embedded in central government departments and the practice was consequently 
given statutory authority.  
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3.2 Performance Audit in New Zealand  
 
 
Figure 2 outlines significant events relevant to the emergence and evolvement of 
performance audit in New Zealand. Unlike statutory financial and compliance audits, 
performance audit is a relatively new concept. In New Zealand, there was no 
immediate acceptance of this new form of auditing, with initial resistance coming 
from politicians and other control agencies like the Treasury. As illustrated in Figure 
2, there was a chain of events that led to performance auditing as it is today, and 
understanding these events would subsequently inform an understanding of the way 
that performance audit is practised.  
 
Figure 2 
Chronology of Major Events 
    1964:  Two ‘special investigations’ carried out on local councils  
1975:   National government took office 
The appointment of Shailes as the AG 
1977:   Public Revenues Act 1956 amended into Public Finance Act 1977 
1983:   The appointment of Tyler as the AG  
1984:   Labour government took office 
   New Zealand public sector reform begins 
1988:   Strategos Report 
1989:   The passage of Public Finance Act 1989 
   Inquiry into Officers of Parliament  
1990:   National government took office 
1992:   Appointment of Chapman as the AG 
1994:   Chapman’s resignation 
1995:   Appointment of Macdonald as the AG 
1998:   Inquiry into Audit Office Legislation by the Finance & Expenditure  
Committee 
1999:   Labour government took office 
2000:   Public Audit Bill presented to the Parliament  
2001:   The passage of Public Audit Act 2001 
2002:   Appointment of Brady as the AG 
2004:   Increment in Funding for Performance Audit, 5 Year Strategic Plan 
2009:   Appointment of Provost as the AG  
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 3.2.1 The Early Developments (1960s-1970s)  
 
Performance auditing in New Zealand can be traced as far back as the 1960s, 
although at that time it was more of ‘special investigations’ rather than a 
formal audit (Colquhoun, 2005). Colquhoun found that the Audit Office began 
to seriously consider efficiency issues in local government in the 1960s, 
following the report by the Public Expenditure Committee (of the House of 
Representatives) in 19633. There were two such ‘special investigations’ 
carried out on the local councils in 1964; the first reviewing wage and salary 
systems, and the second reviewing the use of motor vehicles (ibid). During 
this time period however, there was no legal mandate for the AG to carry out 
reviews on local councils or any government departments. Quite the contrary, 
the restrictive language of Public Revenues Act 1956 gave no authority to the 
AG to conduct such reviews (Jacobs, 1998).  
 
Many of the major developments towards a more formal performance audit 
occurred in the 1970s. This period of time witnessed significant efforts 
towards a reform, both in the public sector and within the Office itself. At 
about the same time there was also a global movement towards a focus on 
efficiency and effectiveness, which to some extent influenced the 
developments in New Zealand. Canada, US, Sweden and Australia in 
particular, started to formally adopt performance auditing in the 1970s (Glynn, 
1985). Colquhoun (2005) attributed the conceptual impetus to adopt 
performance audit in New Zealand to similar developments in the US public 
sector, and Jacobs (1998) claimed the influence of Canadian practices in New 
Zealand’s performance audit. In addition to these external influences, the 
impetus towards performance auditing can also be found from within the 
system. The literature on New Zealand public sector attributed the push 
towards this technology to the ruling government and the AG himself (Skene, 
1985; Jacobs, 1998; Colquhoun, 2005). However, there are no common 
                                                 
3 According to the author, the Committee holds the Audit Office responsible for improving efficiency 
in local councils and suggested that should the councils fail to satisfy the review, the office should 
report this to the Parliament.  
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grounds in these studies as to who was the main player that pushed for 
performance auditing in New Zealand.  
 
These studies recorded two important events in 1975 that occurred with regard 
to the emergence of performance auditing in the country. The first event is the 
general election that saw a transfer of power from a Labour to a National 
government and the second event is the appointment of AC Shailes as the new 
AG. When the Labour government was still in office, the Minister of Local 
Government, Henry May visited South Australia in 1973 and was inspired to 
introduce “efficiency inspections” in New Zealand local councils, like the 
ones he found in South Australia (Colquhoun, 2005). May was driven by the 
concern over an increasing call for additional funding from the local councils 
and the ‘perceived’ inefficiency believed to be prevalent in the local 
government sector (ibid). When National took office, the focus of the 
government changed from welfare of the state to cutting costs across 
government departments (Jacobs, 1998). Jacobs links this focus with the 
economic bust that follows a booming economy in the previous decade. Due 
to this desire to cut costs, both Skene (1985) and Jacobs (1998) contend that 
the National government was very supportive and influential in the 
establishment of performance audit in New Zealand.  
 
Prior to the appointment of Shailes as the AG in 1975, there were already 
considerable developments within the Audit Office. Efficiency in both central 
and local level had become among the main concerns of the office since the 
1960s and well into the start of the next decade, as suggested by Skene (1985) 
and Colquhoun (2005). For example, in 1972 the AG commented on “the 
failure to examine faulty machinery thoroughly before purchase and even on 
low breeding percentages caused by bad management on government farms” 
(Skene, 1985, p.274). The developments were however constrained by the 
limited staff to conduct such audits, and more importantly by the “absence of 
statutory authority for other than financial and compliance audit” (ibid). Upon 
his appointment, Shailes was determined to develop and strengthen the OAG 
by pushing the performance audit agenda forward. Not only did he broaden 
audit practices (despite the restrictive language of the Public Revenues Act), 
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he also pushed for a wider statutory authorisation during the redrafting of the 
Act. Due to Shailes’ significant influence in these developments, Skene (1985) 
attributed much of the emergence of performance auditing to the AG himself.  
 
There was however, a minor obstacle for Shailes soon after he took office. 
Foreseeing pressure to cut costs with the election of National government, the 
State Services Commission established its own management audit unit (Skene, 
1985). This created reluctance on the part of the auditors as departments could 
not be expected to accept two reviews, although they were slightly different in 
approach (ibid). Notwithstanding this setback, Shailes and the Audit Office 
continued to push for further developments on performance audit for the 
public sector.   
 
 3.2.2 A New Mandate, 1977 
 
To a certain degree, Shailes’ efforts were successful in that he was able to shift 
the focus of the Audit Office from purely financial and compliance audits to 
include efficiency and effectiveness of management in the public sector. He 
was also successful in achieving statutory authority to conduct performance 
audits with the passage of Public Finance Act 1977. These favourable 
developments however, met further setbacks that limit the development of 
performance audit intended by Shailes. 
 
The enactment of the Public Finance Act 1977 at long last provided the legal 
mandate to the AG to conduct performance audits on public sector entities. 
During the redrafting of the 1956 Act, Shailes had worked closely with the 
Treasury to ensure that when the new legislation became law, the AG would 
be “left unrestricted in determining its interpretation” (Skene, 1985, p.276). 
There have been differing opinions in the literature regarding Section 25 (3) of 
the 1977 Act that specifies the mandate. Skene criticised the mandate for 
being too broad and failing to address the confusion surrounding the new 
concept. His concern was about the ability of the AG to question policy 
effectiveness and that such reviews can proceed “without the interest or the 
guidance of the Parliament” (p.274). Jacobs (1998) had similar concerns as the 
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mandate allows the AG to hold politicians accountable, which led him to 
describe the Act as “the most radical innovation in the function of the AG 
since the establishment of the office in the 1840s” (p.348). These concerns 
however were not shared by Colquhoun (2005). He acknowledged the 
legislative authority provided by the new Act, however suggested that it only 
made “minor differences to the existence and process of operational audits in 
local governments” (p.36), in sharp contrast with the “radical innovation” 
posited by Jacobs (1998). What Colquhoun (2005) thought changed was the 
Audit Office’s approach to performance audit, as the authority granted allows 
the office to exert its power on inefficient and ineffective local councils that 
did not take up suggested reviews.  
 
Although the 1977 Act was a huge step forward for performance auditing in 
New Zealand, there were several problematic areas that restricted its further 
progress. Much of these problems were identified by Skene (1985). Lack of 
departmental objectives, performance indicators and output measurement were 
the main problems encountered by the Audit Office when performing the 
efficiency reviews. There were very few departments that clearly stated their 
objectives and performance indicators, whilst a majority were still reluctant to 
state these explicitly. Most departments also had an input orientation of 
performance when a successful performance audit necessitates the adoption of 
an output orientation4. A review undertaken on the Education Department’s 
pre-school policy for example, wasn’t able to provide a conclusion due to 
insufficient performance measures (ibid). The problem with lack of staff and 
skills continued to preoccupy the office. The Audit Office was subjected to a 
staff ceiling imposed by the government and the right skills to conduct this 
relatively new practice were not available. Another challenge was on the part 
of the government departments and the local councils who showed reluctance 
in accepting advice from the Audit Office. There was an attitude that deemed 
efficiency reviews as irrelevant to day-to-day operations, and that there was no 
                                                 
4 Departments like Social Welfare, Justice and Education would find it practically difficult to develop 
objectives and performance measurements (Skene, 1985).  
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need for improvement in service performance and delivery5. However, 
notwithstanding these hurdles, several efficiency reviews were undertaken by 
the Audit Office in between the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1974, 
performance audit formally began in New Zealand, where it was conducted on 
two local authorities (Colquhoun, 2005). Between 1976 - 1982, there were 
thirteen reviews undertaken on local authorities, set against the management 
criteria published by the Audit Office (Skene, 1985). 
 
 3.2.3 Major Public Sector Restructuring (1980s)  
 
The 1980s brought significant reforms in the New Zealand public sector. 
There was a wave of public sector reform occurring elsewhere in the world, a 
movement commonly known as the New Public Management (NPM) in the 
UK or “managerialism” in Australia (Guthrie and Parker, 1999). According to 
Hood (1991), the label NPM is a loose term which encompasses “a set of 
broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic 
reform agenda” in many countries in the late 1970s. For New Zealand a 
significant part of the reform occurred when the fourth Labour government 
took office in 1984, along with a strong influence from the Treasury. The 
movement was driven by “fiscal imperatives” and “the quest for greater 
accountability of the bureaucracy and the political executive” (Boston, 1991, 
p.1). These were due to the state of the country at that time which was 
described as bad and in an “economic bust” (Jacobs, 1998).  
 
As the name suggests, NPM brought a new idea for management in the public 
sector. It entails changing the public sector to operate more like a business, 
exerting greater emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness, and “letting the 
managers manage” (Mulgan, 2001). Underlying these changes is the idea of 
greater autonomy for public sector managers and the aim to enhance the public 
accountability framework. The central concern of the new movement therefore 
was on the value of taxpayers’ money and the improvement of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. This was seen as a shift from 
                                                 
5 Skene (1985) attribute this attitude to the widespread assumption that existing policies will remain 
and that increment of resources will continue being received by the departments.   
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the prior concept of “accountability for processes” to “accountability for 
managing outcomes” (Hoque, 2005), hence the catchphrases “managing for 
results” and “letting managers manage” (Mulgan, 2001). This approach was to 
a great extent consistent with the concerns that prevailed in the Audit Office in 
the 1970s. More specifically, both NPM and the Audit Office put a very strong 
emphasis on accountability, efficiency and effectiveness matters. Perhaps due 
to this strong similarity, performance audit started to gain its place in the 
country in the 1980s.  
 
Notwithstanding the massive scale of the reform, New Zealand has been 
lauded for the remarkably consistent, comprehensive and speedy restructuring. 
Major structural, organisational and management changes were made both at 
the central and local level (Boston, 1991). For example, the enactment of the 
Public Finance Act 19896 required public sector entities to adopt a new accrual 
accounting regime, a shift from the previous cash accounting, also requiring 
the entities to comply with private sector accounting standards (Jacobs, 1998). 
The 1989 Act marks a significant milestone of the reform as it brings radical 
changes to New Zealand public financial management. In addition, it also 
automatically places New Zealand at the frontiers of public sector reform, 
being among the first governments to adopt accrual accounting.  
 
In 1983, Brian Tyler was appointed as the new AG replacing Shailes. Tyler 
had a slightly different focus compared to Shailes, but he was also keen on 
developing performance audit further. Unlike Shailes, who developed 
performance audit to strengthen the Audit Office, Tyler used performance 
audit as a tool for public accountability. In 1986 his office established a 
designated group specifically for the purpose of conducting performance audit 
(Jacobs, 1998). This establishment allowed non-accounting professionals like 
engineers and policy experts to be involved in the audits, hence further 
developing performance audit.  
 
                                                 
6 With the enactment of the 1989 Act, the AG was now governed by this Act. In the new legislation, 
Part II of the 1977 was left intact. The part sets out the responsibilities and roles of the AG and the 
OAG (Pallot, 1991).  
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However, despite this favourable turn for the Audit Office, there were 
conflicts that clouded the office and some desires to restrain the powers of the 
AG in conducting performance audit. During the public sector reform, there 
were other influential groups that were fighting for their jurisdiction in the 
public sector. In some cases, there was a duplication of control by two or more 
agencies, which led to conflicts between the agencies. For example, among the 
strong voices during these reforms was that of the Treasury, and Jacobs (1998) 
contend that their influence was so significant that “they effectively became 
the creators of Labour’s political-economic policies” (p.352). The Treasury 
was not supportive of performance audit, as they thought it had traces of 
control and influence of the Parliament and this was deemed inconsistent with 
the commercial orientation of the reforms (Green and Singleton, 2009). This 
concern might stem from the fact that under the existing legislation, the AG 
was not yet an Officer of the Parliament, and his independence had not been 
made clear in the mandate. Some bold comments made by Tyler also strained 
the relationship between the Audit Office and some politicians. For example, 
in 1988 Peter Neilson, who was the Associate Minister of Finance at the time, 
contemplated suing the AG due to the AG’s bold comments over public 
spending on tax advertisements (Pallot, 1991). Apart from the public 
disagreement between Tyler and Neilson over the government spending, in 
1990 Tyler also criticised political spending on MP’s postage, travel and 
communications (Jacobs, 1998). Not surprisingly, this was not well received 
by the politicians, causing the desire to restrict the mandate of the AG and to 
end performance audit. There was also conflict with regard to the legitimacy 
demonstrated by the Audit Office, which was somewhat stained by a report 
prepared by Strategos Consultants in 1988.  The Finance and Expenditure 
Committee (FEC) commissioned Strategos to review the Audit Office and the 
report was not in support of either the Audit Office and performance audit 
(Pallot, 1991). The report suggested the Audit Office was no longer needed7, 
and even if the Audit Office continued to exist, performance audit should be 
removed because it is a waste of time and money (Jacobs, 1998). Although 
                                                 
7 On the grounds that most audits could be contracted out to the private sector, and that other functions 
were either covered by State Services Commission and Treasury functions or by the new reporting 
requirements.  
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this report was later found to contain numerous flaws, it to some extent 
sparked controversy over the role of the AG and his office.  
 
3.2.4 Towards the New Millennium  
 
The developments in performance auditing in the 1980s were sustained despite 
the conflicts that surrounded the Audit Office, and it continued to strengthen 
towards the new millennium. Jacobs (1998) described the period into the 
1990s as the time of further growth and consolidation for performance 
auditing in New Zealand. There is however, a striking lack of New Zealand 
literature relating to performance auditing in this period. An interesting twist 
occurred in this decade, as there were three AGs that were in office within the 
ten years. Tyler held office until 1992, and he was replaced by Jeff Chapman 
who later resigned in 1994, and it was not until April 1995 that David 
Macdonald was appointed as the new AG.  
 
The AGs all had a slightly different approach to performance auditing, and in 
that regard a different influence on the development of the practice. Unlike 
Tyler, Chapman did not want to use performance audit to criticise government 
actions, instead working closely with the Parliamentary Select Committees 
(Jacobs, 1998). He shifted the review for accountability emphasis to 
consulting for revenue, perhaps deeming it more consistent with the business 
orientation of the newly reformed government. Chapman’s role as the AG 
however, was short-lived due to the serious allegations of financial 
mismanagement and fraud which led him to resign merely two years after 
assuming office. Unlike Chapman, Macdonald, who took office in 1995, was 
supportive of the original emphasis on performance auditing and made 
important contributions to its development (Green and Singleton, 2009). His 
approach was quite different from Tyler’s (who was also supportive of the 
audit) in that he maintained the strong liaison with Parliamentary Select 
Committees (Jacobs, 1998). Macdonald’s contribution is arguably the most 
significant as he exerted strong influence over the new legislation for the AG 
and his office. This new piece of legislation not only established that the AG is 
an Officer of the Parliament, but also reformed laws relating to the AG and his 
 32
office and clarified the AG’s jurisdiction in the public sector (Anderton, 
2000).   
 
3.2.5 Public Audit Act 2001 
 
Although the Act was passed when Macdonald was in office, the idea to 
statutorily recognise the AG as an Officer of the Parliament had been around 
since 1989. The idea partly followed an inquiry into Officers of Parliament 
done in that year, which recommended that the AG be made a Parliamentary 
Officer, and that the Audit Department should be disestablished to be 
incorporated within the Audit Office itself (Pallot, 1991). Even with the 
passage of the 1989 Act, the FEC expressed the need for an Audit Office Bill 
that would give effect to the recommendations of this inquiry. The potential 
content of the bill is explained by Pallot (1991):  
“In addition to establishing the Audit Office as an Office of Parliament with 
its own staffing, removing its funding from the influence of the Executive, 
and recognising accountability to the House through the Speaker, the bill 
may represent an opportunity to clarify several other matters. These include: 
whether the functions, duties and powers of the Controller and Auditor 
General are to be conferred on the office or be personal to the appointed 
officer; the term of appointment, if any; the organisations over which the 
responsibilities are exercisable; whether an audit appointment extends to 
subsidiary organisations that are controlled by public sector organisations; 
and explicit recognition of the now comprehensive nature of the audit role.” 
The FEC stressed the urgent need for the bill, but it was not until 2000 that the 
Public Audit Bill was finally presented to the Parliament.  
 
The OAG website records the history of the passage of the Public Audit Act 
2001 from the year 1998 onwards (OAG, 2009b). Despite the call for a bill in 
1989, it was not given a high priority on the legislative agenda, and another 
inquiry by the FEC followed only nearly a decade later. The inquiry came up 
with recommendations to be included in proposed legislation for the AG and 
the Audit Office, and the Bill fully implemented these recommendations 
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(Anderton, 2000). The Bill was introduced to the Parliament in March 2000, 
and was eventually passed in 2001.  
 
The passage of the 2001 Act was a significant milestone for the AG and his 
office. It established the AG and the Deputy Auditor General as Officers of the 
Parliament and provided a clearer accountability framework for the Office of 
the Controller and Auditor General (OAG). It resolved decades-long 
constitutional and accountability issues relating to the OAG (Buchanan and 
Simpkins, 2001) and better reflected the audit of modern public sector 
practices (Anderton, 2000). Prior to the Act there was no backing for the 
independence of the OAG, and the relationship between the Audit Office, 
Parliament and government was ambiguous (Green and Singleton, 2009, p. 
129). Without constitutional independence there was a risk of political 
manipulation (p.130). The absence of a legal recognition of the independence 
certainly did not help when there were clashes between influential groups and 
the AG, where the AG had to fight for its accountability to the public (through 
Parliament), rather than to the politicians or the government. The 2001 Act 
also establishes a strong ground for performance audit in the country, and 
ensured that performance audit can continue to be performed, as well as 
clarifies the entities within the jurisdiction of the AG. More specifically, the 
Act allows the AG to conduct performance audits on all public sector entities 
(except the Reserve Bank and any registered banks).  
 
The fight to continue its jurisdiction in conducting performance audit was not 
an easy one for the OAG. Although the recommendations of the inquiry did 
support the continuation of such audits, the Treasury continued to disagree. 
This episode was recorded by Green and Singleton (2009): 
“Heated discussion ensued with the Treasury officials, who argued that the 
government did not need to own a large auditing business, that performance 
auditing was not really auditing at all and that the Auditor General did not 
require a special form of independence, other than the professional 
independence asserted by any auditor. Macdonald describes the OAG’s 
relationship with Treasury at this time as one of ‘extreme mistrust on both 
sides. It was a very, very difficult relationship.” (p.152) 
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When the Act was finally passed, the mandate for performance audit was kept 
and included under Section 16. Macdonald took responsibility for reviving the 
performance audit function and was quoted as saying that he feels the Public 
Audit Act has “left a legacy for those following on in terms of the tools to 
carry out the function in the best possible way” (Green and Singleton, 2009, 
p.145). The continued and strengthened presence of the mandate has allowed a 
well established practice under Brady, who succeeded Macdonald in 2002.  
 
Under Brady, the OAG further developed and strengthened performance 
auditing. Although it was a long and winding road before the Public Audit Bill 
was passed, the struggle was proven worth it when Brady had to fight against 
the unlawful use of Parliamentary Service funds in 2005 (Green and Singleton, 
2009, p.156). It would have been more difficult to fight against political 
pressure had it not for the clear accountability framework provided by the 
Public Audit Act. The office has also successfully maintained a steady 
increase in the number of audits carried out, and this development is generally 
welcomed by the executives and public entities. Among the important 
milestones during Brady’s tenure is a budgetary increment that involves 
performance audit in 2004. This has made an increasing number of 
performance audit possible, and hence greater acceptance and development of 
performance audit in the country. The budgetary increment followed 
development of a Five-year Strategic Plan that included a proposal to 
strengthen performance audit activities. The OAG aimed to double the number 
of audits carried out within the time period specified by the plan (2004-2009).  
 
In addition to the effort to strengthen performance auditing, the OAG also 
took the first initiative in 2009 to report a comprehensive follow-up of 
performance audits carried out in 2007 (OAG, 2009a). The report contains a 
summary of all performance audits carried out in 2007, the recommendations 
made to entities being audited, and the number of recommendations being 
accepted (or partially accepted) by the entities. In particular, the OAG reported 
that: 
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“We made 131 recommendations in the performance audit reports we 
published during 2007, and have information on the response to 110 of these. 
Of the 110 recommendations, 108 have been accepted or partially accepted. 
Of the 110 recommendations we have information on, 76 (69%) have been 
implemented. A further 27 recommendations are expected to be implemented 
within the first half of 2009 – this would bring the number of 
recommendations implemented to nearly 94%”  
 
The efforts made by the OAG under Brady’s leadership provided a strong 
performance audit platform for his successor, Provost, who took office in late 
2009. As the brief history illustrates, performance audit is very much a product 
of the AG’s approach due to its nature and the broad mandate granted by the 
Public Audit Act. Hence, although there are undoubtedly many other factors 
that will shape performance audit practice in the future, the past suggests the 
influence of Provost herself will also be a significant factor. 
 
3.3 Performance Audit Methodology  
 
In the earlier days of performance auditing there were extensive discussions on 
performance audit methodology. This was largely due to the different scope in 
mandate across jurisdictions, as well as the different interpretation and application of 
the mandate in practice (Shand and Anand, 1996). However there is currently a 
general guide that outlines the performance audit process, and in New Zealand this 
has been provided by the OAG as in Figure 3.  
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Source: New Zealand Office of Auditor General; http://oag.govt.nz/about-us/our-
work/performance-audits 
Scoping 
The OAG identifies the broad audit topic through an office-wide audit planning process. 
Before the audit starts, the OAG contacts public entities being audited and other parties to 
seek input into the audit's scope and timing. Some performance audits will involve more 
than one public entity.   
Planning 
The OAG creates a set of audit criteria or expectations, against which performance of public 
entities being audited are assessed. The OAG consults the entities on the audit criteria used 
and may take expert advice.  
Fieldwork 
The OAG collects evidence to ascertain whether its audit criteria or expectations have been 
met. Methodologies used include interviewing staff and stakeholders, reviewing documents 
and files, observation and statistical analysis. Under the Public Audit Act 2001, the OAG 
can assess any information it considers necessary to carry out the work. The information 
collected is confidential and cannot be requested under the Official Information Act 1982.  
Summary of findings 
The OAG analyses the evidence collected and draw conclusions from the evidence. It then 
provides the public entities being audited with a summary of the audit findings – this may be 
an oral briefing, a written document, or both. The public entity has a chance to comment on 
the audit findings.  
Draft Report 
Once a performance audit report is drafted, its content is checked for factual accuracy, peer 
reviewed and edited. Public entities being audited are given two weeks to comment on the 
accuracy, balance and presentation of the draft report. To maintain the Auditor-General's 
independence, the OAG is not required to reach agreement on a report’s content.  
Public Release of the Report 
The report is presented to Parliament and becomes public. The OAG offers relevant 
Ministers, select committees and other interested parties briefings on the report.  
Performance Audit Methodology 
New Zealand Office of Auditor General 
Figure 3 
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3.4 Research Statement  
 
Although it has been nearly half a century of the evolvement of performance auditing, 
there are still many unanswered questions surrounding this form of auditing. A brief 
look into history reveals that several antecedents intertwined to shape performance 
audit as it is today. In particular the emergence of performance audit was largely 
driven by the concerns in the public sector, similar developments in other countries, 
major public sector restructuring, individual lead of the AGs, the government in office 
and presence of a mandate that grants statutory authority to carry out the audits. These 
antecedents have subsequently moulded the role of performance audit in the country, 
which is primarily to provide assurance to Parliament on the management of 
operations and processes of public entities. In doing so the OAG has sought to 
promote efficiency and effectiveness, hence providing observable performance 
improvement in the public sector. However, have the changes brought by 
performance audit been beneficial to the public sector? Have the goals of performance 
audit been achieved? To date there has been limited effort in answering these 
questions, with the majority of the effort coming from the OAG, for example through 
peer reviews and follow-up reports.  
 
There is also a question of the value added by performance audit in the public sector. 
Literature of performance audit in the past and from other countries have recorded 
that in several cases these audits have been unsuccessful. Morin (2001) for example, 
found that more than half of her audit sample was unsuccessful influencing the 
auditees8. Following her findings of unsuccessful audits, Morin encouraged more 
scepticism over performance audit impact by stating that:  
“There are in fact many a priori beliefs about VFM audit, especially concerning its 
effectiveness as an instrument to control and improve the management of public 
affairs. But, in light of the findings reported here, more scepticism is advisable. 
Time is up for certain public institutions which have been considered sacred cows, 
above attack and unimpeachable in their effectiveness. The Auditors General 
officers should not be above the questions which have been aimed at (and which 
continue to be aimed at) most of the other public institutions” (p.115)  
                                                 
8 In her study success is measured by the level of influence that the AG exerts into the public entities 
with the audits carried out. 
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Closer to home, less than successful and acceptable audits also occurred in Australia, 
particularly in the early days of performance audit. Performance audits, or ‘special 
investigations’ as it was termed back then, “often caused bitter conflict between 
governments and Auditors-General” (Green and Singleton, 2009, p.146). We have 
also seen that in New Zealand, during the major public sector restructuring sceptics 
and critics of performance audit questioned the value of such audit in a 
commercialised environment. Although it is unquestionable that the notion of ‘value’ 
is difficult to gauge, studies should also look at the contributions that performance 
audit actually make in practice.  
 
Throughout the recent history of the New Zealand public sector discussed in this 
chapter, the AGs have envisaged different roles for performance audit. Nonetheless, 
later AGs particularly Macdonald and Brady shared a similar vision for performance 
audit, which is primarily to provide assurance to the Parliament and public. How has 
this been translated into practice? Additionally, there are also questions as discussed 
above, largely pertaining to the practical benefits and contribution of performance 
audit in the public sector. Driven by these questions and the lack of attention that this 
area is receiving from the literature, my study seeks to answer the question: “What is 
the impact of performance audit on seven entities audited in 2006 by the New Zealand 
Office of the Auditor General?” 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
The emergence and development of performance audit in New Zealand was greatly 
influenced by surrounding political, legal and economic climate. In addition, the 
influence also came from within the OAG, with individual AGs being able to exert 
their own interpretation of the mandate granted to carry out the audits. The 1960s saw 
the first audits of this nature performed on local governments (Colquhoun, 2005), 
despite the absence of a mandate for the AG to do so. Things started to pick up for 
performance audit in the 1970s with the enactment of the Public Finance Act 1977 
and the international movement of NPM which reflected rising concerns over 
accountability in the public sector. During this period, the attention towards efficiency 
and effectiveness heightened, but the efforts by the AG to advance greater efficiency 
and effectiveness were hindered by the prevalent attitude towards performance audit, 
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which generally was sceptical of the new form of auditing. In addition, there were 
other setbacks for the OAG like limited staff and skills, and also the absence of 
performance indicators due to the input orientation that was in place. The 1980s was 
promising for performance audit, with major public sector restructuring by the new 
Labour government working in concert with the orientation promoted by such audits. 
In particular, focus was shifted from input and processes to output and outcomes. 
There was also greater emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness, and the 
accountability of public sector managers, information which performance audit could 
potentially provide. The next decade, 1990s, was a critical decade for the OAG. There 
were internal crises, particularly financial troubles and the ‘Chapman saga’ (Green 
and Singleton, 2009, p.144), and performance audit took several different directions 
with the three AGs that were in office during the 1990s. The new millennium brought 
new milestones to performance auditing in New Zealand, first with the Public Audit 
Act 2001 that clarified the entities within the scope of the mandate, and later with the 
budgetary increment in 2004 that allowed more performance audits to be undertaken. 
The AG also took several initiatives in strengthening the role of performance audit in 
the public sector, for example by publishing follow-up reports on all of the 
performance audits undertaken in 2007 (OAG, 2009a).  
 
There has been half a century of performance audit development in New Zealand. 
Throughout this period, there have been many changes to performance audit, in terms 
of the mandate, the AGs interpretations of the mandate, acceptance and attitude 
towards the audits, as well as other factors which affect the development of 
performance audit. These factors inform the performance audit practice at present, 
and will continue to influence performance audit practice in the future.  
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Chapter Four – Theoretical Framework  
Chapter four justifies the methodological approach adopted in this study and the 
theoretical framework that provides the basis for analysis. The chapter also discusses 
the philosophical paradigm underpinning the methodological approach and the 
theoretical framework used.  
 
“As researchers, we have to devise for ourselves a research process that serves 
our purpose best, one that helps us more than any other to answer our research 
question…Rather than selecting established paradigms to follow, we are using 
established paradigms to delineate and illustrate our own.” (Crotty, 1998, p.216) 
 
Chapter Introduction  
 
Previous chapters have described the nature of performance audit and set out the 
research question that will provide the direction of the study. The research question 
and nature of the research subject largely determine the methodology that will be 
adopted. In many cases research starts with the research question, and a method 
deemed most suitable to answer the research question. In turn, research methods 
usually fall into a particular research methodology that provides a framework to 
enable systematic and analytical research procedures. This research methodology is 
informed by an underlying theoretical perspective, which is a subset of a larger 
epistemological world9 (Crotty, 1998). The theoretical framework of this study, which 
consists of the research methods, methodology, theoretical perspective, and 
epistemology, is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
                                                 
9 Epistemology as defined by Crotty (1998, p.3) is “the theory of knowledge embedded in the 
theoretical perspective and thereby in methodology”.  
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The theoretical framework adopted for this study is developed from the research 
question “what is the impact of performance audit on the audited entities?” The aim of 
this question is to assess the actual impact experienced by audited entities, inducted 
from evidence of the audit process itself, as well as the experience of the staff (of the 
audited entities) that were involved with the audits. The methods used to obtain such 
information are therefore textual analysis of documents relevant to the audits and 
interviews with the staff. The study was approached without prior presumptions to 
gain fresh insights into the experiences of the auditees. A methodology that allows 
such an approach to data is Grounded Theory, where knowledge evolves from data, 
“rather than be developed a priori and then be tested” (Lye, Perera and Rahman, 
2006, p.129). Underpinning the methodology is symbolic interactionism, which 
focuses on knowledge and meanings derived from human action and interaction, and 
Methods 
 
Textual Analysis 
Coding 
Conceptualisation 
Interviews 
Epistemology 
 
Constructionism 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
 
Symbolic 
Interactionism 
 
Methodology 
 
Adaptation of Grounded 
Theory 
Figure 4 
Theoretical Framework  
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rejects the notion of observer’s objectivity. The larger epistemological world that 
informs this theoretical perspective10 is Constructionism. These elements will be 
further discussed throughout the chapter.  
 
4.1 Data  
 
Research begins with data. The quality of the materials analysed is a major 
contributing factor to the quality of the research itself (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
p.27). Hence data needs to be useful, suitable and sufficient; what Charmaz (2006, p. 
13) termed as “rich data”. She describes “rich data” as going “beneath the surface of 
social and subjective life”, “detailed, focused and full”, and revealing participants’ 
“views, feelings, intentions, and actions as well as the contexts and structures of their 
lives” (p.14). Charmaz’s explanation provides an idea of what is expected of 
qualitative data; however she did not further explain what is meant by “detailed, 
focused and full”. Charmaz’s and Corbin and Strauss’ descriptions of data are also 
heavily oriented for qualitative research in medical and psychological sociology, 
where research draws heavily on personal experience rather than professional 
experience of participants, as sought by this study. Hence, gathering data in their 
sense is capturing the richness in human feeling and thinking, as opposed to my study 
which involves individuals speaking on behalf of the entity that they are employed by. 
Charmaz’s and Corbin and Strauss’ accounts of data are, nonetheless, still appropriate 
as data serves a universal purpose in all research, which is the root of all analysis.  
 
The data used in this research comes in the forms of performance audit reports, 
official documents and interviews. Although these might not necessarily fit what 
Charmaz has termed as “rich data”, these data are deemed useful, suitable and 
sufficient given the limitations and scope of this study. Charmaz (2006, p.25) claims 
that rich data, among other sources, may be derived from “intensive interviewing” 
where the purpose is for an “in-depth exploration of a particular topic or experience”. 
For this research interviews were added to the data source of performance audit 
reports and official documents, as those sources did not provide sufficient information 
with regard to the impact of performance audit on the audited entities. The timeline of 
                                                 
10 Theoretical perspective is defined as “the philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus 
providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria” (Crotty, 1998, p.3). 
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this study however, only allowed for one interview session with each of the entities. 
In addition, in one case interviewees had limited experience with the audit because the 
manager in charge who was closely involved with the audit is no longer with the 
organisation. The triangulation of data consisting of official documents, relevant 
reports and interviews, allows for each data source to complement the usefulness, 
suitability and sufficiency of the other sources. The official documents, reports and 
interviews were obtained from a sample of public entities audited by the OAG that 
meet the research criteria, as detailed below.  
 
 4.1.1 Sample  
 
There are seven public entities used as the sample in this study. Table 1 
provides the list of the public entities and the performance audit carried out on 
the respective entities. The sample was selected based on several criteria:  
i. As specified in Chapter 3, there were several important developments 
in regards to performance audit recently (2001 onwards), which are 
important in setting the current contextual setting. Hence in keeping 
the contextual relevance and consistency, the audit sample cannot be 
taken from very far back. Furthermore, a long duration from the time 
the audits were undertaken would create difficulties in retrieving data 
from the archives, and even more difficulties in finding persons who 
were part of the audit to be interviewed. However, if the sample was 
of very recent audits, this might not allow for any impact of the audit 
to materialise. Therefore, for the purpose of consistency, contextual 
relevance and ease of data-gathering, the year 2006 was chosen as the 
base year for the sample list. Figure 5 outlines the timeline of the 
relevant dates for the purpose of this study.  
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ii. In 2006 there were fourteen performance audits carried out by the 
OAG (Appendix 1). This number includes audits of central and local 
governments, audits involving multiple agencies, as well as follow-up 
audits. To make the sample manageable and in line with the scope of 
the study, the sample has been restricted to audits on central 
government agencies. I foresee that there are complexities involved in 
gathering data on audits involving multiple agencies and local 
governments. One particular difficulty is the contextual arrangements 
of these entities.  Audits involving multiple government agencies are 
subject to differing legal obligations and, similarly, local 
governments are subject to different Acts and by-laws. Hence with 
these audits, there are complex legal dimensions that would need to 
be taken into consideration if an analysis were to be carried out of 
them. By limiting the sample to audits involving central government 
agencies, this complexity was minimised and enabled the sample to 
be more manageable within the scope of my study. Follow-up audits 
were also excluded from the sample. With follow-up audits the initial 
audits have usually been done several years prior, hence not meeting 
the criteria of the base year. The date of the initial audit impacted 
both archival data, as well as the availability of potential interviewees 
for the study. After excluding performance audits involving multiple 
government agencies, local agencies and follow-up audits, the sample 
comprised a total of seven central government agencies as specified 
in Table 1.  
 
2001 
Public 
Audit Act 
2004 
Increase in 
funding 
2006 
SAMPLE 
2009 
This 
research 
Figure 5 
Timeline of Relevant Dates 
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Table 1 
Sample of Performance Audits  
Entity Performance Audit 
The Treasury Capability to recognise and respond to issues for 
Maori 
Foundation for 
Research, Science and 
Technology 
Administration of grant programmes 
Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry 
Managing bio-security risks associated with high-
risk sea containers 
Department of 
Conservation 
 Planning for and managing publicly owned land 
Housing NZ 
Corporation 
Effectiveness of programmes to buy and lease 
properties for state housing 
Ministry of Education Ministry of Education: Management of the school 
property portfolio 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
Performance of the contract centre for Work and 
Income 
 
 4.1.2 Data Sources  
 
i. Performance Audit Reports 
 
At the conclusion of each audit, performance audit reports are tabled 
in Parliament and published for public viewing11 (refer Figure 3 in 
Chapter 3). Performance audit reports are the key communication 
channel of the OAG for each audit, hence containing crucial 
information regarding the audit. Information documented in 
performance audit reports include the reasons for the audit, 
background of the audited entity and audit subject, audit summary, 
findings and recommendations, and to a limited extent, the response 
from the auditees on the findings and recommendations.  
                                                 
11 The PDF copy of these reports is available at the OAG’s website; http://www.oag.govt.nz/reports/by-
type/performance-audits, or hardcopy can be made available upon request.  
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Performance audit reports not only provide the basic information 
about the audit for this study, but also provide the point of view of the 
OAG in relation to all of the audits. To the extent that any auditee’s 
response is reported, the performance audit reports also allow for a 
comparison between the response mentioned in the report and the 
actual response made by the auditees to the initial draft provided to 
them, as documented in the official documents.  
 
ii. Official Documents  
 
Official documents relating to the seven performance audits in the 
sample provide one of the main data sources of the study. The official 
documents were requested from the seven entities under the auspices 
of Official Information Act 1982. These documents mainly relate to 
the correspondence between the auditees and the OAG during the 
drafting stage of the final audit report (refer Figure 3 in Chapter 3), 
as well as relevant departmental reports following the public release 
of the audit report. Examples of the official documents obtained are; 
departmental submissions, progress reports, action plans, briefing 
notes, correspondence emails between the public entities and the 
OAG, correspondence letters, memos and slide presentations.  
 
There are several imperatives that underpin the choice of the official 
documents as source of data. Firstly these documents contain 
important data on the initial reaction and responses to the 
performance audit findings. This information is highly useful in 
capturing the voice of the auditees and looking at the audit from the 
perspective of the auditees. Secondly, the documents also offer 
information on the actions undertaken (or not undertaken) in response 
to the audit recommendations between the time that the audit report 
was published and the present day. Lastly, the documents provide an 
overall picture and general feel to the audit that has taken place.  
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iii. Interviews 
 
The performance audit reports and official documents do not contain 
all information sought after for this study, which necessitated 
interviews as an additional source of data. The interviews followed 
initial coding on the reports and official documents that gave rise to 
specific issues or questions regarding a particular performance audit. 
In addition, they were carried out with staff that were involved with 
the performance audits to gain rich insights of auditees’ experience. 
This sort of information cannot be found in the other data sources. It 
is however, not an easy task to get hold of an individual staff member 
who meets this criterion mainly due to staff turnover and structural 
reorganisation within the entities. Due to these reasons and given the 
limited time and scope of this study, interviews were carried out with 
only four of the entities in the sample list.  
 
The main reason that the four entities were chosen for interview 
sessions is because of the clear accountability line of the internal 
department/program involved, making it possible to identify a 
suitable interviewee. In addition, these entities were also chosen on 
the basis of the issues and questions that arose from the review of the 
official documents. For the other three entities, whilst it may be 
possible to trace a suitable interviewee that has been involved with 
the audit, this was not done for two reasons. Firstly, four interviews 
were deemed to be sufficient given the time constraint of this 
research. Secondly, the four interviews provided a good range of 
aspects of performance audit practice and hence, were deemed to 
provide sufficient information for the research.  
 
The four entities were approached through the person that responded 
to the earlier official information request, which in most cases was 
the person responsible for the audited department/program. Of the 
four entities approached for interviews, three managers in charge / 
liaison officers who were directly involved with the performance 
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audits are still with the organisations, albeit having some changes to 
their respective managerial positions. For one entity the managers 
heavily involved with the audit were no longer with the organisation. 
Two staff members from the entity who had limited involvement, but 
were part of the team that assisted the audit were interviewed. 
Questions were sent to the interviewees prior to the interview.  
 
The interviews focused on several aspects. The first was 
interviewee’s experience with performance audit. In particular, the 
experience sought is on the area of auditee-auditor relationship during 
the audit, and additionally interviewees were also asked what they 
think of the relationship generally. I am interested in their 
experiences, as experience in itself can be an impact on the entity. 
The second issue was the auditee’s perspective on the contribution of 
the audit to performance improvement, and what the auditee thought 
the impact of the audit on the entity was. The third issue was on the 
progress of the area audited, and how much of the progress that could 
be attributed to the performance audit. In addition to these generic 
questions, interviewees were also asked questions stemming from the 
official documents provided by their entity. These questions follow 
their responses to the draft provided by the OAG before the report is 
tabled in the Parliament. Interviewees were also asked if they had any 
suggestions to make with regard to performance audit.   
 
For the purpose of reporting the research findings, the interviews are 
labelled: 
 
Interview 1:  
Interview 1 was attended by two managers from the entity. One 
manager was in charge of the area covered by the audit and hence 
worked directly with the performance auditors. The second manager 
was not directly involved but was at the organisation at the time and 
made some contributions to the audit, although not directly. 
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Interview 2:  
Interview 2 was also attended by two managers. However for this 
particular entity, major restructuring of their internal structure took 
place recently, hence there were changes with the managerial 
positions since the audit. The manager who worked directly with the 
performance auditors had also left the organisation, hence the two 
interviewees were only indirectly involved with the performance 
audit. The first manager joined the organisation later during the audit, 
but was in charge of overseeing that a part of the audit 
recommendations were executed and reported back to the auditors. 
The second manager was from the internal audit team, which at some 
point was approached by the manager in charge of the area covered 
by the audit. The interviewed manager also attended several meetings 
with the performance auditors.  
 
Interview 3:  
Interview 3 was conducted with the manager directly involved with 
the audit, although he referred to himself more as the ‘liaison officer’ 
between his entity and the OAG. This is because he was specifically 
requested to ensure that the audit went as smoothly as possible and 
that the auditors were provided with what was needed for the audit. 
He has an auditing background, and felt that he understood 
completely the reasons for an audit and the work of the auditors.  
  
Interview 4:  
Interview 4 was also conducted with a manager who was directly 
involved with the performance audit on his entity. He was the main 
liaison person between the entity and the OAG, including in 
responding to the initial draft of the performance audit report.  
 
iv. Other 
 
This study also considered other sources that might provide a 
different perspective on performance audits carried out by the OAG. 
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This included parliamentary select committee12 considerations, 
newspaper articles and other publications pertaining to performance 
audit. Nonetheless, in regard to the seven audits in the sample list, no 
other information could be found from the list of other sources. 
Although these audit reports were tabled in Parliament and presented 
to the relevant select committees, no further consideration of these 
audits was found in Select Committee Reports, Hansard or the 
Journal of the House of Representatives. Parliamentary consideration 
would have been very useful to reflect responses from the main 
stakeholder of the public sector.  
 
4.2 An Adaptation of Grounded Theory 
 
Grounded theory largely stems from the work of Glaser and Strauss (Charmaz, 2006, 
p.5) and falls into the alternative realms of research methodology. ‘Alternative’ 
because it tries to provide insights that conservative scientific methodology cannot. 
Researchers in social science claim that scientific methodology fails to acknowledge 
complex human phenomena and oversimplifies the complex phenomena with a 
deductive theory development approach. As opposed to deduction, grounded theory 
applies an inductive approach to develop a theory “grounded in empirical evidence” 
(Lye et al, 2006). It is therefore, interpretive on the part of the researcher, aiming to 
discover the underlying reality of a complex social situation. In this vein, researchers 
do not attempt to distance themselves from the participants but on the contrary seek 
“the opportunity to connect with them at a human level” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, 
p.13). The researchers also acknowledge that they bring prior knowledge, experience 
and skills into the study, which inevitably affects the outcomes of the study.  
 
The application of methodology from grounded theory enables the construction of 
knowledge from data, without being bounded to a pre-determined theory. In 
particular, the methodology allows for knowledge to emerge from information and 
insights contained in primary data sources, without imposing any a priori knowledge.  
                                                 
12 The Parliament’s website described select committees as working “on behalf of the House and report 
their conclusions to the House. There are up to 13 subject-area select committees, plus any number of 
ad hoc committees set up from time to time for particular purposes. Select committees often ask the 
public for input when they are considering a bill or inquiry” (The Parliament, 2010). 
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In the public sector literature, researchers like Abdul-Rahman and Goddard (1998), 
Morin (2001), Goddard (2004) and Lye, Perera and Rahman (2005) have sought to 
answer their research questions by applying this methodology. Abdul-Rahman and 
Goddard (1998) for example, triangulated grounded theory and ethnography to 
conduct a case study into accounting in two Islamic organisations through interviews 
with personnel in both organisations. Authors adopting grounded theory often rely 
primarily on empirical data alone in developing a theory or emergent knowledge in 
their areas of study. The authors also purposely avoid imposing any a priori 
knowledge to gain richer, deeper and more in-depth exploration of their research 
subjects.  Perhaps due to these reasons Charmaz (2006, p.20) is encouraged to make 
the claim: “These authors bring an imaginative eye and an incisive voice to their 
studies and inspire good work. Their work transcends their immediate circles.”  
 
Studies adopting grounded theory are also not interested in making generalised 
claims, instead are primarily focused on a specialised context which is unique only to 
the research subject. Although this might be seen as a research limitation, even by 
authors espousing grounded theory themselves (Abdul-Rahman and Goddard, 1998; 
Lye, Perera and Rahman, 2005), it should not necessarily be so. It is the inherent 
nature of Grounded Theory, or any case study for that matter, that no generalisation 
can be made from the findings. The focus on the specific context through case studies 
and grounded theory enables in depth exploration of the research subject, as well as 
evaluation across different contextual arrangements. For example, this study into the 
impact of performance audit on seven audited entities enables a look into the very 
experience of these entities, and enables a later assessment of the impact experienced 
by other entities under different contextual arrangements; for example other 
jurisdictions, other Auditors General or other economic and political concerns.   
 
Figure 6 provides a simplistic view of the grounded theory adaptation applied in this 
study, whilst Figure 7 (at the end of this section) summarizes the framework used. 
The research is not linear but iterative, where a researcher revises and returns to the 
earlier steps several times throughout the research.  
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Figure 6 
Adaptation of Grounded Theory Methodology 
 
 
 4.2.1 Sensitizing concepts 
 
‘Sensitizing concepts’ is a process of identifying important concepts and 
general disciplinary perspectives from literature (Charmaz, 2006). In this 
research for example, it was identified that authors generally apply the 
constructivist perspective in studying performance audit (Hamburger, 1989; 
Jacobs, 1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Morin, 2001). Furthermore, 
performance improvement and performance accountability were identified as 
the inherent themes embedded within the origins of performance audit, as well 
as central to performance audit discussions in prior literature. The process of 
synthesizing concepts therefore, is important in placing this research in the 
wider literature context and also in determining the body of knowledge that 
this research belongs to.  
 
 4.2.2 Data Collection  
 
In processing the data, I have several times returned to data collection after 
analysing and questioning the acquired data. The data collection started by 
acquiring performance audit reports of all performance audits carried out in 
2006. As previously mentioned, there were fourteen performance audits 
carried out in that year. A closer examination of the audits narrowed down the 
sample into only performance audits on a single central government agency, 
Data 
Gathering 
Categories 
 
Questions 
Analysis 
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hence further data collection was done on the seven entities that met the 
sample criteria. Another step of data collection was done by sending requests 
for official information to the seven entities in the sample list. Once received, 
the documents were reviewed, and initial coding was done. However, since 
interviewing the auditees was deemed to provide a more thorough analysis, 
more data collection was done after the initial coding using interviews. In 
grounded theory, this iterative process is continued until the point of “data 
saturation”13 (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.148). Since my research only 
applies several tools of grounded theory and did not seek to develop a theory, 
the process is continued until the data was deemed sufficient and credible.  
 
4.2.3 Coding  
 
In the method of grounded theory proposed by Charmaz (2006) and Corbin 
and Strauss (2008), there are several different stages of coding, in particular 
open coding and axial coding. However, as Charmaz (2006) believed, 
grounded theory methods should be viewed as “a set of principles and 
practices, not as prescriptions or packages” (Charmaz, 2006, p.9), this research 
will not follow the process of coding in such detail. Firstly, because this 
research did not aim for theory building hence not demanding such detail, but 
also secondly, because the nature of the data gathered in this research does not 
necessitate detailed coding be done. There is not as much depth in reports and 
official documents for example, compared to personal and emotional 
experiences usually found in data for medical and psychological sociology 
research. Moreover, the size of sample and hence the amount of data used in 
this research is relatively less than for research done aimed at theory building.  
 
In initial coding, textual data is read through to generate codes. Issues that 
may arise from the audits were also picked up during this stage. The codes 
generated from initial coding provide a general idea of the data content and the 
                                                 
13 Corbin and Strauss (2008) define “data saturation” loosely as “when no new categories or relevant 
themes are emerging” from the data. However, the saturation does not only concerns categories and 
themes, but the properties and dimensions of these. Hence saturation is a point where categories and 
themes are “sufficiently well developed” with properties and dimensions explored under different 
conditions. Since determinate categories and themes are not possible, properties and dimensions not 
covered by the research have to be acknowledged as limitations of the study (p.149).  
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areas that I might want to explore more. During this process, there were 
several questions that arose, in which I felt I needed to know more because the 
information could not be found in the official documents or the performance 
audit reports. Examples of these questions are: ‘What did the auditees think of 
the outstanding differences in opinion between the entity and the OAG?’, 
‘What was the experience like for the auditees; was there any reluctance?’ and 
‘How have the operations covered by the audit scope changed, and how much 
of this can be attributed to the audits?’ Hence, although initial coding on the 
textual documents was useful, there were several questions that remained, 
which official documents and performance audit reports did not answer.  
 
The codes generated from initial coding were tentatively placed into specific 
categories of concepts. There were many recurring codes as I progressed 
further into the coding process. This is not surprising because performance 
audit is centrally focussed on issues surrounding systems, processes and 
procedures. These codes are put into broad categories, which essentially 
capture performance audit in practice, and this is valuable knowledge as such 
information has never been reported in the literature.  
 
The next level of coding is focused coding, whereby new codes generated 
were allocated into the categories that were developed in initial coding. New 
codes largely arise from new data, particularly from interviews14. 
Additionally, I did random selection of data previously coded to check on the 
codes generated to avoid multiplication of codes with similar meaning but 
different terms, for example ‘monitoring’ and ‘oversight’.  
 
4.2.4 Memos 
 
Memos provided the basic structure of a grounded theory research and are 
conceived as “adaptable narrative tools for developing ideas and elaborating 
the social worlds of research sites” (Lempert, 2007, p.247). Essentially, 
memos provide a place for ‘intellectual conversations’ between researchers 
                                                 
14 As explained in Chapter 4, interviews are carried out due to the limited information provided by 
official documents and performance audit reports needed to answer this research question.  
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and their data, where researchers “find their own voices, and where they give 
themselves permission to formulate ideas, to play with them, to reconfigure 
them, to expand them, to explore them, and ultimately to distil them for 
publication and participation in conversation with others” (ibid). According to 
Holton (2007, p.265):  
“Memo construction differs from writing detailed description. Although 
typically based on description, memos raise that description to the theoretical 
level through the conceptual rendering of the material. Early in the process, 
memos arise from constant comparison of indicators to indicators, then 
indicators to concepts. These memos are often very brief, just a few lines. Later 
memos will be more extensive as they integrate the ideation of the earlier 
memos and will, in turn, generate new memos further raising the level of 
conceptualization.” 
Memos therefore, are at the heart of the thinking process and analysis of the 
research.  
 
Although memo-writing started at an early stage of the study, it was a 
continuous activity that recorded my thinking process and thought 
development throughout the research. Memo content included ideas from 
readings, interviews and even meetings with my supervisors. At the start of the 
research, memos included ideas from the initial coding process, ideas which 
would be further developed throughout the memo writing process. These 
memos make ‘initial memos’ and the ideas in initial memos sometimes change 
depending on new information found, for example earlier in a memo I wrote: 
“Reading through the performance audit reports it seems that most of them 
are not reader-friendly. Firstly, there is no particular format in terms of its 
content and there is an overcrowding of descriptive information. Secondly, in 
some reports it have been succinctly stated the reason of conducting the 
audit, but in some other reports there are no explicit reason for the audit. In 
addition, it could also be useful that the AG tells whether the audit was by 
the request of the Parliament, by recent issues or by the AG’s own initiative. 
As with other accountability reports, I believe there is much to be studied in 
terms of the report content and format of performance audit reports.”  
However, after gaining a better grasp of the performance audit reports, I wrote 
in a later memo:  
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“The reports in general are actually well organised, but still make a long read 
due to the descriptive content and repetition of such content. It would have 
been better if the descriptive content was reduced and with more 
straightforward points highlighted. Interestingly, this issue has also been 
raised by the Peer Review Team in their report (para 6.2.48) (OAG, 2008). 
The AG also does give reasoning for each audit and this is usually set to be 
consistent with the audit expectations. However, after studying the official 
documents and interviewing the entities, I feel that the situations faced by 
some of entities are not really reflected in the reports. On this note, there is 
little that can be derived from performance audit reports in terms of the 
impact because the reports do not really capture responses of the auditees, 
although this is valid since the OAG is not expected to reach an agreement 
with the auditees to maintain its independence.”  
  
In writing memos, I focused my thoughts around the research focus, which is 
the impact of performance audit on audited entities. There were points in the 
memos that were regarded as tentatively useful at the start of the research, but 
proved not to be part of the main focus in later stages of the research. The type 
of performance audit for example15, was deemed irrelevant to the whole focus 
of this research, and hence was included in earlier memos but not in the final 
draft.  
 
Memo-writing goes hand in hand with coding, as it also functions to make 
sense out of the codes generated. Advanced memo-writing is done after codes 
are derived from all data sources, including from the interviews. Hence during 
advanced memo-writing, ideas were generally developed from findings. These 
findings at the basic level come in the form of codes, but without ideas 
generated based on the background information, observation and a lot of 
thinking, the codes are just words. Therefore memos were used as a platform 
to develop these codes into more meaningful information through comparison 
and synthesis.  
                                                 
15 Shand and Anand (1996) categorised performance audit into substantive and systemic audits. At the 
start of the research, this was included into consideration, tentatively if the type adopted by New 
Zealand may leave influence the impact that performance audit has. However, upon reflection, the 
categorisation was deemed irrelevant. It may be more relevant in studies that do cross-country 
comparisons of performance audit practice, for example.  
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Towards the end of the analysis, memos were integrated with categories to 
form themes and discussions, as presented in Chapter 6. This process brings 
together memos from the initial-memo stage, through to the advanced-memo 
stage with refined categories. During this process, the literature and data were 
also revisited for further comparison and synthesis. The process picks up 
issues for additional insights and integration and develops knowledge derived 
from the analysis, especially on matters pertaining to performance 
improvement and performance accountability brought about by the audits. For 
this research, such information is known as ‘concepts’, falling under the larger 
themes of; ‘performance improvement’ or ‘performance accountability’.   
 
4.2.5 Concepts & Themes 
 
Concepts are the product of coding and memo writing, and ‘themes’ are used 
to denote higher level concepts. Themes (or sometimes called categories), are 
a cluster of lower-level concepts with similar properties that represent 
incidents, and these characteristics enable a researcher to manage data 
collection (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.159). In this research for example, 
‘performance accountability’ is a theme that is used to represent concepts like 
‘meeting public expectations’ and ‘implications/influence (of decisions) on the 
public’. Corbin and Strauss further explain that: 
“All concepts, regardless of level, arise out of data. It is just that some are 
more abstract than others. The process of conceptualizing data looks like this. 
The researcher scrutinizes the data in an attempt to understand the essence of 
what is being expressed in the raw data. Then, the researcher delineates a 
conceptual name to describe that understanding – a researcher denoted 
concept. Other times, participants provide the conceptualisation. A term that 
they use to speak about something is so vivid and descriptive that the 
researcher borrows it – an in-vivo code.” (p.160) 
However in-vivo codes are not necessarily derived from what participants 
‘speak about’ because data does not just come from interviews, although in 
grounded theory research such is common. Since my research triangulates 
data from textual documents and interviews, some in-vivo codes may arise 
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from the documents, and some from the interview participants. Regardless, 
the essence is that codes and concepts arise out of the data.  
 
Essentially, concepts are made of codes which have been synthesised, which 
went through the thought process of memo-writing. Like the coding process, 
there were also two stages of categorising to avoid multiplication of similar 
concepts. The first stage of conceptualisation came after initial coding and 
memo-writing. This stage is tentative as there was not only a long list of codes 
to be synthesised, but also the concepts themselves needed to be checked and 
refined to avoid repetition. The concepts were refined after focused coding 
was done and as advanced memo-writing took place.  
 
The result of the conceptualisation process is concepts that elucidate a 
comprehensive performance audit focus demonstrated in the seven audits 
studied. In particular, the concepts generated covered aspects from input, 
output and outcomes of the audited entities. These include resource 
management, planning, all the way through to the impact of the decisions that 
these entities make on the public and other stakeholders.  These concepts are 
in turn, developed from codes like ‘prioritisation’, ‘strategic direction’, 
‘annual plan’, and ‘consideration of stakeholders’. 
 
As discussed in section 4.2.5, ‘theme’ is the term used to denote higher level 
concepts. Hence, for this study, whilst ‘meeting statutory obligations’ and 
‘implications / influence’ on the public represent lower level concepts, these 
have been grouped together to represent a theme of ‘public accountability’. 
The themes identified by this study are discussed in further detail in Chapter 
6.  
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Adapted from Charmaz (2006, p.11) 
Research 
question 
Figure 7 
Framework of the Research Process 
Data Collection: Official Information 
Requests, Performance Audit Reports  
Initial coding 
Initial memo 
Codes are tentatively put into categories  
Data collection: Interviews 
Focussed coding  
Advanced memo writing  
Integrating memos 
Refining & diagramming concepts 
 
Conceptualisation: Themes 
First draft  
Re-examination of 
earlier data 
Literature Review / 
Sensitising Concepts 
L
inking findings w
ith prior literature  
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4.3 Theoretical Perspective: Interpretivism - Symbolic Interactionism  
 
All methodologies are underpinned by beliefs of knowledge, and for this reason I 
choose to elucidate the assumptions underlying the methodology adopted in this 
study. Crotty (1998, p. 66) has clearly explained the relation between theoretical 
perspective and methodology; 
“`Theoretical perspective’ is being taken here to mean the philosophical stance 
lying behind a methodology. The theoretical perspective provides a context for the 
process involved and a basis for its logic and its criteria. Another way to put it is to 
say that, whenever one examines a particular methodology, one discovers a 
complexus of assumptions buried within it. It is these assumptions that constitute 
one’s theoretical perspective and they largely have to do with the world that the 
methodology envisages. Different ways of viewing the world shape different ways 
of researching the world.”  
Theoretical perspective to a certain extent reflects where a researcher is coming from. 
Within the area of my research interest for example, I do not believe quantifying the 
knowledge will add much meaning to the knowledge base. Hence rather than 
answering the research question through hypothesis testing, I am more interested in 
investigating what the actors would make of it. Having said that, I also do not think it 
is necessary for all cases to let software and computer programmes do the thinking in 
a research, as this also will not provide much meaning to the researcher. Software and 
computer programmes are useful tools to aid research, but what adds value to the 
research is the thought process of the researcher.  
 
This research is done based on the assumptions of Symbolic Interactionism, which 
has roots in Interpretivism and Pragmatism (Crotty, 1998; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
Interpretivism as a theoretical perspective has branches out to several schools of 
thoughts distinct in their own right; into symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and 
hermeneutics (Crotty, 1998, p.5). Theoretical perspective embodies the broad 
assumption that interpretations are “culturally derived and historically situated” 
(p.67). This research applies the views of symbolic interactionism. As the name 
suggests, symbolic interactionism assumes that meanings and knowledge are created 
through human interaction. Meanings in a symbolic interactionist world hence are 
created through action. Here the Pragmatist philosophy is reflected in that human 
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action (in practice) creates problems which are taken to be studied, and the knowledge 
that results feeds into action, and the process reiterates to provide cumulative 
knowledge as we know now. For this reason pragmatists believe that “for the time 
being this is what we know – but eventually it may be judged partly or even wholly 
wrong” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.4). Hence, the current knowledge is seen as a 
contribution to the evolution of knowledge in society. This is my sentiment exactly as 
the researcher in this study: that there exists an opportunity for new knowledge by 
studying human action and interaction in the field of performance audit in New 
Zealand. What is it that the OAG does that leaves an impact on public entities and 
subsequently the public sector? How does the action of the OAG with performance 
audit impact the audited entities, if it does so at all? How does the interaction between 
the OAG and the auditees of performance audit create an impact both on the entities 
and the public sector? These questions can only be answered by looking at practice 
itself, which mirrors the crucial interplay between research and practice central to the 
Pragmatist philosophy.  
 
4.4 Epistemology: Constructionism 
 
Many researchers adopt Constructionism, without succinctly acknowledging it or 
perhaps without finding the necessity to do so (Sinclair, 1995; Abdul-Rahman and 
Goddard, 1998; Jacobs, 1998; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Lye, Perera and Rahman, 
2005). As with the theoretical perspective, I find it useful to elucidate the worldview 
that underlies this study to aid greater understanding of the methodology, and 
consequently the findings of this study. The most basic tenet of this epistemological 
stance is that knowledge, meanings and truth are all constructed by humans, as 
opposed to being discovered16. Crotty (1998, p.42) describes this epistemological 
stance in short: 
“It is the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is 
contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction 
between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an 
essentially social context.”  
                                                 
16 The discovery of meaning is taught by the conservative school of thought; positivism, which believes 
that meanings are waiting to be discovered by human, and that these meanings/objects exist with or 
without the consciousness or human/subjects.  
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Seeing the world through the eyes of a Constructionist, one can find many instances 
of constructions of reality in societies. Languages, currencies, politics, nationalism, 
cultures – they are all socially constructed; what is true in one society does not make 
it true in the other, or what is true in the past doesn’t make it true now. However, 
social constructions do not apply only in social science, but also in natural science. 
Crotty (1998, p.54) warns of the difference between `the construction of social 
reality’ and ‘social construction of reality’, with the latter being the correct stance of 
the epistemology. He uses an example of a tree, being a natural object yet having 
different meanings according to what societies make of it, and that natural scientists 
may enter a study of trees with different conceptions of a tree, according to their 
respective backgrounds.  
 
Performance audit as a social construction also has these traits whereby its 
characteristics are largely determined by historical, cultural, constitutional and 
societal rudiments surrounding it. Although in a very broad sense performance audit 
is taken to represent audits of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the reality of it 
in practice varies greatly in terms of mandate, scope, approach, methodology and 
reporting across different jurisdictions. The impetus and antecedents of the 
development also vary, leading to different forms of performance audit, different 
objectives for performance audit and consequently different achievements between 
different countries (Shand and Anand, 1996). Therefore, performance audit is taken 
to be a product of social construction in this study.  
 
There are of course several important consequences of having this worldview as the 
basic assumption of one’s research. Due to the continual nature of construction by 
societies, Crotty (1998, p. 16) postulates that under Constructionism, no knowledge 
and meaning is “objective, absolute, or truly generalisable”. This statement definitely 
applies to this research. In studying the impact of performance audit on seven public 
entities, I bring my skills and prior knowledge which do have an influence on the 
direction and the outcome of the research. Thus other researchers studying the same 
area or even the same entities might provide a different outlook. Yet each study on 
performance auditing contributes to the accumulation of knowledge in the area, 
enriching the performance audit scene in practice. Also, it is virtually impossible to 
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generalise the outcomes of the study given the Constructionist nature of the activity, 
hence I do not see this as a limitation, instead it is an inherent nature of the study.   
 
Chapter Conclusion  
 
Underlying this research are the beliefs and assumptions of social interactionists, 
which belong to a wider body of knowledge called Constructionism. The 
understanding provided by the philosophy of Constructionism is that performance 
audit is the product of various antecedents like the political and economic 
environment, the AG in office and also international movements like the NPM. With 
the belief that performance audit is a social construct, this research analysed seven 
performance audits undertaken in 2006 against the backdrop of the New Zealand 
public sector from the late 1960s to the early twenty first century. In addition, the 
analysis was also done without imposing a priori knowledge to learn the dynamics of 
performance audit that were constructed by its surrounding. The methodology of 
grounded theory allowed for such assessment, however, since I am not seeking to 
develop a theory, only several aspects of grounded theory were applied to this 
research. In learning about performance audit in New Zealand, analysis was done on 
three data sources, namely: performance audit reports, official documents and 
interviews with auditees. The analysis included coding, memo-writing and 
conceptualising, which consequently provided concepts and themes that informed an 
understanding of performance audit practice in New Zealand.  
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Chapter 5 – Findings  
Chapter four has laid out the theoretical foundation of the research and this chapter 
presents the actual adoption of the theoretical framework in this study, as well as the 
findings resulting from the adoption. In particular, this chapter provides background 
information and details of the sample derived from the data and literature.   
 
“It is the freedom to think, the ability of the researcher to change his or her 
mind, to check out ideas, and to follow the data trail wherever it leads that 
makes the findings derived through qualitative research so compelling and 
relevant and the process of getting there such an exciting voyage of discovery.” 
(Corbin and Strauss, p. 228)  
 
Chapter Introduction  
 
In 2006, there were fourteen performance audits carried out by the OAG (Appendix 
1). These include performance audits on central and local agencies, cross-sector 
audits, and follow-up audits. As discussed in chapter 4, this study is only interested in 
audits of single central government agencies, which brings the number of the entities 
in the sample to seven. The performance audits in the sample are:  
§ The Treasury: Capability to recognise and respond to issues for Maori 
§ Foundation for Research Science and Technology (FRST): Administration of 
grant programmes 
§ Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF): Managing bio-security risks 
associated with high-risk sea containers 
§ Department of Conservation  (DOC): Planning for and managing publicly 
owned land 
§ Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC): Effectiveness of programmes to 
buy and lease properties for state housing 
§ Ministry of Education (MOE): Management of the school property portfolio 
§ Ministry of Social Development (MSD): Performance of the contract centre for 
Work and Income 
Although small in number, this sample provides a good range of activities and issues 
that concern a particular public entity. For example, this sample includes entities in 
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the agricultural, housing and education sector, with each having different 
stakeholders, issues, concerns and legislative arrangements.  
 
5.1 Performance Audit Reports and Official Documents  
 
As detailed in section 4.1.2, in the data collection stage performance audit reports of 
these seven audits were acquired and official information requests were sent to the 
respective entities. Next, initial analysis was done on these documents, which are 
presented by entity as follows: 
 
5.1.1 The Treasury 
 
The Treasury is the lead economic advisor to the government, providing a 
wide range of outputs and services. These include managing the financial 
affairs of the Crown, giving policy advice, and forecasting and reporting fiscal 
and economic activities (Directory of Official Information, 2005). The 
Treasury also aims to improve the living standard of all New Zealanders 
(Treasury, 2009). As a lead advisor to the government, the Treasury is a very 
important agency in New Zealand’s fiscal and economic performance. This 
subsequently has an impact on the public as they are most likely to be affected 
by the decisions made and advice given by the Treasury.  
 
In 2006, the AG carried out a performance audit to assess the capability of the 
Treasury to recognise and respond to issues for Maori (OAG, 2006g). In New 
Zealand, the state has a special accountability towards the Maori arising from 
the Treaty of Waitangi17, as explained by the Court of Appeal in 1987 (Green 
and Singleton, 2009, p.147). The audit essentially looked at the effectiveness 
of the systems and procedures in terms of dealing with issues for Maori. It 
followed the Third Report for 1998 which included a Part entitled ‘Delivering 
Effective Outputs for Maori’ (OAG, 2006g, p.5). The issue is important, 
consistent with the social and economic goals that the government set for New 
                                                 
17 “The Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand’s founding document…The Treaty is an agreement, in 
Maori and English, that was made between the British Crown and about 540 Maori rangatira (chiefs)” 
(The Treaty in brief, 2010).  
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Zealanders generally, which encompasses Maori. The audit found that overall 
the Treasury was recognising and responding effectively to issues for Maori, 
although there were two areas that were suggested for improvement. The 
recommendations of the audit are as detailed in Table 2. The Treasury was 
found to have plans in place, as well as sufficient systems, structures and 
processes to recognise and respond not only to Maori people in general, but 
also to its Maori staff (OAG, 2006g). The AG also advised that “other 
departments may find the methods that the Treasury has used to improve the 
capability of its staff a useful model for their own efforts to do the same” 
(p.3). The advice reflects the use of the performance audit report by the AG as 
a tool to promote knowledge sharing of management best practice within the 
New Zealand public sector.  
 
Table 2 
Capability to Recognise and Respond to Issues for Maori: Audit 
Recommendations 
No  Recommendations to the Treasury (OAG, 2006g) 
 Preparing staff to recognise and respond to issues for Maori 
1 Ensure that new employees, including managers, are provided with 
information about the activities and resources available within the 
Treasury to recognise and respond to issues for Maori. 
2 When its standardised frameworks for analysing Maori policy issues 
are sufficiently reliable, the Treasury draw up a set of competencies 
to ensure that there is a common body of knowledge and skills among 
staff to respond to Treaty of Waitangi and Maori issues. 
 
The official documents provided by the Treasury contained information on the 
initial correspondence between the OAG and the Treasury, as well as a work 
plan and process for Maori Responsiveness by the Treasury’s Maori 
Responsiveness Group (MRG). No response of the Treasury to the findings or 
recommendations however, was provided. Hence based on the official 
information available, it cannot be said if these recommendations have been 
implemented or followed up by the Treasury. In addition, although the paper 
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by the MRG discussed issues and plans for Maori Responsiveness, it did not 
specifically address the recommendations made by the audit. There was 
reported progress against the 2004/05 work plan on the design and delivery of 
training courses that is relevant to Maori Responsiveness, but there was no 
mention of how this relates to creating awareness to new employees in terms 
of recognising and responding to issues for Maori. There was also no mention 
of implementing the second recommendation from the audit. Despite the lack 
of information in the official documents regarding the response to the audit 
recommendations, the documents illustrated a good auditor-auditee 
relationship between the Treasury and the OAG. Generally, the Treasury staff 
were very responsive and co-operative to the requests of the performance 
auditors in gathering data and understanding the capabilities of the Treasury in 
recognising and responding to issues for Maori.  
 
 5.1.2 Foundation for Research, Science and Technology  
 
The core mission of the Foundation is to “invest for results from research, 
science and technology to deliver greater prosperity, security and opportunities 
to all New Zealanders” (FRST, 2009). In line with this mission, its function is 
to invest on behalf of the government in research, science and technology 
(RS&T) to enhance the wealth and well-being of New Zealanders (Directory 
of Official Information, 2005). It also has three specific roles in building the 
future New Zealand economy, which are;  
“i) purchasing public good RS&T with sound investment decision to 
maximise public returns  
ii) being an intelligent purchaser by adding value to the public funds, and  
iii) providing policy advice to the government on RS&T issues” (ibid) 
 
As part of its role, the Foundation administers grant programmes for RS&T. It 
is the largest public sector provider of grants for RS&T, administering grant 
programmes worth more than $400 million a year (OAG, 2006b). In 2006 the 
AG conducted a performance audit on these programmes as part of a 3-year 
series of examining grant programmes administered by various public entities. 
It was deemed important that grant programmes are efficiently administered, 
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and that public funding was allocated as intended by the government. The 
criteria set for this audit were hence Ministerial criteria in administering grant 
programmes. Overall, the OAG concluded that the FRST is effectively 
administering the grant programmes and scheme examined in the audit18. The 
audit identified several areas for improvement, in which the OAG made 
recommendations for the FRST to act upon. There were seven 
recommendations in total, focussing on areas of grant assessments, database 
systems, and roles and responsibilities between the FRST and the Ministry of 
Research, Science and Technology. These recommendations are detailed in 
Table 3. 
 
According to one of the official documents, the FRST was “pretty happy” with 
the draft report provided to them for comment (FRST, 2006). There were no 
major differences in views regarding the audit recommendations, although 
there were several areas in the draft report that the FRST commented on to 
better reflect the operations of the FRST in administering grant programmes. 
The FRST response to each of the seven recommendations made is also 
detailed in Table 3. The FRST also noted that some of the recommendations 
made by the OAG had already been identified by their Business Redesign 
project team (FRST, 2006). Hence, although the audit recommended 
consistent file identification for its database system for example, this was 
already in the process of being implemented under a large scale redesign 
project called ‘Project Phoenix’19. The consequence of this situation is that, 
when the database system was indeed upgraded, the OAG’s recommendation 
could appear as the dominant driver of the improvement, whereas this change 
was already planned. Therefore the improvement made in this area was not 
necessarily triggered by the performance audit. In this sense, it would not be 
accurate to claim that the performance audit led to the improvement when the 
issue had already been identified by the entity itself and was in the process of 
being addressed through its own initiative.  
                                                 
18 A case study approach was taken to conduct the audit where the OAG selected random grant 
applications to be audited.  
19 At the time when the response in Table 3 was made, the implementation into Project Pheonix was 
only in the planning phase.  
 
69
T
ab
le
 3
 
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
of
 G
ra
nt
 P
ro
gr
am
m
es
: A
ud
it
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
ti
on
s 
an
d 
A
ud
it
ee
 R
es
po
ns
e 
N
o  
R
ec
om
m
en
da
ti
on
s 
to
 th
e 
F
R
ST
  
F
R
ST
 R
es
po
ns
e 
(d
ir
ec
tl
y 
qu
ot
ed
 fr
om
 F
R
ST
 (2
00
6)
) 
 
T
he
 G
ra
nt
s 
fo
r 
P
ri
va
te
 S
ec
to
r 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
&
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t (
G
P
SR
D
) s
ch
em
e 
 
1 
E
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 it
s 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
pr
oc
es
s 
fo
r a
w
ar
di
ng
 
G
PS
R
D
 m
ee
t t
he
 M
in
is
te
ri
al
 
cr
ite
ri
on
 th
at
 a
 p
ro
je
ct
 is
 
lik
el
y 
to
 s
ta
rt
 s
oo
ne
r a
nd
 
co
m
pl
et
e 
ea
rl
ie
r w
ith
 
fu
nd
in
g 
su
pp
or
t. 
W
e 
ar
e 
ha
pp
y 
to
 a
cc
ep
t t
hi
s 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
bu
t O
A
G
 m
ay
 w
is
h 
to
 a
dd
 s
om
e 
fu
rt
he
r c
on
te
xt
 
be
ar
in
g 
in
 m
in
d 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
m
m
en
ts
.  
T
he
 F
ou
nd
at
io
n 
do
es
 a
ss
es
s 
bu
t n
ot
 d
oc
um
en
t t
hi
s 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 c
ri
te
ri
on
 in
 th
e 
T
ec
hN
Z
 d
at
ab
as
e.
 
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e 
it 
is
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 b
ot
h 
th
e 
“T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
fo
r 
B
us
in
es
s 
G
ro
w
th
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t C
ri
te
ri
a”
 
an
d 
th
e 
“I
nv
es
tm
en
t a
nd
 R
et
ur
ns
 A
ss
es
sm
en
t C
ri
te
ri
a”
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 th
e 
w
eb
si
te
 w
hi
ch
 c
ov
er
 
bo
th
 T
B
G
 (T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
fo
r B
us
in
es
s 
G
ro
w
th
) &
 G
PS
R
D
 w
hi
ch
 s
ta
te
s:
 
Th
e 
F
ou
nd
at
io
n 
ai
m
s 
to
 fu
nd
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
th
at
 a
re
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 to
 w
ha
t w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 r
ea
lis
ed
 w
ith
ou
t i
ts
 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t, 
or
 a
t l
ea
st
 th
at
 w
ill
 s
ta
rt
 o
r 
co
m
pl
et
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 s
oo
ne
r 
or
 b
e 
do
ne
 b
et
te
r 
w
ith
 th
an
 
w
ith
ou
t. 
P
ro
po
se
d 
R
&
D
 th
at
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
do
ne
 a
s 
w
el
l w
ith
ou
t G
ov
er
nm
en
t s
up
po
rt
 w
ill
 n
ot
 s
co
re
 h
ig
hl
y.
  
In
 o
rd
er
 to
 s
ec
ur
e 
gr
an
t f
un
di
ng
 th
e 
Fo
un
da
tio
n 
pl
ac
es
 e
xt
ra
 d
em
an
ds
 o
n 
a 
co
m
pa
ny
 th
ro
ug
h 
its
 
ap
pr
ov
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
 s
uc
h 
as
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
a 
de
ta
ile
d 
pr
oj
ec
t p
la
n 
an
d 
sp
ec
if
yi
ng
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 re
tu
rn
s 
et
c 
w
hi
ch
 g
iv
e 
an
y 
gr
an
t f
un
de
d 
pr
oj
ec
t a
 b
et
te
r c
ha
nc
e 
of
 s
uc
ce
ss
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 a
n 
un
fu
nd
ed
 
pr
oj
ec
t. 
 
So
m
e 
cr
ite
ri
a 
le
nd
 th
em
se
lv
es
 to
 e
xp
lic
it 
sc
or
in
g 
an
d 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
is
 c
od
if
ie
d 
ca
pt
ur
e 
in
 o
ur
 
T
ec
hN
Z
 d
at
ab
as
e.
 T
he
 c
ri
te
ri
on
 o
f “
w
he
th
er
 a
 p
ro
je
ct
 is
 li
ke
ly
 to
 s
ta
rt
 s
oo
ne
r a
nd
 c
om
pl
et
e 
 
70
ea
rl
ie
r w
ith
 th
e 
sc
he
m
e’
s 
su
pp
or
t”
 is
 e
ff
ec
tiv
el
y 
a 
ye
s/
no
 q
ue
st
io
n 
th
at
 is
 a
ns
w
er
ed
 to
 th
e 
Fo
un
da
tio
n’
s 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
 (n
ot
in
g 
th
at
 a
ll 
po
te
nt
ia
l g
ra
nt
 re
ci
pi
en
ts
 
w
ou
ld
 a
ns
w
er
 “
ye
s”
 a
ny
w
ay
). 
C
od
if
yi
ng
 th
is
 y
es
/n
o 
qu
es
tio
n 
ca
n 
be
 d
on
e 
ea
si
ly
 b
ut
 p
ro
ba
bl
y 
w
on
’t
 a
dd
 a
 g
re
at
 d
ea
l o
f v
al
ue
 to
 th
e 
G
PS
R
D
 in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
ce
ss
 s
o 
fo
r t
he
se
 p
ra
gm
at
ic
 re
as
on
s 
w
e 
do
n’
t c
od
if
y 
it 
in
 T
ec
hN
Z
 d
at
ab
as
e.
 
2 
R
ev
ie
w
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 
ex
is
tin
g 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 w
ith
 
ev
al
ua
tin
g 
ag
en
ts
 o
f t
he
 
G
PS
R
D
 s
ch
em
e 
fo
r 
ev
al
ua
tin
g 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 
pr
oj
ec
t. 
A
gr
ee
d.
  
 
T
he
 T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
fo
r 
B
us
in
es
s 
G
ro
w
th
 (T
B
G
) s
ch
em
e 
 
3 
E
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 it
s 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
fo
r a
w
ar
di
ng
 T
B
G
 
gr
an
ts
 m
ee
t t
he
 M
in
is
te
ri
al
 
cr
ite
ri
on
 th
at
 a
 p
ro
je
ct
 is
 n
ot
 
lik
el
y 
to
 p
ro
ce
ed
 w
ith
ou
t t
he
 
sc
he
m
e’
s 
fu
nd
in
g 
su
pp
or
t. 
C
om
m
en
ts
 (f
or
 R
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
n 
1)
 a
pp
ly
 h
er
e 
fo
r t
he
 s
am
e 
re
as
on
s.
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
 u
nd
er
 T
B
G
 th
e 
Fo
un
da
tio
n 
im
po
se
s 
ad
di
tio
na
l v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t s
ub
 c
ri
te
ri
a 
of
 “
P
at
hw
ay
 to
 m
ar
ke
t”
 a
nd
 “
A
bi
lit
y 
to
 d
el
iv
er
” 
as
 n
ot
ed
 u
nd
er
 c
la
us
e 
3.
14
 (o
f t
he
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
ud
it 
re
po
rt
). 
T
he
se
 a
re
 in
 e
ff
ec
t t
he
 
ex
te
ns
io
n 
an
d 
co
di
fi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
hi
gh
er
 “
no
t l
ik
el
y 
to
 p
ro
ce
ed
” 
cr
ite
ri
a 
la
id
 o
ut
 in
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
ri
al
 N
ot
ic
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
ga
in
 w
ou
ld
 ju
st
 b
e 
a 
ye
s/
no
 q
ue
st
io
n.
  
In
 o
th
er
 w
or
ds
 w
e 
w
ou
ld
 a
rg
ue
 th
at
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 fo
r T
B
G
 w
e 
al
re
ad
y 
go
 q
ui
te
 s
om
e 
di
st
an
ce
 
fu
rt
he
r t
ha
n 
re
qu
ir
ed
 b
y 
ju
st
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
ri
al
 N
ot
ic
e.
 
 
71
4 
A
m
en
d 
its
 w
eb
-b
as
ed
 
sy
st
em
 fo
r a
dm
in
is
te
ri
ng
 
T
B
G
 g
ra
nt
s 
to
 a
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
 
de
te
ct
 b
re
ac
he
s 
of
 fu
nd
in
g 
lim
its
. 
A
gr
ee
d.
 W
ill
 b
e 
in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
to
 th
e 
B
us
in
es
s 
Pr
oc
es
s 
re
de
si
gn
 p
ro
je
ct
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 u
nd
er
w
ay
. 
5 
C
le
ar
ly
 re
co
rd
 in
 p
ap
er
 fi
le
s 
or
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
sy
st
em
s 
th
e 
re
as
on
s 
fo
r a
pp
ro
ve
d 
va
ri
at
io
ns
 to
 p
ay
m
en
t 
dr
aw
do
w
n 
sc
he
du
le
s 
by
 
gr
an
ts
 re
ci
pi
en
ts
. 
A
gr
ee
d.
 W
ill
 b
e 
in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
to
 th
e 
B
us
in
es
s 
Pr
oc
es
s 
re
de
si
gn
 p
ro
je
ct
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 u
nd
er
w
ay
. 
 
T
he
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
fo
r 
In
du
st
ry
 (R
F
I)
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e 
6 
U
se
 a
 c
on
si
st
en
t f
ile
 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ys
te
m
 fo
r i
ts
 
R
FI
 g
ra
nt
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e,
 s
o 
th
at
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 c
an
 b
e 
ea
si
ly
 li
nk
ed
 to
 a
pp
ro
ve
d 
gr
an
ts
. 
A
gr
ee
d.
 W
ill
 b
e 
in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
to
 th
e 
B
us
in
es
s 
Pr
oc
es
s 
re
de
si
gn
 p
ro
je
ct
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 u
nd
er
w
ay
. 
 
72
7 
L
ia
is
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
R
es
ea
rc
h,
 S
ci
en
ce
 a
nd
 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
to
 d
ef
in
e 
cl
ea
rl
y 
th
ei
r r
es
pe
ct
iv
e 
ro
le
s 
an
d 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
fo
r 
ev
al
ua
tin
g 
gr
an
ts
 
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 a
dm
in
is
te
re
d 
by
 
th
e 
Fo
un
da
tio
n.
 
A
gr
ee
d.
 
        
 73
5.1.3 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) has a responsibility for 
biological resources of New Zealand. The Ministry exists with the aim to 
achieve  “sustainable economic growth and prosperity for New Zealanders, 
healthy New Zealanders and a vibrant rural community, and maintained and 
enhanced economic, social and cultural benefits for New Zealanders from the 
natural environment” (MAF, 2009). In carrying out its role, the Ministry is 
supported by a divisional arm, Biosecurity New Zealand (Biosecurity NZ), 
which is responsible for the country’s biosecurity system. Biosecurity NZ’s 
role is to facilitate international trade, protect the health of New Zealanders 
and ensure the welfare of New Zealand’s environment, flora and fauna, marine 
life and Maori resources (Biosecurity NZ, 2009).  
 
The performance audit carried out in 2006 specifically looked at the 
management of biosecurity risks associated with high-risk sea containers. This 
area is within the remit of Biosecurity NZ. The AG decided to audit the 
management of biosecurity risks by the Ministry due to the large number of 
sea containers coming into the country each year, and the risks that some 
containers may bring to the well being, health, environment and economy of 
New Zealanders (OAG, 2006d). The audit focussed on how the Ministry 
“identifies, inspects, and manages the decontamination of sea containers that 
pose the highest biosecurity risks” (p.2). In particular, the audit examined 
three main areas; the implementation of Import Health Standard for Sea 
Containers from All Countries (the Standard) by the Ministry, the 
identification of high-risk sea containers through risk profiling, and the 
processes involved in relation to biosecurity clearance for high risk sea 
containers. The audit found that there was a delay in implementing the 
Standard and hence, although the Ministry is generally effective in mitigating 
risks, the effectiveness may be hindered to some extent by this delay (ibid). 
The recommendations made by the audit to the MAF are detailed in Table 4.  
 
The official documents relating to the audit highlight the usefulness of the 
audit to the MAF in terms of managing sea containers. Generally all 
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recommendations were accepted and addressed through an ad-hoc plan which 
arose from the audit recommendations called ‘Sea Container Management 
Plan’ (MAF, 2007). The specific response made by the MAF to the OAG is 
also provided in Table 4. It is interesting to note that although the MAF 
generally “agrees with all the recommendations” (MAF, 2006, p.2), in its 
response to some of the recommendations it stated that it “needs greater 
ability” (ibid) or the recommendation “has significant resource implication for 
MAF” (p.3). Hence, where such responses were given, it is not clear whether 
the recommendation was adopted or not. However, in its follow-up to the 
OAG, the MAF commented that: 
 “The audit, and the subsequent work on addressing the recommendations, 
has reinforced MAF’s responsibilities for effective and efficient management 
of the sea container pathway. It also has prompted a rethink back to best 
management practices”.  (ibid)  
This comment clearly reflects that the entity regarded the performance audit as 
a contributor to its improvement in managing sea containers.  
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at
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 o
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at
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5.1.4 Department of Conservation  
 
Significant land, natural and historic resources of New Zealand are under the 
care of the Department of Conservation. In providing for these resources it 
administers a wide range of legislation, regulations and bylaws (Directory of 
Official Information, 2005). Its remit includes national and conservation parks, 
reserves and protected natural areas, protected indigenous forests, protected 
inland waters, and wild and scenic rivers, wildlife, freshwater fisheries, game 
birds, historic resources on land under its administration, and managing 
marine reserves and protecting marine mammals (ibid). It also functions to 
carry out several roles including giving advice to the Minister of Conservation 
and managing land and other natural and historical resources23 for 
conservation purposes. The Department operates under the core vision of 
preserving and protecting resources to maintain their intrinsic values, 
providing for their appreciation and recreational enjoyment by the public, and 
safe guarding the options of future generations (p.101).  
 
The performance audit carried out in 2006 specifically concentrated on the 
planning and managing of publicly owned land. According to the OAG report, 
publicly owned land managed by the Department covers nearly a third of the 
total land area of the country (OAG, 2006a). In auditing the management of 
and planning for publicly owned land, the OAG focused on three specific 
areas which are; strategic planning, management systems and information 
systems. The AG found that the Department’s performance in managing and 
planning for publicly owned land “met or partially met” his expectations. 
According to the report;  
“The Department had policies and objectives for land within its statutory 
planning documents, and comprehensive management and information 
systems. However, the Department’s strategic planning, management 
systems, and information systems were not always well connected” (OAG, 
2006a, p.7).  
                                                 
23 Those held under the Conservation Act 1987, or those that the owner agrees to be managed by the 
Department (Directory of Official Information, 2005).  
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Following these findings, there were nine recommendations made from the 
audit dealing with a national strategic plan for land, central oversight for land 
management and land information systems. These recommendations are 
detailed in Table 5. The DOC’s response to each recommendation is also 
included in the same table.   
 
Due to the detailed nature of the audit subject, there remained disagreements 
between the OAG and the Department at the conclusion of the audit. The 
official documents highlighted these differences in the responses of the 
Department to the OAG, particularly in areas where the findings did not meet 
the audit expectations. The Department responded that it operates in a 
“resource-constrained” context and hence explained that: 
 “While it might be reasonable to expect comprehensive planning, 
compliance monitoring, standardised responses, etc in a different context, I 
need to prioritise planning work, respond to a changing environment, and 
ensure that processes achieve the desired result” (DOC, 2006b) 
Hence, although in the main the recommendations from the audit were 
accepted by the DOC, there were a small number of recommendations that 
were not implemented due to the reasons specified in DOC’s response (Table 
5). This case provides an excellent example of why some audit 
recommendations are not implemented by the audited entity. The question is, 
does the decision to decline audit recommendations hinder performance 
improvement in the entity? This research will attempt to answer this question 
through the analysis. 
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ew
ed
 th
e 
w
or
k.
 R
el
ev
an
t 
m
at
er
ia
l w
as
 in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
to
 th
e 
G
en
er
al
 P
ol
ic
ie
s 
un
de
r t
he
 N
at
io
na
l P
ar
ks
 a
nd
 
C
on
se
rv
at
io
n 
A
ct
s 
th
at
 w
er
e 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 in
 A
pr
il 
20
05
, a
nd
 a
ft
er
 c
om
pl
et
in
g 
th
at
 p
ro
ce
ss
 
th
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t c
on
cl
ud
ed
 th
at
 a
ny
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 n
at
io
na
l g
ui
da
nc
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
be
st
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
ot
he
r p
ro
ce
ss
es
, s
uc
h 
as
 b
us
in
es
s 
pl
an
ni
ng
 a
nd
 b
ro
ad
er
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 w
or
k.
  
T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t d
oe
s 
no
t, 
th
er
ef
or
e,
 a
gr
ee
 w
ith
 th
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
O
A
G
. 
 
L
an
d 
M
an
ag
em
en
t S
ys
te
m
s 
3 
Pr
ep
ar
e 
gu
id
an
ce
 fo
r c
on
se
rv
an
ci
es
 in
 
T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t d
ev
el
op
s 
ce
nt
ra
l g
ui
da
nc
e 
w
he
re
 w
e 
co
ns
id
er
 th
at
 th
is
 is
 c
os
t e
ff
ec
tiv
e.
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se
tti
ng
 p
ri
or
iti
es
 w
ith
in
 b
us
in
es
s 
pl
an
s 
th
at
 a
re
 c
le
ar
ly
 li
nk
ed
 to
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 fo
r l
an
d.
 
T
he
re
 a
re
 a
 n
um
be
r o
f s
ta
nd
ar
d 
op
er
at
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 in
 p
la
ce
, a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
pl
an
ni
ng
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
an
d 
br
oa
de
r p
ol
ic
ie
s.
  
T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t r
ec
og
ni
se
s 
ho
w
ev
er
, t
ha
t i
n 
a 
de
ce
nt
ra
lis
ed
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
n,
 a
 b
al
an
ce
 is
 
ne
ed
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
ac
hi
ev
in
g 
co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
an
d 
pr
ev
en
tin
g 
fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
 in
 th
e 
fa
ce
 o
f l
oc
al
 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s.
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, p
ro
vi
di
ng
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
gu
id
an
ce
 is
 a
n 
ex
pe
ns
iv
e 
ex
er
ci
se
, w
hi
ch
 
di
ve
rt
s 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
fr
om
 o
th
er
 w
or
k.
 T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t t
he
re
fo
re
 p
ri
or
iti
se
s 
th
e 
ar
ea
s 
th
at
 it
 
ad
dr
es
se
s.
  
T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t a
ls
o 
us
es
 m
et
ho
ds
 o
th
er
 th
an
 w
ri
tte
n 
gu
id
an
ce
 to
 im
pr
ov
e 
co
ns
is
te
nc
y 
an
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. T
hi
s 
in
cl
ud
es
 n
at
io
na
l w
or
ks
ho
ps
 o
f s
ta
ff
 w
or
ki
ng
 in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 a
re
as
 
(e
.g
. s
ta
tu
to
ry
 la
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
), 
m
an
ag
em
en
t b
y 
w
al
ki
ng
 a
bo
ut
, 
em
ai
l n
et
w
or
ks
 o
f s
ta
ff
, e
tc
.  
4 
Fo
rm
al
ly
 m
on
ito
r c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 
re
le
va
nt
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
op
er
at
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 o
f a
ll 
la
nd
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
un
de
rt
ak
en
 b
y 
co
ns
er
va
nc
ie
s.
 
T
hr
ou
gh
 it
s 
co
ns
er
va
nc
y 
of
fi
ce
s 
th
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t d
ea
ls
 w
ith
 a
 la
rg
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 o
f v
ar
io
us
 ty
pe
s 
ea
ch
 y
ea
r. 
T
o 
m
on
ito
r c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
in
 e
ac
h 
ca
se
 w
ou
ld
 re
qu
ir
e 
m
or
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
th
an
 w
e 
co
ns
id
er
 w
ar
ra
nt
ed
. T
he
 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t p
re
fe
rs
 to
 o
ff
er
 s
up
po
rt
 a
nd
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
its
 H
ea
d 
O
ff
ic
e 
st
af
f. 
C
on
se
rv
an
ci
es
 a
re
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
d 
to
 s
ee
k 
he
lp
 w
ith
 c
om
pl
ex
 o
r s
en
si
tiv
e 
ca
se
s.
 T
hi
s 
of
te
n 
in
vo
lv
es
 c
om
m
en
t o
n 
dr
af
t c
as
es
, p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 th
os
e 
th
at
 h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r f
or
 d
ec
is
io
n.
 S
om
e 
st
an
da
rd
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 in
cl
ud
e 
te
m
pl
at
es
 a
nd
 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
ca
se
 fo
rm
at
s 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 d
es
ig
ne
d 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
 
ar
e 
m
et
. A
s 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l m
at
te
rs
, n
or
m
al
 in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
it 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
w
ou
ld
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pr
ov
id
e 
pe
ri
od
ic
 c
he
ck
s 
on
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
.  
5 
R
ev
ie
w
 re
ce
nt
 la
nd
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
un
de
rt
ak
en
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
L
an
d 
A
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
Fu
nd
 (L
A
F)
, a
nd
 b
y 
al
l 
co
ns
er
va
nc
ie
s,
 to
 id
en
tif
y 
an
y 
co
m
m
on
 d
ef
ic
ie
nc
ie
s 
an
d 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 
ar
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
.  
T
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f d
et
ai
l i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 L
A
F 
ca
se
s 
va
ri
es
 b
ut
 a
ll 
co
ns
er
va
nc
ie
s 
ar
e 
aw
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
ne
ed
 to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
be
st
 p
os
si
bl
e 
ca
se
 fo
r f
un
di
ng
 a
nd
 th
er
ef
or
e 
pu
t i
n 
th
e 
ef
fo
rt
 th
ey
 
co
ns
id
er
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
. T
he
 re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
te
m
pl
at
e 
ha
s 
be
en
 re
vi
se
d 
to
 s
pe
ci
fi
ca
lly
 
pr
ov
id
e 
th
at
 th
e 
ca
se
s 
m
us
t b
e 
as
se
ss
ed
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
LA
F 
cr
ite
ri
a.
 T
he
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t o
f t
he
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
as
es
 b
y 
L
A
F 
an
d 
th
e 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 to
 c
on
se
rv
an
ci
es
 a
ct
s 
to
 id
en
tif
y 
an
y 
sh
or
t 
co
m
in
gs
 in
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
.  
 
L
an
d 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sy
st
em
s 
6 
C
on
si
de
r t
he
 u
se
fu
ln
es
s 
of
 g
at
he
ri
ng
 
in
fo
 o
n 
th
e 
or
ig
in
 o
f a
ll 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
 
pr
op
er
ty
 it
 m
an
ag
es
.  
T
he
 im
po
rt
an
ce
 o
f t
hi
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 a
pp
re
ci
at
ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t’
s 
L
an
d 
R
eg
is
te
r 
at
te
m
pt
s 
to
 re
co
rd
 th
e 
de
ta
ils
 o
f h
ow
 a
n 
ar
ea
 w
as
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
or
 o
ri
gi
na
lly
 s
et
 a
pa
rt
. T
he
 
or
ig
in
 o
f t
he
 a
re
a 
be
fo
re
 th
at
 is
 n
ot
 a
lw
ay
s 
re
ad
ily
 id
en
tif
ie
d,
 a
nd
 is
 m
os
t u
se
fu
l w
he
n 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 a
id
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g,
 s
ay
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f a
 re
vo
ca
tio
n 
or
 
di
sp
os
al
 o
r i
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f a
 T
re
at
y 
se
ttl
em
en
t. 
In
 s
uc
h 
ca
se
s 
it’
s 
es
se
nt
ia
l f
or
 p
ro
pe
r 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
tim
e 
an
d 
ef
fo
rt
 to
 in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
e 
or
ig
in
 o
f a
n 
ar
ea
 is
 ju
st
if
ie
d.
  
T
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
on
 th
e 
hi
st
or
ic
 fi
le
 re
co
rd
s 
w
he
re
 th
es
e 
ar
e 
he
ld
 b
y 
th
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t b
ut
 in
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f t
he
 C
ro
w
n 
L
an
d 
or
 S
ta
te
 fo
re
st
 a
llo
ca
te
d 
to
 th
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
in
 1
98
7 
fo
r c
on
se
rv
at
io
n 
ar
ea
s 
pu
rp
os
es
 th
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t i
s 
un
lik
el
y 
to
 h
av
e 
th
e 
hi
st
or
ic
 
re
co
rd
s 
of
 th
e 
or
ig
in
 o
f t
ho
se
 a
re
as
.  
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T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t c
on
si
de
r t
ha
t t
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 re
co
rd
 is
 s
uf
fi
ci
en
t f
or
 m
os
t p
ur
po
se
s,
 a
nd
 th
at
 
fu
rt
he
r i
nv
es
tig
at
io
n 
in
to
 th
e 
or
ig
in
 o
f a
re
as
 is
 o
nl
y 
ju
st
if
ie
d 
w
he
re
 th
at
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 fo
r 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g.
  
7 
R
ev
ie
w
 it
s 
sy
st
em
s 
to
 re
co
rd
 la
nd
 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
, t
o 
ga
in
 o
ve
rs
ig
ht
 o
f t
he
 
nu
m
be
r a
nd
 ty
pe
 o
f l
an
d 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
oc
cu
rr
in
g 
w
ith
in
 in
di
vi
du
al
 
co
ns
er
va
nc
ie
s 
an
d 
th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 th
e 
co
un
tr
y.
  
It
’s
 d
ou
bt
fu
l w
he
th
er
 th
e 
re
co
rd
in
g 
of
 la
nd
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 w
ith
ou
t a
n 
at
te
m
pt
 to
 a
na
ly
se
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e 
of
 th
os
e 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 w
ou
ld
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
n 
im
pr
ov
ed
 o
ve
rv
ie
w
 o
f t
he
 
w
or
k 
of
 c
on
se
rv
an
ci
es
. T
he
 e
ff
or
t t
ha
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 is
 u
nl
ik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
ju
st
if
ie
d 
by
 
th
e 
re
su
lts
.  
8 
In
cl
ud
e 
on
 it
s 
L
an
d 
R
eg
is
te
r (
or
 
th
ro
ug
h 
lin
ks
 fr
om
 it
s 
L
an
d 
R
eg
is
te
r)
 
re
fe
re
nc
es
 to
 re
le
va
nt
 c
on
se
rv
at
io
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t s
tr
at
eg
ie
s,
 re
po
rt
s,
 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s,
 a
nd
 s
ur
ve
ys
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
it 
m
an
ag
es
.  
T
he
 L
an
d 
R
eg
is
te
r i
s 
pr
im
ar
ily
 to
 re
co
rd
 th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
st
at
us
 a
nd
 le
ga
l d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
ar
ea
s.
 T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t i
s 
no
t s
ee
ki
ng
 to
 u
se
 th
at
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 to
ol
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 li
nk
ag
es
 to
 
re
le
va
nt
 m
an
ag
em
en
t d
oc
um
en
ts
. O
th
er
 to
ol
s,
 s
uc
h 
as
 th
e 
pa
pe
r f
ile
 s
ys
te
m
 a
nd
 re
la
te
d 
ca
ta
lo
gu
in
g 
sy
st
em
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 u
se
d 
fo
r t
hi
s 
pu
rp
os
e.
  
9 
U
se
 la
nd
 c
on
se
rv
at
io
n 
va
lu
e 
in
fo
 a
s 
pa
rt
 o
f a
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 
la
nd
 c
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
ns
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
ly
 
pr
ot
ec
t t
he
 la
nd
 th
ey
 a
pp
ly
 to
.  
It
 is
 re
co
gn
is
ed
 th
at
 c
ur
re
nt
 c
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
ns
 a
re
 h
is
to
ri
c 
in
 n
at
ur
e,
 a
nd
 d
o 
no
t n
ec
es
sa
ri
ly
 
re
fl
ec
t t
he
 c
on
se
rv
at
io
n 
va
lu
es
 o
f t
he
 la
nd
. T
hi
s 
do
es
 n
ot
, h
ow
ev
er
, n
ec
es
sa
ri
ly
 m
ea
n 
th
at
 
th
e 
la
nd
 h
as
 a
n 
in
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
le
ve
l o
f p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
 F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 s
te
w
ar
ds
hi
p 
st
at
us
 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
an
 a
de
qu
at
e 
le
ve
l o
f p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
de
sp
ite
 n
ot
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 th
e 
st
at
us
 th
at
 a
n 
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ar
ea
 o
f l
an
d 
m
ay
 w
ar
ra
nt
. 
Id
ea
lly
, t
he
 le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
vi
ew
ed
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 fa
r s
m
al
le
r r
an
ge
 o
f l
an
d 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
tio
ns
, w
ith
 m
or
e 
lo
gi
ca
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
le
ve
ls
 a
nd
 c
ri
te
ri
a.
 T
hi
s 
w
ou
ld
 m
ak
e 
re
cl
as
si
fi
ca
tio
n 
fa
r e
as
ie
r. 
Su
ch
 re
fo
rm
 w
as
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
in
 1
98
9,
 a
nd
 a
ba
nd
on
ed
 d
ue
 to
 
pu
bl
ic
 o
pp
os
iti
on
 to
 c
ha
ng
es
 to
 s
om
e 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
tio
ns
 a
nd
 th
e 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 o
f t
he
 is
su
e.
 It
 
w
as
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
an
d 
re
je
ct
ed
 a
ga
in
 in
 th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f t
he
 C
on
se
rv
at
io
n 
A
m
en
dm
en
t B
ill
 
19
94
-9
6.
 
A
s 
a 
re
su
lt 
of
 b
ot
h 
th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 a
nd
 th
e 
st
ro
ng
 p
ub
lic
 a
nd
 s
ec
to
r i
nt
er
es
t i
n 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
tio
n 
ch
an
ge
s,
 la
nd
 re
-c
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
ca
n 
be
 a
 v
er
y 
ex
pe
ns
iv
e 
ex
er
ci
se
. W
ith
 o
ve
r 
10
,0
00
 p
ar
ce
ls
 o
f l
an
d,
 re
-c
la
ss
if
yi
ng
 th
e 
en
tir
e 
sy
st
em
 w
ou
ld
 c
le
ar
ly
 b
e 
un
ju
st
if
ia
bl
e.
 
T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t h
as
 th
er
ef
or
e 
w
or
ke
d 
w
ith
 N
Z
C
A
 to
 d
ev
el
op
 p
ri
or
iti
si
ng
 c
ri
te
ri
a 
fo
r l
an
d 
cl
as
si
fi
ca
tio
n 
w
or
k.
 
T
ho
se
 c
ri
te
ri
a 
re
co
gn
is
e 
th
at
 th
e 
pr
io
ri
ty
 fo
r r
ec
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
is
 th
os
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 th
is
 w
ill
 im
pr
ov
e 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
co
ns
er
va
tio
n 
va
lu
es
, d
ir
ec
tly
 o
r b
y 
ge
ne
ra
tin
g 
gr
ea
te
r c
om
m
un
ity
 s
up
po
rt
 fo
r t
he
ir
 c
on
se
rv
at
io
n,
 o
r i
m
pr
ov
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
(e
.g
. b
y 
re
du
ci
ng
 u
nn
ec
es
sa
ry
 fr
ag
m
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
bo
un
da
ri
es
 o
r a
llo
w
in
g 
th
e 
tr
an
sf
er
 o
f a
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
to
 a
 c
om
m
un
ity
 g
ro
up
). 
 
T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t w
ill
 c
on
tin
ue
 to
 a
dd
re
ss
 c
la
ss
if
ic
at
io
n 
is
su
es
 w
he
re
 th
ey
 a
re
 d
ee
m
ed
 to
 
be
 a
 p
ri
or
ity
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 th
es
e 
cr
ite
ri
a.
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5.1.5 Housing New Zealand Corporation  
 
HNZC is a Crown entity that works closely with the Minister of Housing and 
provides housing and housing-related services to New Zealand citizens. It 
operates under the core vision of providing “access to decent homes, helping 
New Zealanders manage their own circumstances and contribute to 
community life” (Directory of Official Information, 2005, p.249). As a 
corporation in the public sector, the entity functions in a commercial manner 
with social objectives. It aims to exhibit a sense of social and environmental 
responsibility, and operate with sound financial oversight and stewardship 
(ibid).  
 
An area of service provided by HNZC is buying and leasing properties for 
state housing. The performance audit carried out in 2006 was targeted to 
assess the effectiveness of the programmes used to provide this type of 
service. In terms of the statistics, state housing is a significant service in the 
housing industry. As of 2006, there are 66,000 state houses valued at more 
than $11 billion controlled by HNZC, with 190,000 people receiving state 
housing services. In addition to that, the applicants in line for a state house 
amounted to 11,458 for the period ending 30 June 2005 (OAG, 2006c). On the 
basis of these numbers, the AG decided to audit the effectiveness of the 
programmes adopted by HNZC in buying and leasing state properties. The 
audit found that the Corporation had effective buying and leasing programmes, 
which were performing well against programme targets. There were, 
nonetheless, areas identified for improvement spanning across planning, 
acquiring houses, monitoring and reporting activities. There were six 
recommendations “to help the Corporation ensure that its documentation is 
complete, to increase its knowledge about the costs to the Corporation of 
leasing properties from private owners, and to enhance the public reporting of 
its performance” (p.6). These recommendations and the reported progress are 
detailed in Table 6.  
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From the official documents provided by the HNZC, there were no apparent 
issues with the recommendations made by the OAG. The Coproration 
accepted all recommendations and reported back to the OAG on the actions 
taken in response to the recommendations. It also prepared an action plan, 
stating that the recommendations were “reasonable for the Corporation to 
implement” (HNZC, 2006, p.2). Further, in its report to the Minister of 
Housing, the action plan and progress as of June 2006 indicated that the 
Corporation was taking prompt actions in response to the recommendations 
(ibid).  
 
5.1.6 Ministry of Education  
 
The Ministry of Education is the leading advisor to the government on the 
education system, and it functions to support and realise the government’s 
education goals. The government has set overarching goals that comprise 
building an education system that equips New Zealanders with twenty-first 
century skills and reducing systemic underachievement in education 
(Directory of Official Information, 2005). In line with these goals, the 
Ministry functions towards the mission of raising students’ achievement and 
reducing disparity between the highest and lowest achieving students (ibid). In 
view of achieving its goals, the Ministry identified three vital outcomes which 
are believed to give the greatest difference.  
 
One of these outcomes, one over which the Ministry has the most influence, is 
the quality and effectiveness of teaching to all students. To provide effective 
teaching, the OAG believed that the school property portfolio should be 
sufficient, suitable, and well maintained, leading to the audit on management 
of the school property portfolio in 2006. The OAG also recognised the 
significance of the capital value of the school property portfolio which 
amounted to $7,000 million as of 2006 (OAG, 2006e, p.5). This makes the 
portfolio the second largest publicly owned property portfolio, incorporating 
land, buildings and infrastructure (ibid). The audit focused on three main 
aspects of school property management by the Ministry which are; 
organisational arrangements, strategic management and overseeing of capital 
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projects and maintenance. As a result of the audit, the OAG was generally 
satisfied with the accountability arrangements, but was less satisfied with 
maintenance arrangements. The twenty four recommendations that followed 
these findings covered the area of planning, systems, people management and 
Board of Trustees, which include devising common goals for managing school 
property, producing strategic plans and monitoring how schools are spending 
their maintenance funding. The recommendations are specified in Table 7. 
 
Substantial progress has been made within the Ministry in relation to the 
management of the school property portfolio, largely resulting from the 
introduction of new processes for planning and funding school property. The 
new processes were implemented as part of the government’s policy to give 
school boards greater control over the management of their schools (OAG, 
2006e, p.2). The audit has also encouraged greater initiative for the Ministry to 
review and improve the management of school property portfolio, which was 
evident in a report by the Ministry: 
“In 2006, a report by the Office of the Auditor General raised concerns about 
the management of the school property portfolio. Cabinet also raised 
concerns in 2007/2008, directing the Ministry of Education (the ministry) to 
report quarterly to the Ministers of Education and Finance on its work to 
improve school property management.  
Cabinet’s concerns focused on the large amount of committed property 
funding, delays in implementation of the programme, the cost of new schools 
and the timing of approvals being sought from Ministers or Cabinet.  
In response, the Ministry initiated an extensive review (the School Property 
Review) to develop a long-term strategy for managing the school property 
portfolio. The strategy was intended to produce improved asset and financial 
management, a better planned approach to disbursing capital and operating 
funding, and more accurate reporting of all property assets.” (MOE, 2009, 
p.6) 
This report attributed the initiative towards improving management of the 
school property portfolio partly to the performance audit in 2006, and partly to 
Cabinet’s concerns in 2007/2008. Therefore for the audit on MOE, there is 
evidence to suggest that the audit encouraged performance improvement, 
although the initiative was coupled with concerns raised by the Cabinet. In 
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terms of the recommendations made by the audit, work was currently 
underway for most of the twenty four recommendations, which implies that 
the recommendations have generally been accepted by the Ministry. The 
Ministry’s response to each of the recommendations is provided in Table 724. 
It is not clear however, the extent to which improvements can be directly 
attributed to the recommendations as opposed to the new processes introduced 
as part of the government’s policy. This has similarities to the audit on FRST 
whereby simultaneous to the audit, a plan was put in place to address issues 
identified by the entity prior to such issues becoming audit findings. In this 
sense, the official documents provided limited information with regard to the 
impact of performance audit on the audited entity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 This response was directly quoted from MOE (2008).  
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5.1.7 Ministry of Social Development  
 
The Ministry plays a vital role in the welfare of New Zealanders by leading 
the nation’s social development and providing social services to more than one 
million people (Directory of Official Information, 2005). It also provides 
strategic social policy advice to the government and works closely with 
government and non-government agencies, advisory and industry groups, and 
communities and Iwi (MSD, 2009b). It carries a major societal role, helping 
families, youth, elderly and students. In carrying out this role, the Ministry 
provides a wide range of services, from statutory care and protection to 
providing funds in the form of loans or allowances. It operates with the vision 
to achieve an inclusive New Zealand where all people are able to participate in 
the social and economic lives of their communities (ibid). 
 
Within the range of services provided by the Ministry is the Work and Income 
section that offers income support and employment services to society. As a 
main service delivery arm, Work and Income has set up a contact centre to 
assist the delivery of services to its clients. The OAG recognised the growing 
importance of the contact centre in the efficient and effective delivery of 
services and hence performed an audit on the centre in 2006 (OAG, 2006f). 
There were three main audit focuses, namely service practices, support 
management systems and relationship with other areas of Work and Income. 
The OAG was generally satisfied with the systems and processes put in place 
by Work and Income for the contact centre. However, it identified five sets of 
recommendations, mainly concerning the measuring of service level 
performance and business planning. These recommendations are specified in 
Table 8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100
Table 8 
Performance of the Contract Centre for Work and Income: Audit 
Recommendations 
No Recommendations to the MSD (OAG, 2006f) 
 The contact centre’s relationship with callers 
1 In conjunction with existing monthly service level targets, Work and 
Income set a consistent daily service level target for the contact centre, 
expressed as a range.  
2 Performance against this daily target be included in the contact 
centre’s formal monthly reporting to the Work and Income Executive. 
These reports should include explanations for any variation from the 
target range, together with a plan to address the underlying cause. 
3 The contact centre’s formal monthly reporting to the Work and Income 
Executive include its service level performance by 15-minute interval. 
4 The contact centre identify all possible causes of current variations in 
daily service levels, and provide the Work and Income Executive with 
an analysis of options for addressing these. 
 Operations support 
5 The contact centre prepare an annual business plan.  
 
The response received from the Ministry regarding the audit was very positive. 
The Ministry responded that “the contact centre accepted and implemented all 
recommendations made in this audit” (MSD, 2009a). In particular, the MSD 
reported that: 
“The Work and Income Contact Centre has accepted the five 
recommendations in relation to service level and will implement these from 
01 July 2007.  
The contact centre has also finalised a three year strategy and will draw up an 
annual business plan for the 2007-08 financial year.” (MSD, 2006, p.2) 
As of 2009 the recommendations made had been operationalised and included 
in the recent developments within Work and Income. For example, the 
Contact Centre Report for Work and Income Executive 2007 included 
reporting measures that were recommended by the audit, and also the 
preparation of the 2007/08 Annual Business Plan of the Work and Income 
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Contact Centre was prepared in accordance with the audit recommendation. 
The performance audit hence promoted further improvement in the way that 
the MSD operates the contact centres, particularly through better performance 
measures and annual business planning.  
 
The performance audit reports and official documents were useful in providing 
information about the audits, as well as the auditees’ responses. From the seven 
performance audit reports reviewed, there were sixty eight recommendations made in 
total, and sixty six responses to each of the recommendations were obtained from the 
official documents (some of which were fully accepted and implemented by the 
auditee). From these responses, it was found that the audit recommendations were 
generally accepted and implemented. Nevertheless, the performance audit reports and 
official documents provided limited information in regards to auditee’s experience 
and insights as participants of the audits. There is also difficulty in determining the 
extent of the impact on the entity and a way that this can be determined is by 
exploring the impact experienced by the auditees, particularly with their management 
and operations. Therefore to enrich the data for this research, interviews were carried 
out with a focus to acquire the experiences and insights of the auditees.  
 
5.2 Interviews 
 
As explained in section 4.1.2, there were four interviews carried out in this study. The 
interviews have proven to be useful in capturing the experiences of the auditees, and 
in illustrating performance audit practices in New Zealand. The main findings from 
the interviews are as follows25:  
 
5.2.1 Interview 1 
 
The two interviewees from this entity were generally satisfied with the 
performance audit carried out on their entity. They felt that the OAG had a 
robust audit process, and viewed the audit as no different from any other audit 
or external review. As experienced managers they considered they knew what 
                                                 
25 To protect the identity of the interviewees, the entities are not listed in the same order as Table 1 in 
Chapter 4. 
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to expect from such audits in terms of the processes and approaches. Hence 
they were comfortable with the idea of performance audit and did not view it 
as a threatening activity. They were also satisfied with the published report of 
the audit, and advised that other than the report being presented to the relevant 
select committee, there was no response received from any other stakeholders 
regarding the published report.  
 
During the audit, there were several differences in views between the OAG 
and the entity, which the interviewees considered had been handled in a 
professional manner. For example, during the discussion of the terms of 
reference, there were areas that the OAG wanted to cover, but where the entity 
did not think results arising from the area would necessarily add significant 
value to the entity. Some aspects were therefore excluded from the audit 
scope. There were also differences in terms of the audit findings and 
recommendations, and the interviewees attribute this mainly to the differences 
in perspectives held by the entity and the OAG. In particular, the OAG 
maintained a legislative point of view that focused on meeting statutory and 
accountability expectations, whilst the entity maintained a managerial and 
operational point of view which emphasised practicality and workability of the 
recommendations. However, despite these differences, the entity accepted and 
has followed up the rest of the recommendations made by the audit. 
 
Although there are differences in views between the OAG and the auditee, the 
interviewees did not have any concerns about the auditors’ expertise. They did 
not expect the auditors to fully understand their work because: 
 “…auditors by their nature are never going to know enough about any 
business because it’s about taking a sample approach. So by definition, the 
expertise is going to be with the organisation that’s actually being looked at 
rather than from the auditor’s perspective and that’s what the audit is all 
about.” 
The interviewees also recognised that due to the nature of their business, it is 
very difficult for the auditors to ever have expertise or knowledge sufficient to 
fully understand their entity as a whole. The same applies to bringing in 
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outside expertise to provide advice to the auditors, as the interviewees felt that 
their business was unique in terms of their remit and operations. 
 
The occurrence of differences in views and respect for each other’s job 
highlighted the professional relationship that the auditor and auditee shared. 
Both interviewees agreed that their entity had a good relationship with the 
auditor, and that the whole audit process was carried out in a thoroughly 
professional manner. One interviewee also commented that; “I don’t think 
there was any animosity at all between the people doing the audit and our 
people that were providing information”. Hence the auditees were clearly 
satisfied with the relationship with the performance auditors. 
 
In terms of the impact, the interviewees considered that the performance audit 
did not leave a huge impact on their entity and only lent some assistance to 
performance improvement. One interviewee commented that;  
“To be candid I don’t think there has been a huge change, to be honest. 
We’re always intent on making improvements and so on, but often there are 
tweaks around, and remember that we are constrained by the legislative 
processes we must follow, the conditions and expectations on all the 
legislation, and that’s our primary purpose.”  
The other interviewee commented that the differences in views that they had 
to some extent hindered performance improvement through the audit 
recommendations.  
“I think one of the difficulties that you always have between an operational 
department and an audit team is the different views that they take in terms of 
what they’re looking for in an audit process. So from an operational 
perspective, some of the recommendations that they came up with in our 
view, were not sensible in respect to how we could actually move to where 
they wanted us to be, particularly where we had disputes; where they were 
recommending one approach when our view very strongly was that that 
approach was not workable for the department, or for the Crown.”  
 
In addition, there were also other factors that limited improvement, and hence 
the impact that the audit had on the entity. For example, one of the 
recommendations was on giving priority to preparing management strategies 
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within statutory timeframes. However, the interviewees explained that this is a 
complex process which involves a range of external groups like the 
community, non-governmental organisations, political parties and oversight 
boards. Therefore although the entity can prepare the strategies within the 
statutory timeframes, there are many levels of complexity involved which are 
not within the control of the entity, like the signing off of the strategies or 
disputes between different interest groups.   
 
The interviewees perceive performance audit as a control mechanism over the 
performance of public entities, rather than a force behind performance 
improvement. On the role of performance audit, one interviewee said that: 
“It is an essential part of running any business to actually get feedback from 
external people now and again on how you’re running your systems. So I 
don’t have a problem with that and the performance audit whilst somewhat 
different from the normal audit routine that we have at year end for example, 
it’s still a valid approach in terms of checking every now and again those 
things which are reasonably large components of our business.”  
He also stated that “ultimately it comes down to who has the accountability 
and the responsibility for carrying out a particular business, and in this case 
it’s the (chief executive), and then the management within the organisation”.  
 
 5.2.2 Interview 2 
 
Like the entity in Interview 1, this entity was also satisfied with the whole 
audit process, as well as the outcomes of the audit. In particular, the 
interviewees thought it was a good audit which went very well, and had high 
regard for the OAG and the AG. They recalled it as a thorough review where 
the auditors covered “end to end” processes of the entity, and that the auditors 
ensured that they had a good understanding of the entity. 
“In a true sense of project management the OAG identified all the tasks 
needed to be completed to complete the review, so that consisted of 
documents that they wanted to review, people they wanted to meet to 
understand the process and ask a few probing questions of course…they went 
through the whole process…that included all of the review and monitoring 
processes right through the whole end to end process.”  
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With such high regard for the office, it was not surprising that the interviewees 
believed that the auditors possessed the necessary skills and professionalism 
required to undertake the audit.  
“The people that they used had a wide breadth of what I’d call…management 
experience, general experience and it was enough for the purpose in terms of 
this review…a good audit carried out by proficient, what I’d termed as fairly 
smart people that knew what they’re about, very business like…they did 
have a good sense of humour, they were good at being able to relate to us and 
easy to get on with.” 
One of the interviewees also commented that as professionals he believed that 
the auditors were credible in the opinions or recommendations that they 
provided.  
 
Although the audit recommendations were taken very seriously by the entity, 
the interviewees thought that the audit did not have a huge impact on the 
entity. They thought the reasons were twofold: firstly it was an audit on 
relatively simple processes that did not include high-risk issues, and secondly 
they believed that there already had been a good internal review system in 
place to detect such issues. In particular, one of the interviewees commented: 
“I don’t think it (the audit) had a big influence on processes…internally 
we’ve reviewed the processes as well and I mean from delivery, internal-
control perspective, aren’t too bad. I mean they are pretty vanilla 
products…it’s a pretty simple process. When you go to the 
recommendations, nothing came as a surprise and I can’t recall anything 
sticking out that has made a huge difference to the way the entity currently 
carries out its business today.”  
 
He further stated that although the entity was satisfied with the outcomes of 
the audit, he would describe the audit as a “fairly benign sort of review”, 
“fairly routine performance review’, “nothing earth-shattering” and “a bit 
more than housekeeping, but not much more than housekeeping”. This is 
mainly due to the low risk consequences associated with the audit 
recommendations. Furthermore, the interviewees also thought that the issues 
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would have been picked up even without the audit, as they believe they 
already have sufficient internal systems in place.  
 
However, despite the low impact that the entity perceived that the performance 
audit had, they added that it was still a useful tool. One of the interviewees did 
interpret performance audit as providing useful feedback in terms of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. However, he was mistaken in perceiving 
performance audit to be part of the statutory “controller function” performed 
by the AG on public entities. That aside, the relatively modest impact of 
performance audit perceived by the auditee can be translated into a more 
important function of overseeing performance accountability, rather than 
primarily promoting performance improvement in public entities.  
 
5.2.3 Interview 3 
 
The interviewee described the experience with the audit as a good experience, 
and that his entity was also satisfied with the audit. At the start of the audit the 
entity was concerned at the prospect of the audit because not long before the 
audit took place a report of another performance audit made its way to the 
front page of a local newspaper. In addition, they recently had a change in 
higher level management personnel, hence the relatively new people with the 
organisation were not entirely sure of the robustness of the systems and 
procedures. The interviewee recalled that the entity was very pleased that the 
audit didn’t find any major issues, although they also believed that their 
systems were fairly robust. Apart from regarding the whole audit process as 
fair, the interviewee also perceived the audit as providing a chance for him to 
learn more about his entity, as he was assigned to be the liaison officer for an 
audit that included areas outside of his managerial responsibilities.  
 
As the main contact person for the audit, the interviewee said he had 
maintained a good relationship with the performance auditors throughout the 
audit. Coming from an auditing background, he stated that: 
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“…I have a bit of empathy for auditors…I always try to make the job as easy 
as I can for them but they were really easy to deal with as well…consultation 
process was good, you know it was very fair.”  
Having been in auditing before, he added that he was a little surprised to find 
that the performance auditors did not hold an accounting background. In 
addition, he also noted that his entity was very clear as to why the audit took 
place. He added that: 
“…they (the auditors) are not just doing the audit for the audit’s sake, there 
has to be some reason for it, and there was a reason for this and the results 
were important to us. So we really needed to put in effort into helping them 
get it done and make sure there were no snags or obstacles in the way of 
them actually getting the work done. It was just a matter of good customer 
relations to keep your clients or customers happy, and it was fairly easy to 
do.”  
This account reflects the cooperation and the accepting attitude that auditees 
show towards the work of performance auditors, although interestingly the 
interviewee referred to the auditors as the “clients” or “customers”.  
 
In terms of performance improvement, on the one hand the audit did highlight 
a weakness in their database system, however on the other hand planning to 
upgrade the database system was already underway even prior to the audit. 
The interviewee said that the audit reflected what he had been experiencing 
with the system, particularly in accessing and linking data as there was no 
generic database system. However, the recommendation on this area was 
going to be introduced as part of a major plan, which was still in its drafting 
stage at the time of the audit. According to the interviewee, nearly three 
quarters of the audit recommendations were going to be incorporated into the 
plan. Hence the recommendations weren’t perceived as difficult to implement, 
and were not expected to incur significant additional resources as most were 
already part of the plans the entity had. Despite this, the interviewee pointed 
out that they did take the recommendations seriously, and that the 
recommendations were listed as ‘matters arising’ in their Audit & Risk 
Committee papers. Apart from those already incorporated in the major plan, 
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other recommendations have been implemented and were deemed useful to the 
entity.  
 
The interviewee viewed performance audit as having an assurance role, as 
opposed to improving performance due to the limited impact brought about by 
the audit. He said; “I think it was just the confirmation that everything was 
fairly okay in terms of getting the results of the audit”. Furthermore, he also 
suggested that the entity prefers to have an independent reviewer to assess the 
fairness of their systems and procedures, and hence was more than pleased 
when the OAG offered that opportunity through the performance audit.  
  
5.2.4 Interview 4 
 
In this interview, the interviewee thought that the audit on his entity was 
“quite efficient and time well spent”. The OAG carried out interviews with a 
lot of people around the entity, and held several meetings with the key people 
in the area audited, including the interviewee. He didn’t see this audit process 
as impacting their day to day operations and thought the time spent on the 
audit was worthwhile. Furthermore, he believed that the final audit report 
published reflected “what everybody said”. In his capacity as the manager in 
charge, he didn’t agree with some of the points but trusted that those were still 
included in the final report because the auditors “had feedback from other 
people, so they thought it was important they included that in the report”.  
 
It was a good audit report and the entity had a good relationship with the 
auditors. However, in hindsight the interviewee thought there would be some 
benefits from external expertise in assisting the audit. On this he commented: 
“At times we felt that she (the auditor) didn’t understand what we were trying 
to explain to her…and so having someone at least, not necessarily the auditor, 
but someone who’s actually with them that could provide some technical 
expertise to the audit I think would have been helpful…it was just really the 
understanding of some of the technicalities I felt that didn’t come through in 
the feedback.”  
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The auditors also used international benchmarking, which the interviewee 
thought did not necessarily reflect the New Zealand system and this was also 
not reflected in the feedback. Hence the interviewee suggested that: 
“…the audit would have been, or we might have got some more information 
if the person doing the audit had a little more understanding of the New 
Zealand setting, and also had someone who could give some support around 
technical advice.”  
This is therefore a point worth considering, not to question the expertise and 
credibility of the auditor, but to enhance the feedback and hence the outcomes 
of performance audit on the audited entities.  
 
In the main, the interviewee regarded performance audit as useful and that it 
promoted performance improvement in their entity. In particular, he thought it 
helped with the general management discipline within the entity, as well as the 
general systems in place.  On the area of good management disciplines, the 
OAG emphasised planning, people management and also relationships with 
external groups like oversight boards. The audit also helped the entity in terms 
of operational systems, as it encouraged the entity to review its systems and 
make better decisions. The audit also fostered motivation among staff as it 
created greater awareness for shared goals. In addition, the audit created an 
environment where “everybody knows what the goals are, what they’re 
working towards” and that was seen as a significant improvement. Regarding 
the audit findings on the management information system, the interviewee 
commented that: 
“When they (the auditors) undertook the audit, a lot of their feedback was 
reflecting what our people were saying. So the people that used the system 
were saying it was old, it was difficult, and hard to get up to date…The audit 
was just something that triggered the change.”  
Overall, the interviewee thought that the audit had made some aspects of their 
business more efficient, and hence fostered performance improvement.  
 
Nonetheless, despite considering the audit as useful, the interviewee believed 
that the issues would have been picked up by the entity, although within a 
longer timeframe, and also there were a couple of the audit recommendations 
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that were not accepted. Furthermore, some recommendations required time to 
be implemented, hence may delay the overall impact of the audit. There were 
remaining differences at the conclusion of the audit, thus a couple of the audit 
recommendations were not implemented. In particular, the interviewee 
thought some of the audit findings were not quite right “but they (the auditors) 
wanted to keep that in their report”, and thus the recommendation which 
followed this finding was not implemented because the entity maintained that 
it wasn’t part of its role. There were also recommendations that required 
substantial resources, especially in terms of staff time and the number of 
people involved, like changing reporting lines. Hence whilst the entity is 
progressing these issues, they are not fully implemented even three years after 
the audit, and therefore the full impact of the audit on the operational aspect of 
the entity may take much longer to materialise.  
 
Essentially, the interviews captured auditees’ attitudes towards performance audit and 
their experiences being participants of the audits. The auditees generally welcome 
performance audit as an accountability instrument that provides assurance to the 
stakeholders and did not experience significant changes resulting from the adoption of 
the audit recommendations. The auditees and auditors share a professional 
relationship where the auditees were satisfied with the audit processes and 
professionalism shown by the auditors. However, one audited suggested that the 
usefulness of audit recommendations could be enhanced with the assistance of 
external expertise that can provide technical know-how and better understanding of 
the local setting.  
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Chapter Conclusion 
 
The data sources used in this research provided useful evidence for the study of 
performance audit in practice. In particular, the performance audit reports served as 
the main platform to communicate with stakeholders on the reasons for the audit, the 
audit methodologies and processes, the findings, and the recommendations made to 
the auditees. These reports therefore, recorded essential information regarding the 
audits in the sample. Generally, the official documents recorded correspondence 
pertaining to the audits, for example correspondence between the auditees and the 
auditors, as well as reports from the auditees to the responsible Ministers. In addition, 
there were also organisational documents like action plans and progress reports that 
recorded the actions taken in response to the recommendations. The official 
documents were useful in providing evidence of the professional relationship shared 
by the auditors and the auditees, and also in reflecting the attention given to the audit 
recommendations. However, both the performance audit reports and official 
documents provided limited information regarding the experience of the auditees 
during the audits. To gain insights into their experiences, the interviews carried out 
with the auditees proved to be very useful in providing such information. The 
interviews not only provided first hand accounts of auditee participation in 
performance audit, but also confirmed information derived from the other data 
sources, like the professional relationship shared by the auditees and auditors. The 
three data sources therefore, complemented each other in terms of the information 
offered for the purpose of this study. As a result, the use of all three data sources 
offered strong evidence towards a better understanding of performance audit practice 
in New Zealand. Most importantly, these data sources provided the answers to the 
research question, which will be further discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Six – The Impact of Performance Audit and Additional Insights 
Based on the findings presented in Chapter 5, this chapter discusses the question: 
What is the impact of performance audit on audited entities in New Zealand? The 
chapter also presents additional insights gained with regard to the practice of 
performance audit in New Zealand.  
 
“Analysis is about thinking, and thinking is the one thing the computer can’t 
do.” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.316) 
 
Chapter Introduction  
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 highlighted the dearth of studies on the impact of 
performance audit. The few studies in this area generally provide the impression that 
performance audit in practice leaves no significant impact on the auditees (Hatherly 
and Parker, 1988; Shand and Anand, 1996; Morin, 2001). These studies also provided 
insights into the area that might be useful in indicating the impact of performance 
audit. Hatherly and Parker (1988) for example looked at the acceptance and rejection 
rate of audit recommendations, and the reasons that these recommendations were 
rejected. Morin (2001) on the other hand, studied the factors that affect the success or 
failure of performance auditing in influencing the auditees. Additionally, prior studies 
also offered an interesting comparison to the findings of this study, particularly in 
terms of the acceptance of audit recommendations and the means by which these 
recommendations have impacted the audited entities.  
 
The discussion in Chapter 5 illustrates the importance of audit recommendations as 
the manifestation of the impact of performance audit on the audited entities. In 
particular, the responses made to the audit recommendations reflected on how the 
audit recommendations have, or have not, impacted the entity. Generally, most of the 
recommendations made by the OAG were accepted by the audited entities, although 
such cannot be said about some of the recommendations due to lack of evidence for 
the purpose of this study. For example, the official documents provided by the 
Treasury did not contain evidence with regard to the two recommendations made in 
the audit and hence no inference can be made. In addition, some of the responses also 
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did not explicitly state whether the recommendation was accepted and subsequently 
adopted, or otherwise. However lack of evidence on the acceptance or disagreement 
only applies to a small number of the recommendations, and the responses to the 
recommendations were generally positive.  
 
The literature review also found that performance audit was targeted at performance 
improvement and performance accountability, although the relationship between these 
two goals remains arguable (Barzelay, 1996; Roth, 1996; Sloan, 1996). The 
achievement of these goals could also be translated into the impact of performance 
audit if the auditees experience performance improvement and enhanced performance 
accountability as a result of the audits. Such assessment can be made provided that 
there is cooperation from the auditees in providing information on how performance 
audits affect performance improvement and/or performance accountability of their 
entity. Hence, in addition to auditee responses to the audit recommendations, this 
study also analysed auditees’ experience from the information provided in the 
interviews to assess if indeed performance audit goals are achieved in practice, and 
how the entities are impacted by the achievement of the goals.  
 
This chapter therefore, discusses performance audit impact as a manifestation from 
the audit recommendations, as well as the achievement of performance audit goals 
which are translated into the impact of performance audit.  In particular, this chapter 
looks at the changes brought about by the implementation of the audit 
recommendations on the audited entities, and whether the auditees experience 
improvement in performance and enhanced accountability resulting from the audits 
carried out. In addition, this chapter also presents additional insights gained on 
performance audit practice in New Zealand, gained from the research findings and 
analysis.  
 
6.1 Summary of the Responses to the Audit Recommendations  
 
According to the OECD (1996, p.95), the New Zealand OAG:  
“…consults closely with auditees as part of quality control and auditee comments 
are included in their response to Parliament. The Office generally measures its 
impact by the number of recommendations accepted”.  
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Therefore, in the first instance this study looks at the acceptance of audit 
recommendations derived from auditees’ responses for the impact of performance 
audit. The responses from the audited entities were derived form the official 
documents. Table 9 and Table 10 provide a summary of the responses to the audit 
recommendations presented previously in section 5.1.  
 
Table 9 
Summary of Auditee Response 
Performance Audit  Acceptance of recommendations  
The Treasury: Capability to recognise 
and respond to issues for Maori 
N/A 
Foundation for Research, Science and 
Technology: Administration of grant 
programmes 
The FRST generally agreed with the 
recommendations of the audit. There 
were nonetheless, three (out of seven) 
recommendations that received responses 
which provided no evidence that were 
indeed adopted. These recommendations 
in particular were: recommendations 1, 3 
and 7. The FRST was satisfied with the 
current system in place for the three 
recommendations, hence although the 
recommendations were accepted it was 
not implicated that any actions would be 
taken. Therefore, taking this into account, 
approximately 57% of the 
recommendations were indicated as 
accepted and would be adopted.  
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry: 
Managing bio-security risks associated 
with high-risk sea containers 
The MAF generally agreed with the 
recommendations of the audit. However, 
four (out of fifteen) of the 
recommendations may not necessarily be 
adopted, as implied by the specific 
responses like: “MAF needs greater 
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ability” and “has significant resource 
implications for MAF”. The four 
recommendations in particular were: 
recommendations 2, 5, 7 and 8. Taking 
this into account, approximately 73% of 
the recommendations were indicated as 
accepted and would be adopted.  
Department of Conservation: Planning 
for and managing publicly owned land 
For the DOC, five out of nine 
recommendations (approximately 56%) 
received responses that indicates 
acceptance and plans for implementation. 
For the other four recommendations, the 
DOC disagreed with the 
recommendations for their own reasons, 
as depicted in Table 7. These four 
recommendations were: 
recommendations 2, 4, 7 and 8. 
Housing New Zealand Corporation: 
Effectiveness of programmes to buy and 
lease properties for state housing 
All six recommendations were accepted 
and adopted.  
Ministry of Education: Management of 
the school property portfolio 
The MOE responded that it generally 
accepted the audit recommendations. In 
particular, approximately 79% of the 
recommendations received responses that 
indicate acceptance and plans for 
implementation. However, five (out of 
twenty four) recommendations did not 
receive responses to indicate that any 
action was adopted, or any changes 
would be made to the existing systems 
and processes. The five recommendations 
were: recommendations 13, 19, 20, 21 
and 24.  
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Ministry of Social Development: 
Performance of the contract centre for 
Work and Income 
All five recommendations were accepted 
and adopted. 
 
Table 10 
Percentage of Recommendations Accepted and Implemented 
Audited Entity    % of recommendations accepted and adopted 
FRST        57% 
MAF        73% 
DOC        56% 
HNZC        100% 
MOE        79% 
MSD        100%  
 
From the summary tables above: 
§ Two entities, the HNZC and the MSD, provided evidence that 100% of the 
audit recommendations were accepted and had a plan in place to be adopted. 
§ Another two entities, the FRST and the MAF, generally accepted the 
recommendations. Nonetheless, based on the official documents, it was 
difficult to determine whether all the recommendations would be adopted. In 
particular, only 57% of the recommendations for FRST and 73% of the 
recommendations for the MAF received responses which clearly indicated 
that the recommendations would be adopted. 
§ Another two entities, the DOC and the MOE, accepted most of the 
recommendations but did not agree on a small number of the 
recommendations. They stated clearly that the recommendations which in 
their view would not necessarily add value to their respective entities would 
not be adopted. Based on the responses in the official documents, the DOC 
accepted and would adopt 56% of the recommendations, whilst the MOE 
accepted and would adopt 79% of the recommendations.  
§ The acceptance and implementation rate for one entity, the Treasury, cannot 
be determined due to lack of evidence contained in the official documents.  
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Clearly there is a difference between the acceptance rate and the actual adoption of 
the audit recommendations, which will consequently affect the impact that 
performance audit has on the audited entity. In some cases, whilst the audited entity 
agrees with the audit finding, this may not necessarily imply that the entity will adopt 
the audit recommendation that follows. More evidence is needed to determine 
whether the recommendations have been adopted and consequently leave an impact 
on the auditee. In addition, some recommendations did not necessitate any particular 
action by the auditee. As an example, in the case of recommendations 1 and 3 made in 
the performance audit on the administration of grant programmes the OAG 
recommended that the FRST ensure its assessment processes in awarding grants meet 
the ministerial criterion. These recommendations by nature did not require any 
significant action by the FRST and in this sense did not leave any impact on how the 
FRST assess grant applications.  
 
The total recommendation of all the audits in the sample is 68 recommendations. 
However, the above analysis only included 66 responses to the recommendations due 
to the lack of information on the response to a particular audit, which is the audit on 
the Treasury’s capability in recognising and responding to issues for Maori. This 
study found that out of the 66 recommendations, 51 recommendations were accepted, 
although as aforementioned, not all has evidence that they were adopted by the 
auditee. Table 11 provides the responses to the accepted recommendations found by 
this study, and Table 12 provides the reasons that the remaining 14 recommendations 
were not adopted.  
 
Table 11 
Auditee Responses to Accepted Recommendations 
Response to accepted recommendations    No of recommendations  
Recommendation implemented       21 
Review of systems and processes       14 
Recommendation agreed, but no action specified     12 
Incorporate recommendation into newly developed plan    3 
Further consideration given         2 
Total           52 
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Table 12 
Auditee Responses to Recommendations Not Adopted 
Response to recommendations not adopted  No of recommendations  
Reasonable systems and processes already in place     11 
Audit recommendation difficult to implement in practice     3 
Total           14 
 
This study found that most of the audit recommendations were accepted. Most of the 
accepted recommendations were also implemented or encouraged reviews of the 
current systems and processes. Therefore for the majority of the recommendations 
that were accepted and adopted, there was an apparent impact on the internal systems 
and processes of the audited entities. In particular, the recommendations triggered 
reviews and revisions of systems and processes that were in place, which 
consequently led to new processes being developed. For example, in the performance 
audit on MAF’s management of biosecurity risks associated with high risk sea 
containers, the MAF responded that it would make changes to its database system - 
CUSMOD, revise Container Health Import Standard and the General Transitional 
Facility Operational Standard, and develop a draft guideline to accommodate the 
recommendations made by the audit. The audit on MOE’s management of the school 
property portfolio also provides an example of such an impact on the audited entities. 
Implementation of a new Property Management Handbook, a major review of the 
management of school property, and amendment to the existing Asset Management 
Strategy were among the actions taken in response to the recommendations made by 
the audit. It is difficult however, to ascertain how much of this impact can actually be 
directly attributed to the performance audit. As discussed in Chapter 5, some audits 
were coincidental with plans to improve existing systems and processes. In the case of 
the MOE, the 2006 performance audit and Cabinet’s concerns raised in 2007/2008 led 
to an extensive review intended to improve asset and financial management, hence, it 
was not the audit alone that led to the changes made by the MOE in this area.  
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The findings in Chapter 5 on the recommendations disagreed by the auditees are 
similar to the findings in an earlier study by Hatherly and Parker (1988). Hatherly and 
Parker found that there were several reasons for auditees rejecting the audit 
recommendations, with the most cited being “the existing situation is reasonable 
given the circumstances which are outside the control of the auditee” (p.36). For this 
study, the reason most often cited for not adopting the audit recommendation was 
similar to that of Hatherly and Parker’s. Eleven of the total audit recommendations 
considered were not adopted because the auditees believed that the systems and 
processes in place were reasonable given the circumstances that they were in. An 
example of such a response is the response made by FRST to recommendation 1 of 
the audit on the administration of grant programmes. The FRST stated that:  
“The criterion of ‘whether a project is likely to start sooner and complete earlier 
with the scheme’s support’ is effectively a yes/no question that is answered to the 
Foundation’s satisfaction through the approval process (noting that all potential 
grant recipients would answer “yes” anyway). Codifying this yes/no question can 
be done easily but probably won’t add a great deal of value to the GPSRD 
investment process so for these pragmatic reasons we don’t codify it in TechNZ.” 
(FRST, 2006, para. 2.10) 
The second most cited reason for not adopting the audit recommendations was also 
similar to the findings by Hatherly and Parker (1988), whereby the auditees found that 
the recommendations were impractical or difficult to implement. The DOC’s response 
to recommendation 2 of the audit on the management of publicly owned land 
provided an example of such a response. The DOC stated: 
“The Department developed, with Treasury collaboration, a draft strategic plan in 
1998. At that stage work on the strategy was halted because Treasury could no 
longer put resources into the work. The Department subsequently reviewed the 
work. Relevant material was incorporated into the General Policies under the 
National Parks and Conservation Acts that were completed in April 2005, and after 
completing that process the Department concluded that any additional guidance 
would best be provided through other processes, such as business planning and 
broader strategic work. The Department does not, therefore, agree with the 
recommendation of the OAG.” (DOC, 2006a, p.3) 
The study by Hatherly and Parker (1988) found five other reasons given by auditees 
for rejecting the audit recommendations. These included failure by auditors to 
recognise compensation controls, recommendations were contrary to efficiency and 
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effectiveness, and disputed size of potential savings. Nevertheless, the categorisation 
of these reasons relies heavily on the interpretation of the researcher. Therefore, 
whilst the appropriateness of the categorisation may be arguable, new categories can 
be expected to emerge from future studies on the reasons why auditees reject or chose 
not to adopt recommendations made in performance audits.  
 
The low rate of disagreement to the audit recommendations does not imply that 
depending on the rate of the accepted recommendation is the best way to determine 
the impact of performance audit on the audited entity. Caution needs to be taken in 
assessing the impact of performance audit from the acceptance rate of the audit 
recommendations. Not only that the acceptance may not necessarily imply 
implementation of the recommendation, but acceptance rate may also provide a 
misleading representation of the impact of performance audit on the audited entity. In 
the ‘Follow-up Report on Performance Audits in 2007’ published by the OAG, the 
number of accepted recommendations was used as the main measure in following up 
progress since the audits (OAG, 2009a). However as discussed in Chapter 2, 
Hamburger (1989) and Morin (2001) warned against the dependency on the 
acceptance rate of the audit recommendations in determining the success of 
performance audit. Hamburger (1989, p.17) in particular, argued that “a 75% 
acceptance rate might not imply success, for example, if the rejected 
recommendations were the most important”. Morin (2001) echoed this argument by 
asserting that the number of recommendations should also not be the only measure to 
assess the influence or impact that performance audit has on the auditees. In particular 
she asserted that:  
“Auditors General must realize that a mere follow up on the recommendations 
made previously is far from being enough to draw sound conclusions as to the 
success or the failure of auditors’ attempts to influence the management of the 
organisation audited.” (p.110)  
 
Furthermore, although most recommendations were accepted and adopted by the 
auditees in this study, there is a further issue of how much improvement can be 
directly attributed to the audits. All the interviewees in this study believed that whilst 
the recommendations were undoubtedly useful, the issues would have been identified 
even if the audits have not taken place. In addition, some of the recommendations had 
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already been identified by the auditees, but were not yet implemented. The entity in 
Interview 3 for example, was already working on some of the recommendations prior 
to the audit. The recommendations relate to an integrated electronic system, and plans 
to improve the system were underway as part of a larger project, which will take years 
to implement. This means that the entity had already detected weaknesses with the 
current electronic system, and would have made changes even without the audit 
recommendations. Hence although these recommendations may be considered as 
accepted by the entity, it was not just the audit that triggered improvements to the 
electronic system. However, the interviewee in Interview 4 suggested that although 
his entity would have identified issues with their system even without the audit, the 
audit certainly had quickened the pace of improvement within the entity. The 
interviews also suggested that the audit recommendations were not the only 
manifestation of the impact of performance audit, which was supported by the 
analysis done on the data. This is further discussed in the following section.  
 
6.2  Performance Improvement and Performance Accountability   
 
According to Barzelay (1996), performance audit is targeted towards performance 
improvement and performance accountability. He described performance 
improvement as: “…achieving desired changes in efficiency and effectiveness (and 
other dimensions such as performance management capacity” (p.40). Performance 
accountability on the other hand, was described as being concerned with: 
“…establishing and operating a proper relationship between government 
organisations and their principals so that the latter can enforce responsibility for 
performance on their agents” (ibid). He argued that these two goals are not 
synergistic, and hence trade-off may be inevitable for the audit bodies. Barzelay 
further hypothesised that “different audit bodies make different trade-offs”, depending 
on the institutional position of the audit bodies within the government (p.41). Where 
the audit body is part of the government technostructure, he stipulated that auditors 
consider themselves as participants of the management process and therefore are more 
inclined to advance the performance improvement goal. Independent audit bodies on 
the other hand, “feel less responsible for achieving outcome of performance 
improvement” and thus place “more practical importance upon the conceptual 
distinction between the functions of auditing and management” (ibid). If Barzelay’s 
 122
hypothesis is to be taken into consideration therefore, the New Zealand OAG can be 
expected to undertake the latter approach as it is independent of the executive 
government.  
 
Although this study found that the OAG does advance the goal of performance 
improvement, it is however, difficult to determine the extent of emphasis given 
without comparison to the practices of other jurisdictions. There is also difficulty in 
determining what constitutes “performance improvement” when the term is very 
broad in nature. To maintain the relevance of the results to the practice of 
performance audit, this study therefore refers to prior literature of performance audit, 
despite this being very limited. In his study Barzelay (1996) mentioned the 
characteristics of performance within the performance audit framework. He wrote:   
“Clear discussion of the meaning of “performance” requires specifying background 
mental models of governmental functioning. To suggest that behind the concept of 
performance auditing is a single image of governmental functioning risks gross 
oversimplification. In discussions of performance auditing, the most prevalent 
mental model appears to be a process-oriented scheme that downplays the internal 
structure and boundaries of organisations involved in delivering public 
programmes. Specifically, it characterises governmental functioning as a chain of 
production processes (through which inputs are transformed into outputs) and 
causal relationships (through which outputs exerts influence over outcomes).  In 
terms of this abstract picture, economy means eliminating waste of inputs, 
efficiency means achieving an optimal process for transforming inputs to outputs, 
and effectiveness means achieving or improving outcomes through the delivery of 
the outputs (Gray,1993).” (Barzelay, 1996, p.20) 
 
How do we identify performance improvement? Sloan (1996, p.147) suggested that: 
“For those seeking performance improvement, the tracking of auditee performance 
improvement and changes in management practices represents the obvious way 
forward. In both cases some cooperation from the auditee is needed if the results 
are to be seen as credible. Recent improvements in agency performance reporting 
may make it easier to monitor performance trends, but such information will rarely 
be able to isolate the impact of performance audit from other performance 
improvement factors. So some auditee corroboration or interpretation of impact 
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numbers is needed. Similarly the motivation behind changes to management 
practices must be explored.” 
Therefore, in assessing the impact of performance audit on performance 
improvement, much of the information should come from the auditees rather than the 
OAG. For this study, the information from auditees came in the form of official 
documents and interviews, which provided insights on how performance audit has 
impacted the audited entities, including the impact on performance improvement.  
 
To some extent, this study is able to gauge from the auditee’s responses and 
interviews whether performance improvement resulted from the audits. As far as the 
response to the recommendations goes, there is evidence that performance audit 
resulted in changes to management practices which consequently brought about 
performance improvement to the audited entity. The analysis into the audit 
recommendations reveals that 51 of the 66 recommendations were accepted, and 21 
recommendations were fully implemented. Where there is evidence that the 
recommendation was indeed implemented, there was an indication that performance 
audit brought changes to management practices. For example, the development and 
revision of a new strategy provided better direction and integration to the staff of the 
HNZC and MOE. In response to recommendation 3 of the audit on the effectiveness 
of programmes to buy and lease properties for state housing, the HNZC responded 
that the recommendation was accepted and implemented, and that a strategy was 
developed and made operational through an amendment to the existing Asset 
Management Strategy (HNZC, 2006). In addition, a Quality Management System 
process was developed and operational at the time of reporting (ibid). The attainment 
of performance improvement through performance audit was also confirmed by the 
interviewees. The interviewee in Interview 4 for example said that the performance 
audit on his entity fostered performance improvement through fine-tuning of the 
general management disciplines. In particular, the audit recommendations emphasised 
planning, people management and managing operational systems, which helped the 
entity in making better decisions and channelling shared goals to the staff. However, 
as Sloan pointed out above, it is difficult to isolate the improvement that can be 
directly attributed to the performance audit. In addition, such impacts are difficult to 
quantify because the information from the responses and interviews vary greatly in 
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terms of specifications. A survey or questionnaire to the auditees may be able to 
provide more dependable information if it is to be codified and quantified.  
 
Additionally, there are three elements suggested by Danon (1996) which may indicate 
the attainment of performance improvement by performance audit. These are:  
§ “An explicit determination or willingness of public service managers to take an 
audit’s conclusions into account. An audit is a factor for improving 
performance only to the extent that it is either desired or accepted by the people 
running the department being audited. Otherwise, an audit’s conclusions will 
merely gather dust. 
§ A delicate balance between highlighting the failures of the department being 
audited and pointing to ways to improve. Audits can spur progress and help 
enhance performance if they produce balanced conclusions. An audit that 
simply elaborates negative findings may met with wholesale rejection, while an 
auditor who is able to bring out strengths and areas of potential progress can 
give the audit organisation a basis on which to move forward. 
§ A stable political and institutional environment as it takes time to modernise 
public service and improve their performance.” (p.173) 
Based on the reviews and analysis, all three elements were present in the sample 
of performance audits used in this study. Firstly, the four interviews with the 
auditees provided evidence of the attitude of auditees towards performance audit. 
In general, the auditees welcomed performance audit and considered the 
recommendations reflected what was best for their entities and its stakeholders. 
The auditees were found to be cooperative and willing to consider and accept 
recommendations which they deemed useful and would add value to their entities. 
Secondly, the audit recommendations specified in Chapter 5 reflected that the 
OAG approached performance audit through highlighting ways to improve, 
instead of adopting a fault-finding approach. As Danon (1996) suggested, 
focussing on negative findings may lead to an adverse impact as auditees may be 
defensive towards such findings, which consequently may hinder improvement. 
Thirdly, the historical review in Chapter 3 depicts that in 2006, the political and 
institutional environment surrounding performance audit was relatively stable, 
particularly with the increment in funding for OAG activities including 
performance audit, and Brady’s approach to performance audit which 
strengthened and developed the practice in the country. These instances provide 
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further evidence that performance audit indeed impacted the entities through 
improvements in performance. 
 
Whilst there is evidence supporting the impact on performance improvement 
particularly from the official documents, the interviews provided evidence that the 
auditees generally felt that performance audit has greater impact on performance 
accountability. The importance of accountability has also often been cited in prior 
literature on performance audit. Glynn (1996) for example, provided a description of 
what constitutes accountability: 
“Are there principles of accountability to help determine the role of external audit? 
This is a difficult question. Traditionally, public administrators and political 
scientists have related accountability to the separation of power from responsibility. 
In the public sector the term ‘acting in the public interest’ is often used when 
considering the question of responsibility for what and to whom. It is a phrase that 
underlines nearly all discussions on public policy, political action, social value and 
individual interest yet there is no agreement as to what the term 
means…Accountability therefore requires a clear definition of the objectives of a 
policy or programme and the development, as far as is practicable of measures of 
output, outcome and impact” (p.127) 
In addition, Roth (1996) also states that:  
“In the government environment, accountability is an important concept. 
Politicians are accountable to the citizens for the conduct of public affairs. The 
government is accountable to Parliament for the results it achieves with the 
resources entrusted to it. And public servants are accountable to the government for 
the results they achieve in the way in which they achieve them. In the past the 
emphasis has been on holding people to account for the processes used. In the 
current environment the emphasis is shifting to results. In other words, we need to 
think of accountability in terms of a demonstration of results achieved.” (p.256) 
 
The description put forth by Roth (1996) and Barzelay (1996) on accountability 
therefore, suggested that accountability focuses on the relationships and responsibility 
lines within the public sector. To some extent, this focus was demonstrated in the 
audit recommendations where the recommendations emphasised the relationship and 
responsibility of the auditee to the stakeholders. Recommendations 4 and 5 in the 
audit on the effectiveness of programmes to buy and lease properties for state housing 
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(HNZC) for example, were directed at reporting by the HNZC to the Minister of 
Housing and Minister of Finance on regions of high risk (Auckland regions) and 
regions of high needs. The impact of performance audit on performance 
accountability however, was more apparent in the interviews carried out. In particular, 
interviewees in Interview 1, 2 and 3 succinctly communicated that they viewed 
performance audit as having a greater role of performance accountability in 
comparison to performance improvement. Generally, the auditees found that 
performance audit left limited impact in terms of how they manage their businesses, 
particularly since most audits only covered specific aspects of the businesses. In 
addition, some recommendations may not be adopted, depending on the 
considerations of the entities and their managers on the merits of the 
recommendations. For instance an interviewee in Interview 2 said that:  
“I don’t think it (the audit) had a big influence on processes…internally we’ve 
reviewed the processes as well and I mean from delivery, internal-control 
perspective, aren’t too bad. I mean they are pretty vanilla products…it’s a pretty 
simple process. When you go to the recommendations, nothing came as a surprise 
and I can’t recall anything sticking out that has made a huge difference to the way 
the entity currently carries out its business today.”  
Of the role played by performance audit viewed from the perspective of the entities, 
an interviewee from Interview 1 thought that: 
“It is an essential part of running any business to actually get feedback from 
external people now and again on how you’re running your systems. So I don’t 
have a problem with that and the performance audit whilst somewhat different from 
the normal audit routine that we have at year end for example, it’s still a valid 
approach in terms of checking every now and again those things which are 
reasonably large components of our business.”  
This was supported by the interviewee in Interview 3 who viewed performance audit 
as being paramount for assurance and accountability reasons:  
“…they (the auditors) are not just doing the audit for the audit’s sake, there has to 
be some reason for it, and there was a reason for this and the results were important 
to us.”  
Based on the interviews therefore, it was found that auditees generally viewed 
performance audit as having a greater role in providing assurance for accountability 
reasons to their entity, in comparison to performance improvement.  
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6.3 Additional Insights into Performance Audit 
 
In addition to the impact of performance audit found as a result of the findings and 
analysis, this study also gained additional insights with regard to performance audit 
practice. In particular, this study captures a snapshot of performance audit practice in 
New Zealand in the early twenty first century. Although it is true that these findings 
cannot be generalised to other contexts due to sampling and the theoretical 
perspective taken, they do offer a deeper understanding of the current practice of 
performance audit in the country, as well as fresh insights that are different from that 
offered by prior literature. Such information is especially useful and valuable given 
the constructionist nature of performance audit. In particular, the historical review on 
performance audit in New Zealand revealed that the practice of performance audit is 
very much the product of prevailing concerns in the public sector, the government in 
office and their policies, the individual lead of the AGs, as well as the mandate that 
grants statutory authority to carry out the audits. The insights offered by this study 
therefore, are confined to the context of this study. In particular, the performance 
audit practice presented in this chapter reflects performance audits carried out under 
the auspices of the Public Audit Act 2001, with the OAG under the lead of Kevin 
Brady. The political and economic environment that enclosed the practice was 
characterised by a restructured government led by the Labour party. There are several 
fundamental aspects of performance audit found, which essentially captured the 
practice of performance audit in New Zealand.  
 
 6.3.1 Stakeholders of Performance Audit  
 
Among the most striking insights gained by this study is the lack of attention 
given by the stakeholders of performance audit to the results of performance 
audit. This is ironic considering that these stakeholders are the most important 
audience because performance audit existed to serve as an assurance tool to 
these stakeholders. Figure 8 shows the performance audit participants 
framework, which includes the stakeholders; namely the Parliament 
(representing the public), the public and other stakeholders like the 
community, non-governmental organisations, political parties and oversight 
boards. Other stakeholders also involve people that interact directly with 
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auditees’ daily businesses, who were occasionally interviewed by the auditors, 
like contracting agents and business clients. Arrows in the figure represent 
interaction between the performance audit participants, with the solid arrows 
representing recurrent interaction between the participants found in the data of 
this study. The dashed arrows represent the interaction that was expected 
between the stakeholders, but evidence of such interaction was not found by 
this study. For example the solid arrow from the OAG towards the Parliament 
represents the OAG reporting to Parliament through tabling of the 
performance audit reports in Parliament, whilst the dashed arrow from the 
Parliament to the OAG represents the expected consideration by parliamentary 
members, which evidence was not found by this study.  
 
Figure 8 
Stakeholders of Performance Audit  
 
 
There was no evidence found to demonstrate a response from Parliament to 
the tabling of the seven performance audit reports. As part of the data 
gathering process, I talked to a Parliamentary Librarian to identify any Select 
Committee consideration of the audits in the sample. I was told that the New 
Zealand Parliament produces three types of publication to the public which 
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are: the Hansard (parliamentary debates), Journal of the House of 
Representatives and Gazette (official parliamentary newspaper). Additionally, 
there are also three types of documents produced in regards to the Select 
Committees which are: evidence/submissions, advice, and select committee 
reports (The Parliament, 2010). My search into the Select Committee 
documents did not find any evidence of Select Committee consideration of the 
seven audits in the sample. The Select Committees to which the seven audits 
were presented are detailed in Appendix 2.  
 
This finding is consistent with the findings of the Open Budget Questionnaire 
report (International Budget Partnership, 2007) on the lack of scrutiny given 
by Parliament to performance audit reports. The Open Budget Questionnaire 
reported that:  
“The Auditor General also regularly presents various reports to the House, 
for example, general purpose reports that comment on a number of matters 
that warrant Parliament’s attention, and special purpose reports that contain 
the results of performance audit and inquiries. There is no obligation for FEC 
(Finance and Expenditure Committee) or Select Committees to examine 
these reports. On a number of occasions a Select Committee will request a 
briefing from the Controller and Auditor General on such a report, but this 
rarely leads to a Select Committee report to Parliament.” (p.93)  
The lack of scrutiny resulted from the absence of a formal mechanism for the 
Parliament to consider the OAG reports, despite the OAG’s effort in 
“marketing” its reports to key stakeholders (OAG, 2000, p.12). In 2000, a 
subcommittee was formed by the Finance and Expenditure Committee (FEC) 
to consider reports by the OAG or to refer them to the relevant Select 
Committee (ibid). This subcommittee however, was not re-established by the 
FEC after the election in 2002 (OAG, 2003, p.74).  
 
There are several potential means to enhance parliamentary scrutiny over 
OAG reports. For example, absence of a formal mechanism for Parliament to 
consider the OAG reports led the National Integrity Systems report to 
recommend New Zealand to consider an operation currently in place in 
Australia (Henderson, Cave and Petrie, 2003, p.21). The report recommended 
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that departments be required to report to Parliament every three months “on 
the status of actions to remedy deficiencies identified by the Auditor General, 
until the deficiency has been put right or it is otherwise agreed that the matter 
is closed” (ibid). In addition, New Zealand could also consider a system in 
Denmark whereby:  
“Performance audit reports are first addressed to the audited organisation. If 
the results of the performance audit are material or of public interest the 
Auditor General also reports to the Public Accounts Committee. After the 
Committee has given its opinion the published report is forwarded to the 
Parliament and the responsible minister who has four months to prepare a 
response on what steps have been taken to improve the situation. The Auditor 
General then evaluates whether the answer is satisfactory before the Public 
Accounts Committee publishes its final report on the state accounts which is 
subsequently approved by the Parliament. This process is important in 
creating interest at the political level in the results of performance audit.” 
(OECD, 1996, p.83) 
 
6.3.2 Justification for the Audits  
 
The public sector is different from the private sector in that the range of 
stakeholders (i.e. taxpayers and citizens) is broader. Hence value for money is 
a crucial mantra in the public sector, and to achieve this several mechanisms 
are put in place, including performance audit. The audits in the sample were 
all driven by an underlying impetus, in most cases the significance of the 
subject audited, like the amount of public money involved/ managed by the 
public entity. As an example, the audit on the MOE was driven by the 
significant property portfolio under the management of the Ministry, which 
included “land, buildings (such as classrooms and gymnasiums), facilities 
(such as playgrounds), and infrastructure (such as boilers and drains)” (OAG, 
2006e, p.5). As of 2006, the portfolio amounted to a capital value of $7,000 
million, and in 2004/05, approximately $250 million was allocated for 
upgrading buildings and $62 million for maintenance (ibid).  In some cases, 
the OAG carries out a series of audits in a particular area, for example the 
audit on FRST was part of “a series of annual performance audits of grant 
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programmes managed by public entities” (OAG, 2006b, p.2). The AG 
explained that this particular series was targeted “to provide assurance to 
Parliament that grant programmes are well administered, with public funding 
allocated as intended by the Government” (ibid).  
 
In carrying out performance audits, the AG and his office ensured that the 
reasons for the audit were justified and communicated to the auditees, as well 
as the stakeholders. According to the interviewees, the reasons for the audits 
were usually communicated to them through an initial meeting between the 
auditors and auditees, which included a briefing from the auditors and 
reaching agreement on terms of reference between the two parties. For other 
stakeholders, the performance audit reports provided a vital platform for 
communicating the reasons for the audit, as well as for transparency in the 
audit processes and findings.   
 
6.3.3 Performance Audit Methodologies 
  
There is a common approach to the audits in the sample, in that the auditors 
have adopted consistent audit methodologies across the sample. It is 
interesting to note that the observation at client sites and systems-testing 
demonstrates the spirit of the grounded theory methodology. Generally, 
interviewees agree that the methodology adopted assisted the auditors in 
gaining sufficient understanding of the entities, although this may be limited in 
some areas due to the complex nature of the businesses of the public entities. 
The auditees were also comfortable with the idea of having an audit of their 
systems and processes, and generally had a welcoming attitude to such audits, 
as well as the audit approach. This attitude was contrary to the prevailing 
attitude towards performance audit found by the literature review in Chapter 3. 
During the early years of performance audit, public entities were not only 
reluctant to develop departmental objectives and performance indicators, but 
were also reluctant to accept advice from the OAG (Skene, 1985). The 
prevailing attitude at that time considered performance audit as irrelevant to 
their day to day operations, and there was no need for improvement in service 
performance and delivery (ibid). However, interviews with the auditees 
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provided evidence that the general attitude towards performance audit has 
changed. In particular, the interviewees perceived performance audits as no 
different from other types of external reviews, and generally welcome such 
reviews, which in their view are undertaken for the benefit of the entity, and 
ultimately the public.  
 
Overall the auditees viewed the audit methodology as efficient, thorough and 
non-intrusive. They considered the auditors did what was necessary to better 
understand the business of the auditees, in order for them to study the findings 
and recommendations. Nonetheless, some auditees considered the auditors as 
not having a full understanding of their business. For example, the interviewee 
in Interview 4 thought that the audit on his entity would have been more useful 
if the auditors had had a better understanding of the technicalities and New 
Zealand practices. Despite this, generally the interviewees thought it was 
understandable given the level of expertise needed to understand the 
technicalities involved in some areas of their business, as well as the extent of 
legislation governing their entity, some of which was not part of the audit 
scope. Hence, although it could be expected that the resulting 
recommendations would be practical, this may not always be the case. 
According to the interviewees, some recommendations are not practical if 
wider contextual factors are taken into account, or other constraints outside the 
scope of the audit are taken into consideration.  
 
 6.3.4 Performance Audit Process 
 
The OAG demonstrates a robust and transparent performance audit process. 
The high quality of work done by the OAG is not only apparent in 
performance audit reports, but is also confirmed by all the interviewees of this 
study. For example, one of the interviewees in Interview 2 recalled that in the 
initial stages of the audit of his entity, the auditors interacted with a number of 
the staff to gain sufficient understanding of the environment surrounding the 
entity and the rationale behind the processes involved. Hence the whole audit 
was deemed to have gone well with proficient auditors. This process also 
emphasised the rapport and relationship built by the OAG with the auditees.  
 133
 
As a matter of normal practice, after the completion of an audit, auditees are 
given the chance to comment on the draft report of the audit. In particular, 
auditees are given the chance to comment on the accuracy, balance and 
presentation of the reports. Comments sought include whether facts have been 
correctly stated, any material facts have been omitted or if there are any unfair 
inferences conveyed. Furthermore, the auditees are also asked if the draft is 
relevant, reasonable and practical. From the official documents gathered in the 
sample, this process proved to be valuable to this study as it reflected the 
relationship that the auditors and auditees shared. The professional 
relationship was especially highlighted in areas where auditees disagree with 
the audit findings, where both parties negotiated a way to conclude the 
disagreement to be presented in the performance audit report.  
 
Following the comments, the AG will clear the final report after a final 
production edit has been undertaken. The final report will then be tabled in 
Parliament, and up until this point the document is confidential. The contents 
will not be publicly disclosed until the tabling of the report in Parliament. For 
all the seven performance audits in the sample, no further considerations by 
the stakeholders were found by the study. The interviewees also confirmed 
that there was no further response received from external stakeholders after 
the tabling of the report in Parliament.  
 
This process may potentially affect the extent of impact of performance audit 
on the audited entities. In particular, Shand and Anand (1996, p.70) suggested 
that:  
“In some jurisdictions auditors place considerable importance on getting 
agreement from auditees to the audit findings before reporting. Although 
auditors maintain that audit findings are not “negotiable”, audit conclusions 
may be modified as part of this interactive process. While this may in some 
cases reduce audit impact it may be more likely to result in changes being 
implemented.”  
This approach is in contrast with the fault-finding approach in which 
recommendations may not be implemented if auditees become defensive over 
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negative findings. A fault-finding approach may consequently hinder any 
improvement that could have been resulted from performance audit. Danon 
(1996, p.173) for example pointed out that:  
“Audits can spur progress and help enhance performance if they produce 
balanced conclusions. An audit that simply elaborates negative findings may 
meet with wholesale rejection, while an auditor who is able to bring out 
strengths and areas of potential progress can give the audit organisation a 
basis on which to move forward.”  
   
6.3.5 Rapport  
 
The auditors maintain good rapport with the auditees throughout the whole 
audit process. Before an audit commences, terms of reference are agreed 
between the OAG and the auditee. Here the process of negotiation takes place 
if both parties disagree on the area and scope of the audit to be carried out. For 
example, one of the interviewees from Interview 1 pointed out that there were 
some areas that the OAG wanted to look at, but the entity thought would not 
necessarily add significant value in terms of any result. This process of 
negotiation can be viewed in two ways. It could be interpreted as a process of 
exerting influence on the public entities through performance audit, and it also 
can viewed as a process of building trust and rapport by the OAG. Based on 
the reputation that the OAG held, which was also confirmed by the 
interviewees, I am convinced that it is the latter.  
 
In terms of the final report, there may remain some differences between the 
views held by the auditee and the OAG. The OAG is not obliged to reach an 
agreement with the auditee as it must maintain its independence. According to 
interviewees from Interview 1, these differences are usually the result of the 
different perspectives taken by both parties. The interviewees considered the 
legislative perspective taken by the auditors did not always align with the 
operational point of view taken by the management, hence the remaining 
differences in views. Interestingly most of the interviewees do not read the 
final published reports, hence were not sure of the differences remaining in 
views held by both parties. However, overall, the interviewees agreed that the 
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audits were done in a professional manner. The process of building rapport 
starts when the terms of reference are discussed and this is built up throughout 
the whole audit process, right through to the published report, to develop a 
professional, business-like relationship.  
 
However, the literature suggested that there are risks to this professional 
relationship, and also ways to enhance the relationship. Barzelay (1996, p.45) 
for example noted that:  
“To pursue the goal of performance improvement…requires a more intimate 
relation between auditors and managers than characterises by the historical 
pattern…If performance auditing is to advance its goals, role relationships 
between audit and management will have to undergo some adjustment. As 
part of this adjustment, the traditional role boundaries will likely blur in some 
spots where they had been clear.”  
A blurred line in the role relationships may provide greater risk to 
independence. On the one hand there is a need for a balance between a 
cooperative relationship and the perception of audit independence (p.46), 
however on the other hand the independence may cause executives and 
professionals to feel less responsible to achieve outcomes as the 
recommendations may hinder creativity and flexibility (Roth, 1996, p.258). In 
addition, there is also a risk of a mimicry, which stems from the ‘implicit 
feedback theory’. When auditees mimicry, it means that the recommendations 
are implemented for the sake of appearance, instead of for the interest of their 
organisations. Leeuw (1996, p.111) explained that the feedback theory flows 
according to the list below: 
§ “feedback from the auditor to the auditee is needed when it is shown that 
the standards or goals are not (or inefficiently) reached  
§ the auditee will listen to the feedback 
§ he subsequently will take follow-up actions 
§ which will lead to the realisation of the formal goals; while  
§ this will not lead to unintended and undesired side effects”  
He further wrote that “the theory assumes that the auditee refrains from 
strategic actions (merely to make performance look good), elicited by the fact 
that he is familiar with the standards or measurements auditors apply or with 
the methodology used” (ibid). Leeuw suggested that the risk of “mimicrying” 
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also applies to the auditors where procedures, rules and standards which will 
stimulate a response behaviour that may not necessarily result in performance 
improvement. He then suggested “a more open dialogue focused on less 
procedures, rules and standards” to ensure that performance audit does indeed 
result in performance improvement (ibid).  
 
6.3.6 Auditor’s Expertise   
 
Traditionally auditors have an accounting background to fit the technical 
demands of financial audits. With performance audit however, the skills 
involved are different from conventional financial or compliance audit, thus 
having an accounting background is not necessarily a requirement. 
Furthermore, the issues audited vary widely in terms of the expertise required. 
Hence it was not surprising to find that in the early years of performance audit, 
auditors faced challenges in this area. Green and Singleton (2009, p.117) 
wrote that:  
 “Some of the audited entities, as well as some members of the Audit Office, 
questioned whether auditors, trained in accountancy, were qualified to judge 
the effectiveness of many of their activities... External consultants were often 
hired to help with value for money and special audits, compensating the 
dearth of non-accountancy expertise in the Office. It was more economical to 
employ consultants temporarily than to appoint in-house computer scientists, 
engineers, medical experts or economists, especially in a small country 
where human capital was scarce.” 
 
 The findings of this study suggested that not only the attitude towards 
auditors’ expertise is changing, but also performance auditor’s background 
is currently multidisciplinary. In terms of expertise, the interviewees 
generally had high regard for the auditors’ expertise and set reasonable 
expectations for the technical expertise and industry know-how 
demonstrated by the auditors. One of the interviewees in Interview 2 for 
example, thought that the auditors were proficient, smart, experienced and 
professional. Another interviewee from Interview 1 on the other hand 
suggested that: “…auditors by their nature are never going to know 
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enough about any business because it’s about taking a sample approach. 
So by definition, the expertise is going to be with the organisation that’s 
actually being looked at rather than from the auditor’s perspective”. 
However, the interviewee in interview 4 thought that feedback from the 
auditors would have been more useful to the entity if the auditors brought 
in external expertise to provide support over technical areas of the audit. 
In terms of the multidisciplinary background of the auditors, the 
interviewee in Interview 3 commented: “I was surprised actually because 
the two auditors weren’t accountants. They had degrees in other 
disciplines.” The interviewee thought that was ideal for a performance 
audit team, and supported the view that the performance auditors were 
proficient in their work. He also added: “they probably had better 
knowledge of what the (entity) did after they did the review than prior to 
it”.  
 
Therefore, based on the findings and analysis, there are several valuable insights 
gained with regard to the practice of performance audit. In particular, this study 
highlights the issues with the lack of attention on the results of performance audit 
given by the stakeholders, justification made by the AG for the audits, and the 
performance audit methodologies and processes adopted by the OAG. In addition, this 
study also discusses rapport between the auditees and auditors, and also the auditors’ 
expertise.  
 
Chapter Conclusion  
 
This chapter looks at the impact of performance audit on the audited entity as the 
manifestation of the audit recommendations, as well as the attainment of goals of 
performance audit. It was found that 52 of the 66 audit recommendations considered 
in this study were accepted. A majority of the accepted recommendations were either 
implemented, or triggered a review on the current systems and processes. It appears 
that to this extent the audit recommendations impacted the internal systems and 
processes of the audited entities, which included new strategies, documentation and 
database systems. The remaining 14 recommendations were not accepted and not 
adopted on the basis that there was already a reasonable system in place given the 
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circumstances faced by the entities or that the recommendations were difficult to 
implement in practice. The reasons for accepting and adopting the audit 
recommendations therefore, appeared to be based on the assessment of practicality 
and the value that the recommendations would bring to the entity. However, the 
analysis into the rate of acceptance of the audit recommendations may not provide the 
full story, as cautioned by Hamburger (1989) and Morin (2001). This was proven to 
be a valid argument when a deeper assessment into the impact of performance audit 
revealed that there were other impacts that may not be apparent through the 
acceptance rate of the audit recommendations. In particular, it was found that auditees 
were also impacted through the role of performance audit with performance 
accountability and performance improvement. 
 
Based on the interviews with the auditees, this study found that the entities generally 
experience both performance improvement and performance accountability as a result 
of performance audit. According to Sloan (1996), among the ways to detect 
performance improvement is to bring the changes in management practices, which 
can be found particularly when the audit recommendations were accepted and 
adopted. The interviewee of Interview 4 confirmed that his entity experienced 
performance improvement where the audit recommendations were accepted. In 
particular, the audit has helped his entity with the general management discipline and 
general systems, which made some aspects of their business more efficient and hence 
promoted improvement in performance. However, interviewees in the other 
interviews did not share this view as the audits on their entities left very limited 
impact in the way that they carry out their businesses. The interviewees stressed rather 
that, there was greater impact on performance accountability. Performance audit 
literature describes performance accountability as having a focus on the relationships 
and responsibility lines within the public sector. The impact of performance 
accountability in this sense was the feedback and assurance that performance audit 
provided to the entities as well as the stakeholders. In particular, the auditees 
considered that performance audit provided very limited help in terms of performance 
improvement in their entities, but is still a necessary tool within the performance 
accountability framework of the public sector. The results of performance audits 
therefore, left greater impact on the entities in terms of performance accountability 
compared to performance improvement.  
 139
Earlier studies on the impact of performance audit found that performance audit left 
no significant impact on the auditees, or was not very successful in influencing the 
auditees (Hatherly and Parker, 1988; Shand and Anand, 1996; Morin, 2001). This 
study on the other hand found that the accepted recommendations do have an impact 
on the managerial practices of the entities, although the extent of this impact warrants 
further study. However, according to the majority of the auditees interviewed, the 
impact that performance audit has on performance improvement is less significant 
than the impact on performance accountability. Hence whilst the rate of accepted 
audit recommendations appeared to be high, the auditees generally perceived 
performance audit as having a greater role for performance accountability, rather than 
significantly facilitating performance improvement in their entities.  
 
In addition to answering the research question, this chapter also discusses insights 
gained from the findings and analysis on the practice of performance audit. In 
particular, this study highlighted the lack of attention given by the stakeholders of 
performance audit to the results of the audits. This issue mainly results from the 
absence of a formal mechanism for the stakeholders to consider the OAG reports, and 
it has been suggested that a similar system to that of Australia or Denmark be 
considered to address this issue. Additional insights were also gained on how the 
OAG carried out the audits in practice, particularly in terms of justification to carry 
out the audits, and also the methodologies and processes adopted in carrying out the 
audits. There were also insights into the rapport and professional relationship shared 
by the auditees and auditors, as well as a discussion on the subject of auditors’ 
expertise. These insights are valuable not only because of the constructionist nature of 
performance audit, but also because they are different from insights offered by prior 
literature.  
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Chapter Seven – Conclusion 
Chapter seven concludes this research. It reviews briefly the main findings of this 
research. The chapter also discusses the limitations of the study and opportunities for 
future research on performance audit.  
 
“Improved performance and enhanced accountability in government are 
possible. Indeed, they are essential.” Roth, 1996, p. 257 
 
Chapter Introduction  
 
Performance auditing emerged amidst accountability concerns in the public sector, 
and was introduced to respond to rising public demands that followed such concerns. 
Initially, the introduction did not fare favourably with politicians, other government 
control agencies, and the audited entities. New Zealand has even seen some serious 
efforts to halt the AG from further developing performance audit. Nevertheless, 
performance audit continued to strengthen its presence due to its vital role in 
providing assurance to the public sector in matters pertaining to economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness. For nearly half a century performance audit has evolved in New 
Zealand, yet there exists a wide gap between the knowledge in the philosophy and 
practice of performance audit. This study therefore, seeks to improve the knowledge 
on performance audit practice by studying the impact of performance audit on seven 
entities audited in 2006.  
 
7.1  Findings  
 
Applying a methodology adapted from grounded theory, this study found that 
performance audit impacted the seven audited entities through the manifestation of 
the adopted audit recommendations and the attainment of performance audit goals. 
Overall, most of the audit recommendations were accepted and implemented by the 
audited entities, and the implementation generally left an impact on the internal 
systems and processes of the audited entities. Such impact included changes on the 
internal management systems, database systems, and triggered reviews of relevant 
standards and guidelines. The changes brought about by the implementation of audit 
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recommendations were translated into performance improvement, whereby the 
auditees experience changes particularly in the area of management practices, as 
confirmed by interviewee in interview 4. Nevertheless, other interviewees of this 
study suggested that based on their experience, performance audit provided greater 
help to performance accountability in comparison to performance improvement. 
Whilst they viewed performance audit recommendations as being useful, they did not 
think performance audit left a huge impact on their performance. Rather, the auditees 
thought that performance audit plays a more significant role in providing assurance 
and feedback to auditees, and most importantly, to the stakeholders. In particular, the 
interviewees viewed the audits as a review on their performance, which consequently 
provided assurance to the public and Parliament. Hence, in their view, performance 
audit has a greater impact on performance accountability as it played a greater role 
over the accountability arrangements of their entities.  
 
Studying the impact of performance audit also provided additional insights into 
practice. Firstly, despite the important role that performance audit plays in the 
accountability and performance framework in the public sector, this study found that 
stakeholders are not giving the audits the attention they warrant. It has been suggested 
that New Zealand considers a formal mechanism for parliamentary members to 
consider reports by the AG including performance audit reports, similar to the 
systems currently in place in Australia and Denmark (Henderson et al, 2003; OECD, 
1996). Secondly, this study offered insights into the justification provided by the AGs 
for the audits. All the audits in the sample were driven by an underlying impetus, 
which were found to be well communicated to both the auditees and other 
stakeholders. Thirdly, the rapport documented in the official documents and 
interviews highlighted the professional relationship shared by the auditees and the 
auditors. Professionalism was carried out throughout the audit process, including in 
dealing with disagreements and differences between the auditees and the auditors. The 
fourth insight gained concerns the expertise demonstrated by the auditors. 
Performance auditors generally have multidisciplinary background, and their 
expertise was widely accepted among the auditees. However, where beneficial, it is 
worth considering bringing in external expertise to provide more insightful feedback 
to the auditees, hence enhancing the impact of performance audit on the auditees. 
Additionally, this study also documented the general performance audit process and 
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methodology adopted by the OAG. The OAG demonstrated consistency in the process 
and methodology of performance audit, which the auditees found satisfactory. 
Overall, these insights offered greater understanding of the practice of performance 
audit in New Zealand.  
 
7.2 Future Research and Practice   
 
There are substantial opportunities for future research on performance audit. Given 
the nature of performance audit presented in this study, there is much to be learnt 
regarding performance audit as a social construct of a particular context. Performance 
audit practice in other countries for example, provides a fruitful and substantial area 
for research. Comparative studies can also be undertaken to study the differences of 
performance audit and its practice across different jurisdictions. In addition, the 
application of grounded theory could be extended to theory building by undertaking 
research grounded in practice. This could be done for example, with the researcher 
studying performance audit practice by being at the sites of the research subjects for 
deeper understanding in this area. It is important that academics realise these 
opportunities to narrow the knowledge gap that currently exist between practice and 
the literature. The findings of this study offer a platform for such opportunities to be 
explored and discovered in the near future.  
 
There are also opportunities for the stakeholders of performance audit to make the 
best use of the activity. This is an area worth exploring, considering the amount of 
public resources spent on such audits. This study found that performance audit plays a 
role in performance improvement of the audited entities, and plays even a greater role 
for performance accountability of these entities. Hence there is a good reason for the 
stakeholders, particularly the Select Committees to give greater consideration to 
performance audit in terms of the findings, recommendations and actions taken by the 
auditees. As for the OAG, it is important that it maintains the balance between its 
relationship with the auditees and its independence. For example, it is worth 
considering bringing in external expertise for audits involving complex issues to assist 
the auditors in understanding the technicalities and providing more useful feedback. 
These suggested considerations have the potential to enhance the impact that 
performance audit has on the audited entities.  
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7.3 Limitations of Study 
 
This study however, is subject to several limitations. Firstly, this study is interpretive 
in nature, hence the findings and results presented were largely drawn from my 
interpretations. I based my interpretations on the data available, and made the data as 
transparent as possible in this thesis for the interpretations to be credible. However, 
another researcher with a different background analysing similar data may have 
different interpretations of the data. The second limitation is that this study is limited 
to the context that it is in, and the results are limited to the sample used. In addition, it 
was also confined within a relatively short time period. A longer time frame may 
allow more data to be gathered therefore enhancing the knowledge that could be 
gained.  
 
Chapter Conclusion: Contributions of Study  
 
This study has provided valuable insights not offered by prior literature. From the 
sample of the seven performance audits, this study provided evidence that generally 
there is a high level of acceptance of performance audit recommendations. Where the 
audit recommendations were not adopted, the auditees quoted that there was either 
already reasonable systems or processes in place, or that the audit recommendations 
were not practical to be implemented. The responses by the auditees to the 
recommendations also suggested that the recommendations were implemented, or not 
implemented, based on the assessment of practicality in the interest of the entity as 
well as the stakeholders. Additionally, this study also found that in general the 
auditees viewed performance audit as having greater impact on the accountability 
arrangements, rather than leaving significant impact on performance.  Performance 
audit therefore, plays a vital role in the accountability framework of the public sector, 
as intended by the early advocators of performance audit. Based on these findings, 
this study has contributed to the current literature on performance audit by providing 
better understanding of performance audit practice in New Zealand.  
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APPENDICES  
 
Appendix 1 
 
Performance Audits Carried Out in 2006 
No Performance Audit 
1 The Treasury: Capability to recognise and respond to issues for Maori  
2 Progress with priorities for health information management and information 
technology 
3 Management of heritage collections in local museums and art galleries 
4 Management of the West Coast Economic Development Funding Package 
5 Foundation for Research, Science and Technology: Administration of grant 
programmes 
6 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry: Managing bio-security risks associated 
with high-risk sea containers 
7 Department of Conservation: Planning for and managing publicly owned land 
8 Local authority codes of conduct  
9 Housing NZ Corporation: Effectiveness of programmes to buy and lease 
properties for state housing 
10 Ministry of Education: Management of the school property portfolio 
11 Inland Revenue Department: Performance of taxpayer audit – follow up audit 
12 Allocation of the 2002-05 Health Funding Package 
13 Residential rates postponement 
14 Ministry of Social Development: Performance of the contract centre for Work 
and Income 
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Appendix 2  
 
Performance Audit Reports and Relevant Select Committees 
No Performance Audit Select Committee 
1 The Treasury: Capability to recognise and respond 
to issues for Maori 
Maori Affairs 
2 Department of Conservation: Planning for and 
managing publicly owned land 
Local Government 
and Environment 
3 Foundation for Research, Science and 
Technology: Administration of grant programmes 
Education and 
Science 
4 Ministry of Education: Management of the school 
property portfolio 
Education and 
Science 
5 Housing NZ Corporation: Effectiveness of 
programmes to buy and lease properties for state 
housing 
Social Services 
6 Ministry of Social Development: Performance of 
the contract centre for Work and Income 
Social Services 
7 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry: Managing 
biosecurity risks associated with high-risk sea 
containers 
Primary 
Production  
 
 
